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Abstract
The evolution of the internet, digital design tools, and more importantly, increasing
access to global markets and workforce, has increased the interest of firms in offshoring
their engineering and product development activities. However, there exist challenges
in coordinating and collaborating across time zones, cultures, geographical locations,
and organizations. These challenges are magnified in the case of firms engaged in
the design and development of complex engineered products. Our field study of the
global engineering efforts of five firms showed that offshoring success is largely affected
by the choice of the offshoring content, the architecture of the firm's products, and
the organization choices of the respective firms. This led us to frame our research
questions as: How does a firm optimally structure the global work distribution, over
time, of its product development organization? How does the firm's architecture affect
these work distribution decisions?
Arguing based on existing literature in operations management, product develop-
ment, and organizational economics, we identify coordination effort required between
locations as a key contributing factor towards the performance of global product
development organizations. We segregate the time required to complete a product
development task between work time and coordination time, and define the index of
modularity for offshoring as the ratio of the work time to the sum of work time and
coordination time. We incorporate this factor to develop a recursive equation model
that identifies the global structure (work distribution) of a product development or-
ganization.
We apply our model to structure (optimize) the global product development or-
ganization in an industrial setting (with the aim of minimizing costs). We use the
design structure matrix (DSM) to map the current process flow. This DSM helps us
identify the organization architecture that we can utilize in our optimization model.
Our optimization results, based on detailed modeling of coordination costs, show sig-
nificant cost savings through a re-structured PD organization. Subsequent analysis
of our results shows that while offshoring based on modularity is generally right, it is
not the whole answer as there exists a trade-off between the efficiency of performing
specific PD tasks at the offshore location and the modularity of the task.
Besides relative cost rates and modularity, the optimal organization structure is
also affected by the relative efficiencies in performing the product development tasks
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across locations, leading to additional research questions: How does the task comple-
tion time change (efficiency differences) when a PD task is transferred to an offshore
product development center? How are the firm's prioritization and distribution of
efforts towards the offshored PD tasks affected by the various factors that affect the
task completion time?
To understand these efficiency differences and address the above questions, we
develop and analyze a stylized model (two tasks, two locations, two time periods) for
a firm seeking to establish a product development center at an offshore location to
benefit from cost savings. Our key results show that (a) firms should determine their
offshore content to benefit from the existing knowledge base created by the prior off-
shored content and to create a knowledge base from which subsequent offshoring can
benefit (indicating path dependent offshoring) rather than offshoring solely based on
modularity; (b) efforts supporting offshoring should prioritize the coordination chal-
lenges between tasks at different locations before those between tasks at the offshore
location; and (c) in an environment of high volatility of external factors, efforts should
be prioritized to enhance the work time and coordination time efficiencies in the first
(earliest) period.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The subject of global product development (GPD) is generating a lot of interest.
Firms pursue GPD either to meet global market needs (locations other than home
location) or to seek efficiencies. The drive towards GPD has been influenced by
competitive pressures (pricing targets driving aggressive cost targets), availability of
exceptional talent overseas, advances in communication that facilitate seamless infor-
mation flow, intellectual property protection, and growing external markets. However,
developing products across geographical boundaries presents significant challenges in
coordination, communication, differences in culture, different time-zones, etc. (Fine
(1998), Srikanth and Puranam (2008a), Anderson et al. (2008)). Hence, selection of
development tasks that are to be offshored is very important.
The selection of these development tasks is further complicated in the case of
complex engineered systems (CES). Such systems comprise of a number of compo-
nents and processes with inter-dependencies during development. Development of
CES comprises of system architecture development, followed by component devel-
opment, and finally system integration (Fig. 1-1) (Ulrich and Eppinger (2004)).
During system architecture development, the constituents of the system and their
respective interdependencies are planned and their respective performance require-
ments specified. Components are then developed within the architecture established
during system development. Finally the respective development efforts are collected
and tested, during system integration, for adherence to the specifications developed
during system architecture development.
Modularity, 'a plan for organizing work by task partitioning and specifying stan-
dardized interfaces between them' (Srikanth and Puranam (2008b)), is an approach
proposed by many. Though modularization provides an opportunity to address these
issues to some extent (Baldwin and Clark (2000), Anderson et al. (2008)), most engi-
neered products (automobiles, aircraft, complex assemblies, etc.) require significant
interactions between systems, sub-systems, components, etc. during design and de-
velopment. These interactions identify the coordination that is required between the
systems, sub-systems, components, etc. towards successful product development, im-
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Figure 1-1: Product Development Process for Complex Systems
plying 'limited' modularity (Sosa et al. (2007)) which makes it difficult to identify
components/processes that can follow the 'modularity' based concept for offshoring
(Baldwin (2007)). Managing these coordination needs across locations is challenging.
Thus, it becomes necessary to identify and prioritize the components/processes for
offshoring and within this prioritized set, determine how the offshoring efforts need
to be distributed.
Early research (1990s) primarily concentrated on research or on turnkey develop-
ment. Collaborative development, whereby different processes or components of the
product are developed in dispersed parts of the world, is now receiving increasing at-
tention. Eppinger and Chitkara (2007) defined GPD as combining certain centralized
functions with some engineering and related product development (PD) functions dis-
tributed to other sites or regions of the world - the practice may involve outsourced
engineering work along with captive offshore engineering facilities. On similar lines,
Anderson et al. (2008) refer to distributed product development (DPD) as the use
of organizational arrangements involving multiple organizations that are separated
by firm, geographical, or other boundaries, that are used for product development.
Besides cost benefits, firms seek access to technical expertise, knowledge of global
product needs, and flexible PD resource allocation through GPD.
From the above definitions of GPD and DPD, we infer that GPD is an organization
arrangement which identifies the location and ownership of the PD activities. Since
these activities can be distributed in various locations globally, it involves offshoring
wherein some PD activities are done in a different country/continent. Compared to
offshoring which is determined by the location at which the PD task is performed,
outsourcing involves the ownership (make/buy) decision wherein responsibilities for
certain PD tasks are transferred to another firm. This decision is driven, amongst
other considerations, by the incentive structure agreed upon by the firms. An offshore
PD center can be captive or supplier owned. Similarly, a supplier's PD center can be
onshore (similar location as the firm's home PD center) or offshore (Fig. 1-2).
We (Tripathy and Eppinger (2007)) studied the GPD efforts of five firms (chapter
2). Though each firm had its own peculiarity, their GPD efforts had a relationship
with the product, process, or organization architecture of the firm. The firm's archi-
tecture helps in the identification of the product, process or activity (referred to as
-JI
S
High Low
Strategic Content/Value
Figure 1-2: Sourcing-Location Matrix
task hereafter) for offshoring by recognizing the interface/ coordination requirements.
Firms engaged in the development of such complex products need to first define the
set of tasks for offshoring. Thereafter, they need to identify the sequence in which
these tasks/set of tasks are offshored and the proportionate allocation of support ef-
forts to ensure that the objectives of offshoring are met. This leads us to frame our
research questions as:
* How does a firm optimally structure the global work distribution, over time, of
its product development organization?
* How does the firm's architecture affect these work distribution decisions?
We develop a general theory to address the above research questions (chapter 3).
We do so for a firm whose GPD intent is cost savings. We discuss the applicability of
this theory for firms that pursue GPD for other reasons subsequently. The first step
involves identification of the trade-off criterion that would help address the above
questions. The trade-off criterion in this case involves reduced cost rates at the new
GPD location vis a vis higher time to complete the task. A key challenge in CES
(focus of our study) is the significant coordination required between individuals and
groups involved in the development of tasks that need to interact. We segregate the
development time taken by a task (task time) into the time taken to do the assigned
work (hereafter called work time) and the time required to obtain information for or
to provide information from the assigned work (hereafter called coordination time).
We use this segregate to develop the recursive equation model that identifies the
optimal global work distribution for a firm's product development organization. The
relative proportion of task time and coordination time in the total development time
plays a critical role in the trade-off decision regarding GPD (Gomes and Joglekar
(2008)). We define this ratio (work time divided by sum of work and coordination
time (task time)) as the modularity of the component/process/task, a measure of the
firm's architecture.
Make Buy
Offshore Offshore
Make Buy
Onshore Onshore
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We apply the model in an industrial setting to design an efficient GPD organiza-
tion. We use the design structure matrix (a tool used to study dependencies) to map
the organization architecture, which helps us to distinguish between the work time
and the coordination time between the departments. We formulate the example as an
optimization problem and solve it for different scenarios and perform sensitivity anal-
ysis. We see that the coordination time cost component of total costs reduces more
significantly than the work time cost component. This observation would imply that
offshoring prioritization is based on the modularity index. However we also observed
a non-monotonic behavior: offshoring content to the GPD center is non-monotonic
with respect to modularity. On analysis of the results, we observe that besides rela-
tive cost rates and modularity, the organization structuring is also affected by relative
efficiencies in performing the product development tasks across the locations. This
leads to an additional research questions:
* How does the task completion time change (efficiency differences) when a PD
task is transferred to an offshore product development center? How are the
firm's prioritization and distribution of efforts towards the offshored PD tasks
affected by the various factors that affect the task completion time?
We develop a stylized model to study this research question (for a captive offshore
product development center): chapter 4. We identify and incorporate the various
factors that influence the offshoring decision in this model. These factors contribute
to the relative work and coordination efficiencies. We study their individual and joint
(with modularity) impact on the offshoring decision. We observe that a firm should
prioritize those tasks that develop the competence/knowledge at the offshoring cen-
ter rather than offshoring solely based on modularity. This contributes in the learn-
ing process of the subsequent tasks that are offshored. However, it also represents
a trade-off between the long-term (knowledge development based) and short-term
(modularity based) benefits that the firm needs to understand and decide on. Pri-
oritizing offshoring tasks to develop competence/knowledge leads to path-dependent
offshoring.
We summarize in chapter 5 by proposing a method that firms engaging in GPD
can follow. We also outline emerging research questions from this research.
Chapter 2
A System Architecture Analysis of
Global Product Development
Chapter Abstract: Recent advances in engineering collaboration tools and internet
technology have enabled firms to distribute their product development (PD) tasks to
offshore sites and global outsourcing partners while still maintaining a tightly con-
nected process. In this research, we explore these global PD structures from process
flow and system architecture perspectives, employing the design structure matrix
method. Through five case studies spanning electronics, equipment, and aerospace
industries, we observe the interaction complexity inherent in various global work dis-
tribution strategies; the complexity a combination of the PD structure and the spe-
cific strategy used by the firm. Our observations lead to implications for organization
forms and architecture decompositions for firms pursuing offshoring of engineering
activities. We conclude with potential research directions on the subject of global
product development.
Introduction: As introduced in chapter 1, there is growing interest in the subject
of global product development (GPD). Firms are driven towards GPD either due to
competitive pressures, or are attracted by overseas market opportunities and overseas
talent. Further, advances in communication technologies and availability of intellec-
tual property protection have aided the process. However, at the same time, there
is a lot of concern on where to do GPD, and more importantly, how to do GPD. In
this chapter we study the GPD approach and experiences followed by five firms in
engineering and high-technology industries. We use system architecture principles,
utilizing the design structure matrix (DSM) tool.
We first provide a brief survey of existing literature on global product develop-
ment, tracing it from when global efforts were concentrated on research or turnkey
development to now when firms look to develop products through teams located across
locations. We combine the two streams of literature to develop our thoughts on orga-
nizing GPD for CES as a prelude to the case studies (section 2.2). Our case studies
follow in section 2.3. We collate our findings from the field studies, from organization
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and architecture viewpoints (section 2.4), deriving some key learnings (section 2.5).
We conclude with some thoughts on GPD and directions for future research (section
2.6).
2.1 Literature Review
2.1.1 Global Product Development (GPD)
Past studies in the area of global research (global R&D) have primarily focussed
either on research or turnkey development. Collaborative development, whereby dif-
ferent processes or components of the product are developed in dispersed parts of the
world, is now gaining increasing attention as a research topic. Eppinger and Chitkara
(2007) outlined the benefits of GPD to include greater engineering efficiency (through
utilization of lower cost resources), access to technical expertise that is distributed
internationally, design of products for more global markets, and more flexible PD
resource allocation (through use of outsourced staff). We capture the evolution of
academic literature in the area of global product development in Fig. 2-1.
Research / Turnkey Development
Govt. controls, closed Open markets, collaborative Global Product
markets, limited tools/bandwidth Development
IT/bandwidth
upto mid 90s from mid 90s 2000s
Why Kummerle (1997) Eppinger & Chitkara (2006)
Chiesa (2002) Khurana (2007)
Where Howells (199C0) Kumar (1991) Eppinger & Chitkara (2006)
Julian & Keller (1991)
How Hakonson ar Zander (1988) Kahn & McDonough III (1997) Gomes & Joglekar (2004, 2008)
(Organization) Howells (1990) Chiesa (1996) Eppinger & Chitkara (2006)
Julian & Keller (1991) Hamen & Nihtila (1997) Anderson, et.al. (2007)
Gassman & vor Zedwitz (2002) Khurana (2007)
Chiesa, Manzni, & Pizzurno (2004) Tnpathy & Eppinger (2007)
Figure 2-1: Research in Global Product Development
Academic literature is rich in the study of global R&D, virtual teams, distributed
development, etc. Kuemmerle (1997) differentiated global R&D sites between those
that are home-base augmenting and those that are home-base exploiting. The home-
base augmenting R&D sites absorb knowledge from the global scientific community,
create new knowledge, and transfer it to the company's central R&D site. In contrast,
home-base exploiting R&D sites commercialize knowledge by transferring it from
the company's home base to the laboratory site abroad, and from there to local
manufacturing and marketing. Gassmann and von Zedtwitz (2002) further defined
four archetypes of R&D internationalization -
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1. national treasure, where both research and development are done domestically
2. technology-driven, where development is domestic and research dispersed
3. market-driven, where research is domestic and development dispersed
4. global R&D, where both research and development are dispersed
Companies would normally start from type 1. and then proceed, through either 2.
or 3., to 4. global R&D. In contrast, Chiesa (2000) had associated foreign-based
R&D laboratories with two structures - specialization based (where the laboratory
has full global responsibility for a product or technology or process) and integration
based (where different units contribute to technology development programs). These
integrated R&D laboratories with their networks do get involved in GPD in terms of
the definition provided by Eppinger and Chitkara (2007).
Beyond defining global R&D and GPD, it is imperative to understand why these
efforts are undertaken, how these efforts are undertaken, and what challenges and
issues arise in these efforts. GPD is gaining prominence for many reasons (Eppinger
and Chitkara (2007)), chief among which are leveraging lower costs, improved pro-
cesses available on account of focus on design for manufacturing (1980s) and reduced
time to market (1990s), global growth in markets requiring instant access to market,
and availability of integrated PD processes (leveraging on advances in digital and net-
worked technology) that include engineers in regions where critical new technology
has been developed.
Coupled with the 'why' is the 'where' to do GPD question. Kumar (2001) studied
the determinants of location of overseas R&D in multinational enterprises of US and
Japanese origin and found that the key factors favoring location of overseas R&D were
large domestic market, abundance of low-cost R&D manpower, and scale of national
technological effort. A significant proportion of the studied firm's R&D activities
followed that of leaders in their own fields. Further, lack of patent protection or
restrictive trade regime affected the attractiveness of a country which was otherwise
suited for R&D expansion. He also noticed that Japanese firms' R&D abroad was
more in low-tech products.
Through their study of Japanese, European and US based multinational enter-
prises, Bas and Sierra (2002) found that companies decided on investing in R&D
after comparing relative advantages of home and host countries. The key strategies
followed fall into four broad types -
* technology seeking, where the company tries to offset home country weakness
in a given technological field by selecting a host country with proven strength
in the technology
* home base exploiting, where the technology is created at home but then adapted
in the foreign location to exploit the market
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* home base augmenting, where the technology base is strong in the company at
home and at the host and the idea is to acquire knowledge from the host
* market driven, where the technology base is weak both at home and at host
National market importance, local considerations like government incentives, and
modes for implementation (greenfield, joint-venture, foreign acquisition, global matrix
structure) are also influencing factors that contribute to the identification of R&D
locations (Julian and Keller (1991)).
The key issues that academic literature has addressed with respect with global
R&D relate to how to manage the R&D sites and issues regarding culture/ teams/
communication. Hakonson and Zander (1988) studied the internationalization of
R&D efforts of four Swedish companies and concluded that a strategic balance is
required in managing the R&D sites. Corporate R&D needs to carry out the cen-
tral task of acting as liaison between the R&D organization/sites with corporate
management (to ensure conformance of R&D to corporate objectives), facilitate com-
munication within the group, develop common standards, etc. Detailed R&D needs
to be conducted and tracked by divisional R&D departments, who will coordinate
worldwide efforts of the products. The line responsibility should lie with individual
country/market leads. Graber (1996) in his discussions on global R&D efforts of
Black & Decker's Worldwide Household Division, identified the global business team
structure as a very important ingredient to GPD, along with top management com-
mitment. Other factors critical to the success of global R&D efforts include steps
to prevent leakage of information, managing government policies and political risks
(Julian and Keller (1991)), and the need for adequate networking (Pearch and Pa-
panastassiou (1996)). Asakawa (2001) discussed managing the organizational tensions
prevalent in global R&D. He has used perception gap as a primary manifestation of
organizational tension within a firm and claims that this gap occurs due to two main
reasons - information sharing issues and autonomy related issues.
The other big challenge with global R&D and hence with GPD is with the global
teams - how will they operate, will they be able to work together, and what will
be the methods/modes for communication and information sharing. deBrentani and
Kleinschmidt (2004) identified four scenarios for international product development
- positive balanced, hands-off approach, no budget for international PD and high
involvement only. They suggested that the scenario adopted played an important
contributory role towards the success of international PD efforts. The best perform-
ers needed to be positively balanced, required a strong innovation-plus-globalization
culture for PD, solid top-management involvement, and sufficient resources to support
the program. However the biggest problems faced with global teams are social and
cultural (Kahn and McDonoughIII (1996))- communication, interpretation, promot-
ing trust, getting over the not-invented-here syndrome. The key challenges for a global
NPD team leader are therefore both interpersonal (trust) and programming (program
milestones, tracking, responsibilities, resources) (Barczak and McDonoughIII (2003)).
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Barczak and McDonoughIII (2003) further advise that the global NPD teams should
meet initially for at least 3 days, to increase the amount and quality of communica-
tion, and hold periodic progress meetings. Cedrone and McDonoughIII (2000) suggest
that individuals have a strong desire to perform well in the eyes of other members
of the peer group and it may be advisable to allow them to choose their tasks/work
through which they may want to contribute. Managing communications is a crucial
task of the team leader. However, another study has found that virtual teams can be
just as effective without ever meeting in person (Cummings (2004)).
Yet another branch of literature deals with knowledge transfer in global R&D net-
works. In particular, tacit knowledge has been studied, which is difficult to measure
or monitor for transfer. Subramaniam et al. (1998) observed that European and US
based multi-national enterprises seemed to employ cross-national PD teams and use
overseas subsidiaries as sources of new product concepts when knowledge about differ-
ent product design requirements among overseas markets or plants is tacit. Subrama-
niam and Venkatraman (2001) studied NPD capability and tacit overseas knowledge,
and concluded that companies that harness greater tacit insights about overseas mar-
kets are more likely to have greater transnational NPD capabilities. Tacit knowledge
'indwells' in minds of people of an organization, and the inherent difficulties in its
codification and communication pose significant barriers to the replication of the same
by rival organizations, and hence, it is an important strategic resource. Subramaniam
(2006) concluded, from his survey of 45 MNCs (90 responses) involved in manufac-
tured goods, that instead of cross-national teams or cross-national communication,
cross-national collaboration is more effective in new product development. Cross-
national collaboration involves the collaboration of the home organization and its
offshore development center in pricing, planning new products and programs, com-
petitive analysis and product (involving effective transfer of embedded knowledge)
and enhances the embodiment of embedded knowledge into the product.
Though most of the global R&D or GPD studies have reflected on why they
should be done, the challenges faced therein, etc., they have not addressed the key
issue of how it should be done. This issue has not been clearly addressed even by
recent studies (Eppinger and Chitkara (2007), Anderson et al. (2008), Gomes and
Joglekar (2008), Sosa and Mihm (2008)) that have called for product development
to be organized through GPD organizations, where systems/components/processes of
product development are carried out simultaneously across the globe. Most of these
studies assume that it is possible to transfer the complete responsibility of the product
or the process to a global site (implying that there exist modular content that can
be transferred). Such an assumption may not hold in the case of complex products
which are developed by teams whose strength may be in hundreds or thousands. In
such cases a proper system architecture analysis is needed to understand the product
or process, and then identify the suitable content for offshoring.
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2.1.2 System Architecture
CES (Fig. 2-2) are networks of components that share technical interfaces to function
as a whole (Sosa et al. (2007)). They have behaviors and properties that no subset
of their elements have (Whitney et al. (2004)). CES generally comprise of a large
number of components. In such cases, a hierarchy can be established wherein the
product or system is decomposed into sub-systems, and those sub-systems are further
decomposed into components. There could be more than a single level of sub-system
decomposition before arriving at the component level. The system is then defined as
a set of different elements connected or related so as to perform a unique function
not performable by the elements alone (Rechtin and Maier (2000)). The sub-systems
within the system and the components within a sub-system are interconnected or
dependent on each other and these relationships define the system architecture.
Product
Sub-system
Component
Simple System Complex System
Figure 2-2: Simple and Complex Engineered Systems
Complexity of a system is defined by the complexity of the interconnections and/or
the dependencies in the system architecture. The complexity of an architecture there-
fore relates to the structure - in terms of components, connections, and constraints
- of a product, system, process, or element. Architecting is the process of creating
and building architectures, mostly those aspects of system development most con-
cerned with conceptualization, objective definition, and certification for use. System
architecting has been defined (Rechtin and Maier (2000)) as the art and science of
creating and building CES, the part of systems development that is most concerned
with scoping, structuring, and certification. System architecting can be of two types
- the art which is based on qualitative heuristic principles and techniques, and the
science which is based on quantitative analytic techniques.
The architecture of a system can be looked at in many ways - product architecture,
process architecture, organizational architecture, etc. Ulrich (1995) defined product
architecture as the scheme by which the function of a product is allocated to physical
components, driving the performance of the product, product variety, product change,
etc. Further studies (Gulati and Eppinger (1996)) have shown that an intricate rela-
tionship exists between product architecture and organizational design, each relying
upon and driving the other. Product architecture is reflected in the information flow
system of the firm and any change in the architecture has the potential to destroy the
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firm (Henderson and Clark (1990)). Process architecture can be defined as the set of
tasks and the related information flow between them, that sum to produce the final
product/system. Organizational architecture can be defined as the small sub-teams
in a project involving the development of a system/product and the relationships, in
terms of information flow, hierarchy, etc., existing between these sub-teams.
In a CES, it is very difficult to study, design, or source the entire system as one.
Rather, as stated by Simon (1969), CES should be decomposed into sub-systems
or models such that each module becomes a black box, hiding design details from
other modules. So it becomes necessary to decompose the system. Often such de-
composition is necessary to identify the cause of a problem, or to identify a level
of sub-system/component that can be designed or outsourced, or a level at which a
sub-team can be assigned responsibility, von Hippel (1990) suggests that firms should
specify their tasks in order to reduce the problem-solving interdependence amongst
them, by predicting which tasks are likely to be important new information sources
and which tasks affect others.
Design structure matrix (DSM) can be a useful tool to represent the architecture
of a system, either by product or by process or by team or as a hybrid of these.
DSM (Steward (1981)) is a project modeling tool which captures the relationships
between project tasks or sub-systems/components in a matrix form. DSM can be
used in organizing tasks in product development (Eppinger et al. (1994)). DSM helps
to first decompose the system (by product, process or as required) and then identify
the relationships or information flow, if any, between these decomposed sub-systems,
tasks, sub-teams. An extension of the DSM is the numerical DSM where numbers,
either absolute or relative, are input into the matrix and help in making decisions.
2.2 Organizing GPD for CES
As evident from existing literature, there exists a gap on how GPD needs to be under-
taken, i.e. what are the components or tasks or sub-systems that should be offshored.
How does the offshored development work relate to the objective of pursuing GPD?
What process does a firm try to follow in their GPD efforts? What are the results
of their GPD efforts? The key to understanding a firm's approach to GPD lies in
two complementary theoretical constructs: (a) decomposition of interacting elements,
and (b) difficulties in coordination across distances. We discuss the 'decomposition'
approach to GPD in this section and observe the challenges of coordination across
distances in the case studies in the next section.
It is rare for a firm engaged in the design and development of CES to offshore
the complete set of activities. It may happen when it is to an offshore captive unit
or the product is being supplied by an ODM. At times the design and development
may be offshored (with outsourcing) to design houses, captive development centers,
or engineerings services firms, but these become rare as the complexity of the systems
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increases. Rather a firm initiates the process of setting up an offshore development
center (captive or supplier) by offshoring a set of tasks, with the expectation that
this set would grow over time. Identification of these successive and sequential sets
of tasks is challenging for CES due to the coordination needs required to ensure
that appropriate information exchange takes place for successful product development
(Clark and Fujimoto (1991), Wheelwright and Clark (1992)).
CES (Fig.2-3) comprise of sub-systems which are made of components or tasks.
At the component/task level, there can be a need for significant coordination needs
during offshoring. Offshoring of a component/task that has coordination needs with
another component/task that is at a different (home) location is difficult compared
to offshoring of either a component/task that does not have these coordination needs
or set of components/tasks that require coordination within themselves. However in
some cases the firm may decide to go in for offshoring the component with coordina-
tion needs across locations when it may be seeking product competence and is unable
to identify the necessary interfaces (Fujimoto (2002)) to eliminate coordination needs.
Generally these happen with outsourcing where the supplier with the necessary com-
petence happens to be offshore (a happenstance), e.g. Pitney Bowes (section 4) could
identify the interface needs to ensure outsourcing to an offshore supplier Canon such
that there were limited coordination requirements during component development.
System/
Product -n
I significant
S I s coordination needs
Sub-system - information
I lflow
Component/
Easiest to offshore
Offshoring is hard Offshoring both is easier
(coordination (coordination within
across locations) locations)
Figure 2-3: Offshoring Difficulties
The above offshoring approaches can be classified into two types for CES: com-
ponent offshoring and sub-system offshoring (Fig.2-4). Each of these GPD organiza-
tional arrangements has its own benefits and challenges. While sub-system offshoring
may ensure that coordination needs are controlled within a location, it could lead to
loss of sub-system development capability at the home location. Similarly component
development offshoring will require significant coordination across locations and can
lad to inefficiencies.
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Figure 2-4: Global Product Development Architecture
In this study we review and critique the GPD efforts of five firms which are
engaged in the design, development and manufacture of CES. Specifically, as outlined
by papers on analysis of case studies (Eisenhardt (1989), Yin (2002), Eisenhardt and
Graebner (2007)), we enquire why the firm undertook GPD, how the firm undertook
GPD, and what were the results of the GPD efforts undertaken by the firm.
We analyze the GPD efforts of each firm using a system-architecture approach.
Using existing theories and tools of system architecture, we study how each of these
firms' processes and/or products could be decomposed. We used this decomposition
to understand the rationale for their GPD efforts. For firms following a process-
based GPD approach, we analyze their task structure, the information flows between
different processes, and the relationship between their process based architecture and
GPD content. Similarly, for firms that used product decomposition, we analyze how
the product is decomposed to sub-systems and parts, the existing interdependencies
between the sub-systems/parts so defined, and the relationship between the product
architecture and GPD content. In our final case study, we come across a firm that was
in the process of setting up a new department and was looking at exploiting the labor
cost differences between locations to staff the department. In such a case, the use of
task decomposition to sub-tasks and the identification of co-ordination requirements
between sub-tasks play a significant role in identifying the tasks that can be located
offshore.
We use the DSM methodology to decompose the architecture (product/ process/
organization) of the firm and then understand the rationale for offshoring and/or
outsourcing the relevant component/ task/ activity. We also use the DSM to initiate
the process for identifying the structure of a new department.
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2.3 GPD Case Studies
2.3.1 Danaher Motion Precision Systems Group (Dover): Task
Offshoring
Our study was based at Dover, a unit of Danaher Motion's Precision Systems group.
This unit's products were based on air-bearing based precision motion (linear and
rotary). These products found applications in high performance machinery utilized
in a wide array of industries including data storage, flat panel display, semiconductor
lithography and wafer inspection, circuit board assembly, high precision assembly,
and metrology. Due to its ability to develop customized solutions based on its core
technology, this unit has a loyal customer base which values the quality, speed and
agility with which their needs are addressed. In a typical scenario, Dover's order to
delivery timeline is just six months.
Dover's short order-to-delivery timeline requires quick engineering turnaround,
which in turn involves large groups of engineers working together to provide solution
alternatives and rapid design iterations as well as concurrent design, engineering, and
manufacturing process development. Many component designs are translated into
production parts with no prototype production. The combined requirements of quick
turnaround and customized products present a challenging proposition to Dover's en-
gineering staff whose experience has helped them to address these challenges. Product
development at Danaher Motion followed a six-stage gate process. The duration of
each stage gate varies by product and customer need. Decomposition of Dover's
product development process is shown in Fig. 2-5.
Danaher Motion's GPD efforts: Dover's GPD efforts has evolved through two
Figure 2-5: Danaher Motion Process-based DSM
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of three planned GPD phases:
Phase 1 Learning about Outsourced Engineering: This unit outsourced and
offshored certain process-driven engineering jobs such as drawings, detailing for man-
ufacturing, CAD, etc. to a engineering service provider in India. These tasks needed
to interact with other tasks (Fig. 2-5), most of which were performed inhouse at
the home location. The offshore supplier was not able to meet the turnaround time
requirements and Dover Motion had to transfer the responsibility of these tasks back
to the home location.
Phase 2 Setup of Global Development Center (GDC): Danaher Motion then
initiated a group intiative which required that all group companies offshore to another
engineering service provider in India (much larger and providing a wider range of
engineering services and solutions). This activity involved the setting up of a Global
Development Center (GDC) with the service provider. Each unit in the group was
assigned dedicated project engineers and a pool of engineers was created below them
Fig. 2-6. These project engineers were trained at the respective units and provided
specific product-related expertise. In contrast, the pool of engineers were trained in
general engineering skills which could be utilized across the units.
Project Engineers (dedicated by unit)
Kollmorgan (3) Thomson (3) NEAT (3) Dover (3)
Engineer Pool
(flexible)
Figure 2-6: GDC Flexible Workforce (number in brackets indicates number of dedi-
cated project engineers)
Dover, as a first step, offshored the same work content as Phase 1. They observed
a significant difference in work turnaround and efficiency compared to Phase 1. This
encouraged them to identify more tasks for offshoring to meet budget and efficiency
targets. The process DSM (Fig. 2-5) was the appropriate tool to help identify the
same.
Phase 3 Increasing Utilization to Achieve Efficiency and Scale: The next
phase would require a higher level of involvement by GDC in the Precision Group's
product development efforts. This could involve the transfer of complete component
or sub-system design responsibility. From the architecture-based DSM (Fig. 2-7),
the control systems parts have limited interactions with other systems/parts. Hence,
they could be considered for the next stage of offshoring. Other systems for offshoring
include pneumatics and hydraulics of the basic structure. However, the design of
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the axis carrying motion components, a core technology that needs extensive on-
site collaboration, needs to stay in-house. Further, being a core competence related
system, Dover would want to protect it for deliverable compliance. Subsequent to
design and development offshoring, manufacturing offshoring could be reviewed.
Systems
and Precision Structure and Drive x
frarnmeweldmen structure lr*~ouse x x
isolation system Inhouse x x x
granite platorm Irhouse x x x x x x
axis carrying motion (linearlrotary) Inhouse xx x
- axis carrying motion devices (motors and tracks) Inhouse x x x
- air bearings Inhouse x x x x
- box (x) structure (AI. Steel) Inhouse x x x x x x x
- encoders, sensors, etc. Inhouse x x X
- cable track Inhouse x x x x x x
pneumatics Inhouse x x x
hydraulics inhouse x x X
testfixtures Inhouse x X X X X X X X X X X X
-la pe X X
apdian mar InOut x x x
teslin satware (nat necessarily shis ith the machine Inhoure x x x
Figure 2-7: Danaher Motion Product-based DSM
Key Takeaway : Due to the quick turnaround requirements of this unit, it is key to
have constant communication between different design/engineering/functional groups
to achieve time and quality requirements. The significant overlap between design,
development and manufacturing activities requires engineers to be present on-site.
A key observation from this process is that GPD can easily be started with
process-based offshoring; drawing, detailing, and CAD are fairly independent pro-
cesses that can be offshored without much disruption. The related software and
protocols are, most often, industry norms. There are also immediate cost and produc-
tivity benefits from offshoring. It may be difficult, however, to transition to offshoring
component/sub-system design as doing so would require training and the benefits will
not be visible until desired levels of efficiency are achieved. Moreover, a quick engi-
neering turnaround company may not want to risk offshoring these responsibilities
before confidence in the offshoring centre is achieved. The DSM architecture helps in
identifying appropriate offshoring strategies.
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2.3.2 Pitney Bowes Mailing Systems: Component Outsourc-
ing
Pitney Bowes (PB) is a US$5.5 billion company based in Stamford, Connecticut. Its
business encompasses global mail processing solutions, global business services and
financial services. Over the years though PB has divested majority of its manufactur-
ing facilities, production of certain core products that require technology, security or
systems integration, has remained in-house. By nature of the mail business, product
innovation and development at PB is driven by the postal requirements specified in
various countries. PB has engineering centers in Shelton, Connecticut, and in UK
and France.
Global Mailstream Solutions is PB's core business. This business is responsible
for all the equipment that PB designs and builds for inserting, sorting and weigh-
ing mail, and affixing postage. Traditionally, these machines included meters which
had to be 'loaded' in post offices and subsequently, through the telephone for postal
credit. In 2002, PB introduced Intelli-link, which allows customers to update postage
credit online. Intelli-link represents a critical competitive advantage for the company.
PB's Global Mailstream Solutions business also offers various mailing and customer
communication software solutions.
The MEGA Mailing Systems: In early 2001, as a response to the United States
Postal Service's new postal indicia requirements, the growth in IT and electronic
media, and the availability of new IT infrastructure, PB began developing a new
series of mailing systems: the MEGA Midjet Series and the MEGA Fastjet Series.
The development of the new series followed certain guidelines:
1. Electronic exchange of data between customer mailing systems and PB through
Intelli-link (e.g., download of postal credit with the required security, software
updates, usage information flow back to PB).
2. Single UIC (user interface) part design, compatible across all MEGA series
mailing systems.
3. Introduction of postal security devices (PSD, ASIC) as mandated by the postal
department.
4. Development of a single print head/engine for all MEGA mailing systems.
5. Self-service mailing systems which would provide savings through a reduction
of field service needs for both PB and the customer, e.g. the customer would
be able to change printer cartridges and control features in UIC, etc.
Product Architecture: The MEGA mailing system was developed in two series:
Fastjet (fully automatic with output of 260 envelopes/minute) and Midjet (semi-
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automatic with output of 160 envelopes/minute). The Midjet Series comprises of
three main modules as shown in Fig. 2-8: UIC, input, and finishing.
MEGA Midjet Series
Penpherals
- personat computer
- rintef
PSD Postal Secunty Devce
MMC Motior Control
PMC Pnnt Mainterance Control
PHC Pnnt Head Control
Figure 2-8: Schematic of MEGA Midjet Series Mail Processing Module
Pitney Bowes follows a five stage PACE product development system (McGarth
(1996)). There is a lot of emphasis on upfront specification and feasibility development
which helps them identify the different modules and the respective interactions and
dependencies between them. This is shown in the product architecture based DSM
(Fig. 2-9).
Global Product Development & Opportunities: While most components
are produced by global suppliers, global engineering is limited to partial software
development by China-based CIENET and printer development by Canon. Most of
the other design and development is done inhouse except UIC's flexi circuit design
and the input module's power supply unit.
However, the highly decomposable structure of the MEGA Midjet Series pro-
vides several opportunities for PB to further develop GPD. The company having
responsibility for core design, manufacturing feasibility sign-off, and manufacturing,
respectively, for each sub-system/part, has been identified in the architecture-based
DSM (Fig. 2-9). Sec Vend against PSD implies that it is designed, studied for man-
ufacturing feasibility, and manufactured by a second vendor, in addition to Pitney
Bowes. Cherry, Brother, and Canon, are the key companies that support the design,
manufacturing feasibility studies, and sub-system/part manufacturing efforts of the
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Figure 2-9: PEGA Midjet Series Architecture-Bed XDSM
ucMEGA Midjet mailing system.While the design of the core technology and security components like PSD, MC,
ASIC, along with system integration will likely remain in-house, many of the o x x ther
components or complete modules could be outsourced (to offshore suppliers) for designaand development. The architecture-based DSM clearly shows that significant upfront
effort is involved in designing the system a rchitecure. The physical and information
ow interfaces beatween Cathe different modules are well identified during this phase,
enabing the modules to be developed independently thereafter.
One opportunity involves software development (primarily in the UIC and the
C) which is becoming F gure 2-9: MEGA Midjet Series Architecture-Based DSM' overall prod-
uct development. WhiGAle all software wMidjetork related to fasibility studies, softwaresystem.archile the design of the core technology and security components like PSD, MMC,
ASIC, along with system integration will likely remain in-house, manythere is a potential to expandof the outsourcing of software
componnfidence in CIENET's compoduletency ancod level outsou ed (to offsh, ore softwauppliers) for designvelop-
meand development. The asourcd. Witectuh proper IP and security shprotection even non-criticalws that significant upfront
flow security rela ed sof etwareen the dffevelopment coulesd bae woutsourced (though the challenge of
enabloutsourcing the modules to f embe developed independently thereafter.s).
A second GPD opportunity for PB involves software development (primarily inng the d sign and thdevelop-
menuct develof the input moduhile. The Brother affiliate Chinese manufacturer ry studiesponsible for
architecture, and MMC, PSD, and ASIC software forassembling the MEGA Midjet Series' input module could eventually be responsible will
for the module's complete design and development, since they are well known for their
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engineering capabilities. Design and development of the power supply unit could also
be included, enabling a complete module design proposal. An alternate design for
the power supply unit could feasibly emerge from this arrangement leading to greater
cost savings for PB.
A third opportunity involves the design and development of the entire UIC mod-
ule. With the exception of the PSD and PB chip, outsourced North American vendors
(primarily Cherry) currently manufacture the entire module. However, considering
that the UIC uses a number of standard parts, design and development for the mod-
ule could feasibly be outsourced to vendors outside of North America.
Key Takeaways: The architecture-based DSM for PB's MEGA Midjet Series
highlights how a product can be well partitioned by modules once the system ar-
chitecture design has been completed. Such modular architecture can enable each
module to be developed independently (out-shore/off-shore/in-house). It also pro-
vides an opportunity for manufacturing suppliers to vertically integrate to become
design-cum-manufacturing suppliers, thereby offering synergy benefits.
2.3.3 Microprocessor Development at Intel: Captive Global
Engineering
Intel designs, fabricates and sells microprocessors, in addition to other products.
The design activities for microprocessors are based in several inhouse facilities in
the United States and Asia/Europe. To enable collaboration and transfer of tasks,
the design capabilities among the centers are similar, though specific system design
capabilities for various types of microprocessors reside at respective locations (Fig.
2-10). For example, while one site specializes in desktop processors, another site
specializes in high-end server microprocessors for industrial applications, and a third
is dedicated to mobile microprocessors.
Location of Center Activity
California "productization" of design
Oregon desktop series microprocessors
Colorado high-end microprocessor design
Massachusetts high-end microprocessor design
Israel mobile technology
Moscow under development
Bangalore under development
Figure 2-10: Intel: Specialization by Site
Microprocessor Design and Development: The modern high-end microproces-
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sor is made up of two main parts: multiple cores supported by an uncore which
provides the external interfaces. Microprocessor design and development follows a
4-phase process (Fig. 2-11): upfront global architecture definition, designs of each
unit of the core and the uncore, complete chip integration, and finally, productization
and manufacturing preparation.
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4
Unore
. Urncore .
Productionization
&
Manufacturing
. Preparation
I I L I
Home Site Many Sites Home Site California Site
Figure 2-11: Intel: Microprocessor Design and Development
Although various Intel design facilities specialize in the architecture development
of various types of microprocessors, capability to develop core or uncore units are
general (rather than specific), and exist in each of the development facilities. As a
result, project leaders are able to draw resources from any of the design facilities. If,
for example, a microprocessor for mobile technology is being developed, the special-
ized design team is able to utilize resources from any of the other facilities based on
need and availability. Intel regards such flexible resource availability for the design
and development of its products as a competitive advantage.
Phase 1 of global architecture development consists of defining the architecture
of the chip, the information flows between the different core and uncore units, and
development of the unit architecture and unit floorplan of the various core and uncore
units. During this phase, the team is co-located, usually at the home site specializ-
ing in the chip type. Thereafter, Phase 2 development could be done in two parts
- one team could do the development upto behavioral code stage, and then another
team could take over from circuit design till unit integration. Though it may be ideal
for the members to be co-located with the project leaders, it is possible for them
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to work from their respective facilities during this phase. In Phase 3, the designs
of the various core and uncore units are integrated per the architecture developed
in Phase 1. During this phase, it is necessary for the relevant team members to be
co-located at the home site. The final phase, Phase 4, occurs at California site, where
productization and manufacturing preparation of the design takes place. The key de-
velopment facilities of Intel with their respective specializations are listed in Fig. 2-10.
DSM Development: It was recognized that a pure architecture-based or pure
process-based DSM would not explain the relationship intricacies present during mi-
croprocessor development. Hence, an architecture-based DSM was first developed
and then the key processes in the development of each of the units were added (Fig.
2-12). A section of the DSM has been expanded in Fig. 2-13. The relationships
between various units/processes were then identified and quantified. Ratings of A,
B or C were assigned based on the impact of one process on another process. Re-
lationships that received an A rating would likely require a 50-100% revision of the
upstream task, B, a 20-50% revision, and C, less than a 20% revision.
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Figure 2-12: Intel: Design and Development DSM
A review of the relationships showed that most A ratings exist within the core
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Figure 2-13: Intel: DSM Summary
or uncore units. Moreover such high rework possibilities only existed during Phase 2
(unit design) and Phase 3 (chip integration). This can be deduced as a strength of
Intel's upfront global architecture development efforts (Phase 1), wherein the various
unit design efforts are self-contained from Phase 2. This also provides an opportunity
for the unit teams to work individually, and it is not necessary for the various teams
to be co-located. The other A ratings occur during chip integration phase (Phase 3)
when all the team members are co-located. There are no A ratings in Phase 3 that
may require a review of any of the Phase 1 or Phase 2 activities.
There are a couple of A rated interactions/dependencies across units. However,
these interactions occur during the unit architecture and unit floorplan part of de-
sign when the team is co-located. Hence, any big revision arising from these inter-
actions/dependencies should be manageable. Similarly, most of the B rated inter-
actions/dependencies occur, either, during Phase 1 or Phase 3 (when the team is
co-located) or within the core and uncore units. Thus, they can be managed within
co-located teams.
Takeaways: Some takeaways from the microprocessor DSM are:
* The formation of unit-based teams is obvious as most interactions/dependencies
exist within the core or uncore unit after Phase 1.
* Significant efforts in Phase 1 (approx. 50% of the microprocessor design time)
ensure that units can be developed independently thereafter, till the final phase
of chip integration (Phase 3).
* During Phase 2, individual unit teams can continue design work independently,
and need not be co-located with other teams. This gives Intel the flexibility of
using resources from different design centers for different unit designs. This is
a very useful flexibility to have when a firm is looking to balance workload.
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* Chip integration (Phase 3) does require the team to be co-located. However, the
total team strength is quite reduced at this phase since limited representation
from the respective unit teams would suffice.
2.3.4 Cessna Aircraft: Supplier Co-Development
Cessna Aircraft (Cessna) is the world's leading designer and manufacturer of light
and mid-size business jets, utility turboprops, and single engine piston aircraft. It
is part of the $10 billion Textron group, and is headquartered at Wichita, Kansas,
where it also has its main manufacturing facility, and engineering and product de-
velopment center. Additional manufacturing facilities are located at Independence,
Kansas and Columbus, Georgia. Cessna's aircraft design and development activities
are vertically integrated; with most design efforts for aerodynamics, structures, and
systems integration and most product-level testing being carried out in-house.
A First Attempt at GPD (Supplier Co-Development): Cessna's first attempt
at GPD was based on a realization that, going forward, it would be challenging to
do all design work in-house. Cessna decided to experiment with GPD in a new air-
craft program by co-developing a complete aircraft section jointly with a key offshore
supplier.
The challenges that arose from that first experience proved to be valuable learn-
ings for the company. While Cessna used the supplier's engineers to carry out part
of the design work, but required that Cessna processes and standards be followed.
The tension between Cessna's involvement and the supplier's desire for independence
proved to be a source of friction and eventually Cessna opted for a second source for
producing this section.The company realized that in the future it might be more pru-
dent to outline product performance specifications and grant more decision-making
authority to the supplier on structural design, manufacturing standards and pro-
cesses. Despite the tensions that arose between the company and the supplier, many
Cessna executives understood that significant learning took place on both sides and
indicated that they would work with the same supplier again.
Second GPD Stage (Textron's Global Technology Center): Cessna's second
GPD effort was in direct response to impressive growth expectations. After suffer-
ing a significant downturn during 2001-03, the cyclical business jet industry bounced
back; Cessna was expecting the business segments in which they operated to grow
by more than 100% between 2004 and 2009. Recognizing the tremendous growth
opportunity, Cessna performed an internal assessment of their design, development,
manufacturing capabilities, and their ability to capitalize on growth expectations.
Given the short lead time available to meet the incremental requirements and cost
factors involved, Cessna concluded that the growth opportunities could only be met
through outsourced design and development (not just build-to-print). Product ar-
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chitecture development and system integration, however, would remain in-house to
ensure that the brand DNA was not compromised.
In 2004, Cessna's parent company, Textron, established the Global Technology
Center (GTC), a corporate sponsored engineering resource center located in Banga-
lore, India, as an effort to provide lower cost and capable engineering capacity to group
companies. Within two years, Cessna hired and trained engineers in various technical
specialties. In addition, the company identified available capability in certain aircraft
development activities with a second Indian vendor.
In 2006, Cessna was operating under a small scale GPD model wherein a supplier's
employees, co-located at the GTC, worked on tasks that matched their capabilities.
Concurrently, Cessna was developing Cessna-dedicated GTC employees on specialized
jobs with an aim of achieving system/sub-system design and development capability
within a few years.
The System Architecture-Based DSM: The high-level architecture-based DSM,
based on inputs from Cessna's system architecture group, indicates that modular
decomposition for Cessna's jet aircraft is not possible. Developing the DSM was
challenging, as the architecture could be defined either by functional systems like
electricals, hydraulics, pneumatics, etc. or by sections like cockpit, cabin, etc. (see
Fig. 2-14). The functional systems are distributed throughout the aircraft, touching
almost all sections. Similarly, each section contains elements of most of the functional
systems. For example, the electrical system starts at the cockpit, and runs through
the cabin, the tailcone, the wings, and the engine.
Engine
Package
Empennage
Wing ----- + Tailcone
Cabin oo Distributed Systems
* Structure
* Avionics
* Electrical System
*Hydraulic System
* Flight Controls
* Pneumatics
* Fuel System
Figure 2-14: Typical Aircraft Sections
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The section-based DSM developed provides key insights about the interdepen-
dencies/interactions between major aircraft sections and functional systems. The
aircraft can be divided into six different 'section-based' systems - cockpit, cabin, tail-
cone, wings, empennage, and engine package (Fig. 2-14). Each section comprises
of structural sub-systems/components that are unique to that section, eg. shell and
structure in the cockpit, and functional systems.
The DSM developed (Fig. 2-15) considers, for each section, those functional sys-
tems that have a significant role, e.g. flight controls in cockpit, wings and empennage,
fuel systems in wings and engine package, etc. The system architecture integrates all
of them. At the overall system level, the product requirements are developed through
sharing information with structural/functional systems like structure, avionics, elec-
trical system, etc. These product level requirements for the structure/functional
systems, are in turn, developed through information exchange with the respective
functions in the sections (the information from and to the functional systems of sys-
tem architecture in the DSM). As is evident from the DSM, most interactions are
contained within sections, though some interactions/information dependencies occur
between sections. Such interactions/ information dependencies will need to be man-
aged if the teams developing the respective sections are not co-located.
Functional Systems
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Figure 2-15: Cessna: System Architecture based DSM
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Key Takeaways: While Cessna is going forward with expanding the development
work content at the GTC, it is expected that in future a lot of their offshore develop-
ment work will be done through outsourcing (either the non-specialized jobs with the
supplier's employees at the GTC or through system/sub-system development with
offshore suppliers). The following takeaways outline the issues that Cessna needs to
be careful about as they offshore to suppliers.
Co-Location: Clearly, as Cessna considers moving from its current vertically inte-
grated development structure to one with more supplier involvement, suppliers pro-
viding design capabilities will play a key role. The strong dependencies of each of
the systems/sub-systems on the product architecture (as evidenced from the DSM)
clearly point towards co-location of the providers with Cessna engineers, at least in
the early part of the program when the package and specifications are developed.
Subsequent co-location would depend on the level of interaction required. The DSM
would need to be expanded to identify the relevant interactions that would require
co-location.
Systems Interactions: The DSM shows interactions between functional sub-systems
- electrical, flight controls, pneumatics, etc.; however, the exact nature and details
of these interactions need to be studied further. Such a study will help determine
the need for Cessna personnel involvement (and the number of people needed) if the
systems are provided by different suppliers. A clear roles and responsibilities (R&R)
may need to be developed in that case.
Culture: Cessna follows the standard Textron 7-stage New Products and Services
Introduction (NPSI) process. If Cessna moves to a more horizontal structure (more
outsourced design and development), the stage timings and applicable processes may
need to be modified/updated to reflect the upstream involvement of suppliers pro-
viding design capabilities and aircraft industry standards, as most of these suppli-
ers operate in the wider aviation industry, and may resist adopting 'Cessna-specific'
practices. Similarly, Cessna engineers will be challenged with learning to work with
outsourced suppliers whose practices may not mirror those followed at Cessna.
Definitions: Cessna would likely face a dilemma in defining systems/sub-systems
for suppliers to design, due to the high level of interactions presented in the DSM.
Though the systems in this DSM have been defined in terms of 'sectional' systems,
it is also possible to develop a DSM based purely on functional lines, e.g., electrical,
pneumatics, etc, and in line with the sourcing strategy being considered, e.g., a
single supplier who provides all the electrical wirings versus a wing supplier who is
responsible for all the electricals within his scope of supply.
2.3.5 Honeywell-Aerospace Division: Task Based Offshoring
Honeywell International Inc. is a $31 billion diversified company headquartered in
Morristown, New Jersey. Honeywell's products span four key areas: aerospace (en-
gines, avionics, aircraft components), automation and control solutions(safety systems
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for homes, buildings, industrial sites, airports), specialty materials(chemicals, fluoro-
carbons, advanced fibers), and transportation systems (automotive turbo systems,
friction materials).
Phoenix-based Honeywell Aerospace (formerly Allied Signal), a $9 billion division
of Honeywell, is a leading industry supplier of avionics and electronics, consumable
hardware, engine controls, environment controls, landing systems, power systems,
and propulsion engines to the defense, space and airline industries. The division has
design and development centers located at several U.S. product sites. This case study
focuses on Honeywell Aerospace's avionics operations (Chang (2007)).
Honeywell follows a seven-stage gate product development process. These stages
are followed for new product introduction and cost reduction activities on existing
products (also known as value engineering activities). The complexity of the products
that Honeywell Aerospace manufactures warrants a strong level of interaction and col-
laboration between design, marketing, planning, and an integrated supply chain to
meet program cost, quality, and timing objectives. A growing competitive landscape
has led to increased cost pressures, more challenging schedule requirements, and ris-
ing manufacturing and quality expectations.
GPD Dilemma: The Advanced Manufacturing Engineering (AME) group was cre-
ated within the Aerospace Integrated Supply Chain in 2005. Its charter is to drive
down program costs by enhancing collaboration between different participants of the
product development process.
As AME grows, it will face local hiring constraints (due to cost) and, per the
mandate of Honeywell's CEO, the group will have to look to hire internationally,
particularly in low-cost regions. Labor costs, efficiency and co-ordination efforts will
all be considered with any decision AME makes regarding off-shoring. The AME
group was considering three location options for Honeywell Aerospace's design and
development activities: Local: current site, close to/near other departments that they
need to collaborate with, e.g., Phoenix, New Jersey Medium Cost: close to current
location, close time-zones, allowing certain customer-constrainedjobs to be moved
there; lower labor costs than local, e.g., Puerto Rico, rural United states Low Cost:
distant location with cheapest labor costs, e.g., India, China
Any location option that AME chooses would involve various costs like: a) La-
bor costs related to manpower (time in hours). b) Co-ordination and collaboration
costs related to the time spent carrying out tasks which involve information shar-
ing/transfer. c) Fixed costs related to setting up new facilities, hiring and training,
etc.
There are likely to be constraints of the type: a) Potential capacity (manpower)
at off-shore locations. b) AME tasks that are required to be executed locally. c) AME
tasks that need to be co-located with other tasks (including non-AME tasks).
Decision-Making Approach: Each option that the AME group contemplated had
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associated risks. For example, while resulting in lower labor costs, it was evident that
moving tasks from local operations to medium cost or low cost locations would require
more co-ordination and collaboration time and, therefore, add costs. Honeywell had
to ensure that an appropriate trade-off, such as lower labor costs against higher co-
ordination and collaboration costs, was achieved prior to off-shoring certain tasks.
The AME group went through the following steps to determine the tasks that could
be off-shored.
Step 1: A full list of tasks that AME is responsible for carrying out was generated.
Tasks that had to remain on-shore were identified while groups of tasks that needed
to be co-located were bundled as single tasks.
Step 2: A (numerical) design structure matrix (DSM) was built (Fig. 2-16). As
shown, there are nine sections in the DSM. Each section represents a combination
based on the relative locations of a pair of tasks (local, medium cost country, low
cost country). One of these sections has been expanded in Fig. 2-17. The rows (and
columns) list each of the AME tasks that could be off-shored and each of the other
departments that AME interacts with (design, integrated supply chain, and marketing
and program management - these departments are constrained to be local).
Local Medium Cost Low Cost
Local Figure 2
Medium Cost
Low Cost
Figure 2-16: Honeywell: Task-Based DSM (Structure)
Step 3: For each task under consideration, the estimated labor time per task for
all aerospace programs was expressed in hours per month. The DSM captured the
approximate hours of interaction between various tasks (coordination time in hours
per month). Fig. 2-17 is a sample drawn from the DSM. The co-ordination time
between task Should-Cost Modeling and Engineering is 60 hours when this task is
done locally (shown as A in Fig.2-18). Similarly, the coordination time between tasks
Should-Cost Modeling and Quote Acquisition is 10 hours when both the tasks are done
locally (shown by B in Fig.2-18), but increases to 15 hours when Quote Acquisition is
done in a medium cost country (shown by C in Fig.2-18). These coordination times
obtained from the DSM were used to derive the coordination costs.
Step 4: For each potential location, the hourly (relative) labor costs and relative
efficiencies for carrying out each task were identified. These helped determine the
labor and coordination costs used in the model (using the coordination time from the
DSM).
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Figure 2-17: One Section of Honeywell DSM
Step 5: An optimization problem was developed to identify the locations for var-
ious tasks.
Key Decisions: Subsequent to the above steps, Honeywell was able to identify
tasks that could be off-shored to a medium and a low cost location. The medium cost
location was chosen on account of its skilled workforce and the ease of coordinating
work with the tasks based in the United States. The tasks were grouped together and
job descriptions then developed, based on skill requirements and the task interactions
(defined from the DSM).
2.4 Summarizing the Case Studies
As outlined earlier, we analyzed the GPD efforts of the five firms (section 2.3) from
the why, how, and what were the results perspectives. In this section we first clas-
sify the reasons for firms to pursue GPD and then summarize the 'how' aspect from
two perspectives: the organization approach and the architecture decomposition ap-
proach.
2.4. SUMMARIZING THE CASE STUDIES 43
Task
NEP&
3sC 0 0 0
.O.0. Cmaiw fad rinMg ]ude mm mwn ) 0 0
u nis T rkra :0 5 4sndrg 0:i a a oa
CMapi rs Tc 0 54 0 0 0 1 41 0
Quote 3cusso 5 5 0 4 a a
Qua* Tra*kig 0 000 004 6
80M c _st _ _m_ is 0 0 a a  4
Oau ma rcaanaa a a a a O 4
Owm"poehieqpnmeapp nmti a a aaao a
B O anIIralysni aosI16M pll cycle arblc a a nca 7 0 a a 0 0 0 4
MC--c ----oiar ima i 4 0 0 a a a 0 0 4
_______________ BW tr arkrw ata a a
ul C 4 0-13 - t-q akl, X
7.5r~in lkg 7.5nnntl"EIU6rikVA*196t
Fi 1 f 6
A B C
Figure 2-18: Sample DSM cutout
2.4.1 Why do firms do GPD?
Ghemawat (2007) stated that an organization's globalization is a mix, in varying
proportions, of adaptation (meeting global market needs), aggregation (of regional
efforts) and arbitrage (attaining efficiencies). For design and development activities,
adaptation and aggregation can be considered as home-base exploiting and arbitrage
as home-based augmenting (Kuemmerle (1997)). We follow on similar lines and clas-
sify the reasons why firms pursue GPD along two motivations: market needs (our
case studies did not have any evidence of this) and efficiencies.
Firms may need to make changes in their CES as they explore overseas markets.
The specific market needs may be designed and developed in the related market. In
such cases, some system architecture development and/or system integration efforts
may also be done at the GPD site. Firms may also pursue GPD seeking efficiencies:
seeking competence through specialized knowledge available at offshore locations,
cost reduction opportunities through lower manpower cost structures, and creating
an option for hedging design and development capacity. In many cases, firms may
opt for GPD to meet market needs while utilizing efficiency benefits. Each firm in
our study was seeking efficiencies in their respective GPD effort.
We observed organization forms motivated by various efficiency considerations in
our case studies (Fig. 2-19). While cost savings were the prime consideration (Dana-
her Motion, Intel, Cessna, Honeywell), these firms had also organized themselves for
other opportunities. Danaher Motion and Cessna were looking for hedging oppor-
tunities too, albeit in different ways. Whilst Danaher Motion used a flexible design
workforce between group companies, Cessna had a combination of inhouse/outsourced
design workforce to meet the PD work content fluctuations. On the other hand, In-
tel's GPD efforts, in addition to cost savings, included competence seeking as they
setup competence centers globally. Pitney Bowes' GPD arrangement with Canon was
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based on dependence for superior printer technology development.
Honeywell
Aerospace
Pitney Bowes Danahe Motion
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Figure 2-19: GPD Considerations
2.4.2 Organization forms
We analyze the firms' approach towards GPD (Fig. 2-20) through the 2x2 make-buy
in-out matrix (Fig. 1-2). While two firms (Intel and Honeywell) set up captive off-
shore development centers, two others (Danaher and Pitney Bowes) sought supplier
support for their offshore engineering activities, and Textron (Cessna) setup an en-
gineering center with a mix of own and supplier staff. Though both Honeywell and
Danaher identified content that could not be offshored, their respective offshoring
approaches were different (inhouse and supplier respectively). Intel and Honeywell
needed to have captive offshore units because the tasks offshored by them were firm-
specific. Though these tasks could utilize the existing talent and knowledge available
in the GPD locations, subsequent firm-specific knowledge was required. Similarly,
Textron (Cessna) identified mission-critical tasks which remained inhouse at their
offshore location but like Danaher Motion, they also had other tasks which were
more 'general' engineering and development oriented and hence it was possible to
identify outsourcing options for these offshoring content. Pitney Bowes sought to
offshore competence for a core part of its product with an offshore supplier. This ap-
proach was clearly a case of competence seeking through outsourcing, and offshoring
happened merely due to the location of the supplier.
2.4.3 Architecture decompositions
The respective decomposition approaches followed by the five firms, towards GPD,
were:
* Danaher Motion: product & process decomposition
* Pitney Bowes: product decomposition
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Figure 2-20: GPD Approaches
* Intel: process decomposition
* Cessna: product (section & function) decomposition
* Honeywell: process (task) decomposition
In addition to the architecture decomposition followed, we also assessed the types
of interfaces after system development (Fig. 2-21). Following Fujimoto (2002), we
differentiated the types of interfaces as open or closed. Closed interfaces are specific
to the product or the firm, while open interfaces are common/standard across firms
in the industry in which the firm operates. Thus, with open interfaces, there exist
opportunities to seek offshore suppliers' existing designs, while closed interfaces re-
quire the offshore location to design interfaces that are specific to the firm. Open
interfaces also reduce the coordination requirement during development, thus reduc-
ing the need for the firm to track the supplier closely (Sanchez and Mahoney (1996):
supplier-manufacturer relationship).
In an integral architecture, it is difficult to identify open interfaces within and
Honeywell presented an example of this wherein decomposition still identified re-
quirements for coordination. Intel, Cessna and Pitney Bowes were more 'modular' in
design with identified closed interfaces. Even Pitney Bowes, with clear defined inter-
faces between the modules, had closed interfaces which were specific to their product.
The open interfaces in the products/systems of these firms existed in the form of elec-
trical connectors, but that level of design existed within the scope of the design and
development offshored rather than at the scope. Only Danaher Motion had certain
open interfaces that were being explored for subsequent offshoring (control systems)
to utilize the existing competencies available with the offshore supplier.
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Figure 2-21: Architecture Assessment and Type of Interface
We summarize our observations from the five case studies in Fig. 2-22, consid-
ering two factors at a time. The figures in the top row illustrate that a firm may
outsource the GPD activities when seeking efficiencies, whether for cost savings or
hedging benefits. Similarly, as shown by the case of Pitney Bowes, firms may seek
offshore suppliers for competence but these should be considered as 'outsourcing for
knowledge' (Fine and Whitney (1996)) rather than as offshoring opportunities. We
also observe that the GPD content that is outsourced is determined by product de-
composition, either on its own or after process decomposition. Similarly the figure in
the second row in Fig. 2-22 shows that the architecture decomposition is generally
hybrid (product after process or process after product) unless the GPD motive is
purely competence seeking or cost savings. We derive some implications for GPD
based on these observations in the next section.
2.5 Key Learnings from Case Studies
2.5.1 Ownership Implications for GPD
We collate our observations from section 2.4 in Fig. 2-23 and analyze the figure to
arrive at some ownership implications for GPD:
1. In the case of Pitney Bowes, they could not have proceeded on their product
without Canon support. We term this quest as seeking complementary knowl-
edge and believe that such a case needs to be treated as one of 'outsourcing
for knowledge' (Fine and Whitney (1996)) rather than offshoring, the offshore
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Figure 2-22: Summary Observations of Case Studies
location of the source of knowledge being a happenstance. However, a firm may
set up an offshore engineering center to benefit from the talent available at the
offshore location; we term this as seeking incremental knowledge. An example
of this would be Intel which set up development centers at Russia and India to
take advantage of local expertise.
2. A firm pursuing GPD for cost savings will set up its own engineering devel-
opment center if the tasks to be offshored relate to core competence or are
'mission-critical' (Cessna) or such that specific product-related development
talent (specialized) is required to be developed with the engineering resources
available at the GPD location (Intel and Honeywell). All other tasks identi-
fied for offshoring can be outsourced. We observed that the outsourced content
generally tends to be of 'general' or 'commodity' nature (with respect to engi-
neering development competence available at GPD location) as seen in the cases
of Danaher Motion and Cessna. Availability and identification of open interfaces
(Fujimoto (2002)) can help get benefits of utilizing existing designs/capabilities
with the GPD supplier.
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3. When tasks are offshored for capacity hedging benefits, the 'extra' or 'spare'
capacity could be inhouse or outsourced. Though Cessna and Danaher Motion
had opted for outsourced engineering centers to hedge design capacity, there do
exist cases (Schneider Electric in PTC (2005)) when a firm may seek to establish
a captive engineering center. When a supplier is used for design and develop-
ment capacity hedging, managing the relationship with the supplier becomes
important as the supplier needs to provide the relevant design workforce when
required.
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Figure 2-23: GPD Ownership by GPD Consideration
2.5.2 Implications for Architecture Decomposition for GPD
We also derive some implications for architecture decomposition (Fig. 2-24):
1. Decomposition helps in identifying offshoring content. Opting for process and/or
product decomposition depends on the firm's GPD motive (cost savings, com-
petence, hedging opportunity).
2. When a firm is seeking GPD for cost savings or for capacity hedging consider-
ations, it may proceed by offshoring certain tasks. So the firm needs a process
decomposition exercise to identify appropriate tasks. However, often, the entire
task responsibility may not be offshored together, rather it may be offshored
in stages. An additional decomposition (thus now requiring a hybrid DSM) is
then needed. Amongst our cases, Danaher Motion followed a process-product
flexible
workforce
capacity
hedging
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decomposition, Intel a process-product-process decomposition, and Cessna had
identified the tasks and then had a product-function decomposition to identify
the exact offshoring content.
3. A firm pursuing GPD for complementary knowledge needs to follow product
decomposition, e.g. Pitney Bowes for outsourcing the printer technology devel-
opment. Such decomposition helps in identifying the exact development respon-
sibility that is offshored/outsourced. However when the firm seeks incremental
knowledge (Intel looking to tap on design talent available offshore), it needs to
follow a product-process hybrid DSM to help identify the exact offshore content
(and interface needs) as the primary knowledge exists within the firm and an
identified content is being sought from the offshore location.
GPD
consideration
Smhed', process function /task
decomposition decomposition
Figure 2-24: Architecture Decomposition by GPD Consideration
2.5.3 Learning to do GPD
We observed the interesting experiences of Danaher Motion and Cessna. These firms
were not quite successful with their initial offshoring experiences. Danaher Motion's
initial offshoring experience consisted of an 'over the wall' approach wherein a set of
tasks were passed on to an offshore supplier and after slow responses, were brought
back onshore (insourced). In their next offshoring attempt, they transferred the
same content but after two additional steps: joining their corporate effort and after
substantial training of their new offshore supplier. In Cessna's case, it was their first
experience of offshoring the system development of a module to a supplier. They faced
challenges in the development effort. However, they believed that it was a learning
experience for them and they would not hesitate to use the same offshore supplier
again.
The above examples illustrate that offshoring is a process that a firm needs to
learn about. Besides the time zone, geographical and cultural challenges that the
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firm faces, the firm also needs to understand the work 'standard' in terms of product
knowledge, standards followed, existing processes and practices, etc. at the offshore
location. A firm may try to force their standards and processes on their suppliers, but
then they are likely to face initial resistance and hence loss of efficiency (expensive).
It may not be easy to change the prevalent practices immediately, even in an inhouse
development facility. The benefits from offshoring design and development activities
is unlikely to be immediate and requires patience on part of the firm.
2.6 Direction for Future Research and Conclusion
We started this paper with a review of the academic literature on GPD and system ar-
chitecture. We then analyzed, using system architecture principles, the GPD efforts
of five firms engaged in the design and development of complex engineered prod-
ucts. We identified the similarities in their GPD approaches from need, architecture
and organization viewpoints. This helped us to identify implications (ownership and
architecture) for firms intenting to pursue GPD. Through these implications and ob-
servations from the case studies, we were able to develop a process for GPD. Amongst
the various inferences and future potential research directions that emerge from the
case studies, the key could be those that address why the firms are doing GPD, how
they are doing GPD and the rationale for the same, and what are the key challenges
that they face in GPD and the corresponding decisions that they take.
As outlined earlier, the case studies have shown that the mode of sourcing (make/
buy) and location for sourcing (onshore/offshore) are parallel decisions. It is impor-
tant for a firm to identify its core competence and intellectual properties, and which
of those they would be willing to share. In CES, core competence or intellectual prop-
erty is primarily a sub-system or a component of the final product, and rarely the
complete CES. Literature (Novak and Eppinger (2001)) has shown that there exists
strong complementarity between complexity in product design and vertical integra-
tion of production, with in-house production being more attractive when product
complexity is high. This drives an idea for research along the lines - using system
architecture tools, how easy or difficult is it to decompose a CES so that GPD of
sub-systems/components can be pursued? What is the relationship between design
complexity and design integration (vertical and horizontal)? Further, from the in-
formation processing view that architectural knowledge tends to become embedded
in the structure and information processing procedures of established organizations
(Henderson and Clark (1990)), it may be worthwhile to see if GPD opportunities
(either pursued due to adaptation or arbitrage reasons) drive architectural changes
and if they do, how does that impact the firm?
Even for a firm that is able to identify its core competence and intellectual prop-
erty that it would want to retain in house, it may still be very difficult to offshore/
outsource the remaining due to the information flows, linkages, dependencies, etc.
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present between the identified in-house and outsource processes/ sub-systems/ parts.
This challenge is magnified for CES. Managers face a significant problem in identify-
ing the GPD content. We believe that managers need to first recognize the difference
between offshoring and outsourcing. The trade-offs are different between these cases.
Further, most academic and practice literature calls for offshoring of modular designs/
activities. These are quite difficult to identify, particularly in CES. Managers need to
be aware that modularity in manufacturing need not necessarily mean modularity in
design. CES are designed and developed by large teams of engineers who need to fre-
quently share and exchange information, and it is challenging to identify engineering
tasks that are truely modular (Pitney Bowes could do so).
System architecture can play a very useful role here. Clearly the outsourced
package is invariably less than the identified 'outsource-able' package (after make-
buy analysis). Similarly, the entire 'offshore-able' package may not get offshored.
This may not be the most desirable situation, more so when a firm is firm is pur-
suing GPD for efficiencies through cost savings. Here system architecture tools like
DSM can play an important role. In this paper, we have shown how DSM could be
used to analyze GPD actions. Research opportunities exist to explore and identify
measures or constructs to quantify the dependencies between the processes/tasks or
sub-systems/components. Such a quantitative approach can help prioritize and op-
timize GPD efforts for maximum benefits (e.g. Intel and Honeywell cases). These
constructs and measures need to first identify the system architecture approach that
the firm needs to follow - process decomposition, or task decomposition, or product
decomposition (functional or sectional), etc. The construct and measures identified
should correspond to the decomposition route chosen.
The key performance measurement constructs for product development are cost,
timing, and quality. The five firms that we studied, pursued GPD for efficiency
reasons in different ways (Fig. 2-19). Tools and methods are needed for measuring
the respective efficiency gains from GPD. Such methods need to carefully consider
the trade-offs involved. The Honeywell case is a good starting example, where the
lower labor cost of medium cost and low cost offshore locations is offset by increased
coordination requirements. A mixed-integer programming formulation can be used
to determine the locations for the respective tasks, optimizing the trade-off between
the reductions in labor costs and the increase in co-ordination costs for moving away
from on-shore activities.
Min Xik(Cik + Wik) i : task, k : location
i k
subject to constraints
Xik is an indicator (decision) variable, with value 1 when task i is done at location
k. Wik is the manpower cost associated with the individual engineering effort for
doing task i at location k and Cik is the manpower cost for all the coordination that
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needs to be done for task i at location k. Thus, Cik = E-, >k' Ck,'k'. The prevailing
constraints also need to be incorporated. This is a very primary formulation, and
research can lead to more sophisticated models that incorporate information flow,
dependencies, feedback loops, etc. from system architecture decompositions, thus
helping to identify better efficiency opportunities in GPD. In the next chapter we
develop the theory leading to a recursive equation for offshoring decisions and apply
it in an industrial setting. We use economic modeling to first optimize the global
product development organization of a firm and then identify some key factors that
impact offshoring and their respective effects on the offshoring decision. Managers
need to embrace economic modeling towards GPD content identification.
Earlier in the chapter (section 2.1 ) we discussed the challenges in communication
and knowledge transfer that global R&D organizations face. Product development is
the transformation of embedded knowledge to embodied knowledge (Madhavan and
Grover (1998)). GPD brings with it the requirements of teams dispersed globally to
be able to communicate and comprehend each other. There is added complexity that
the teams could be operating in time zones that do not overlap during working hours.
Product development requires constant and consistent communication. As observed
in the Honeywell case, the coordination time required between tasks increases when
the tasks are done from different locations. Most decompositions stretch to use nu-
merical DSMs to provide a quantification to the level of coordination required, but
we have not come across any model that incorporates the cultural differences (and ac-
tions required to overcome), communication challenges, or time zone differences, and
has tried to incorporate them into a decision framework. Sosa et al. (2004) studied
the mapping of design interfaces in the product architecture to the communication
patterns within the development organization in a firm, and found that strong design
interfaces tend to be more likely to be aligned with team interactions. An interesting
study could be to observe the change in alignment with GPD - do teams in differ-
ent locations (with their cultural, communication, time zone challenges) continue to
have the same level of interactions or if they change, how do they change, given that
their design interfaces remain the same. If they change, is it possible to quantify the
change, identify the causes for change, and possibly establish a model to predict the
change based on these causes? This study may need to extend across firms.
The above aspects of GPD lead us to consider a key deliverable of any product
development process - timing. Most firms involved in CES tend to follow a stage
gate process (Cooper (1993)). Assuming that the product definition has been com-
pleted, a detailed time plan to launch is then laid out. Such a plan does take into
account the resource availability. In GPD, these resources may be available, with
the added variability of different location, culture, communication methods, and time
zone differences. This can lead to research studying the changes in project time with
GPD. The research could look at the impact of GPD on project timing from different
perspectives: Does project timing change? If so, by how much? Do firms accept
this change in timing or do they, in the event that they are using a location with
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significantly lower labor costs, hire more personnel to maintain or expedite timing?
How does the capability of engineers hired in the GPD location compare with the
home base (a measurement construct may need to be developed) and how does that
impact project timing? Does a firm incorporate learning and hence expect prod-
uct development time for the sub-processes/sub-systems offshored to reduce? How
are these learnings identified and incorporated in the offshoring decision? How does
GPD influence the firm's ability to respond to market changes (leading to changes in
product definition)?
In addition to cost and time, the other major PD parameter is quality. Though
a firm may pursue GPD for arbitrage, it is unlikely that they may compromise on
the quality of the PD process. We observed that Danaher Motion/Dover faced per-
formance problems in their initial GPD effort and had to change their respective
offshore suppliers. Similarly, Cessna was not satisfied with the initial progress in
their first GPD efforts, though in retrospect they would be willing to work with the
same supplier again. Quality dissatisfaction in GPD could arise due to inability of
GPD locations to meet home base requirements in terms cost, specifications, tim-
ing, etc., communication issues leading to misinterpretation, cultural differences, etc.
Considering that GPD efforts are mushrooming now, there are opportunities to re-
search the determinants of good quality in GPD and perhaps help arrive at proper
quality parameters which can be used during GPD assessment.
Most of the research ideas above perhaps allude to a single GPD action by the
firm. In reality, a firm is likely to start slow, outsource a part of a process or a sub-
system, assess the performance, and then decide on how to proceed. It is likely to be
a time-phased sequential decision process. In Phase 3 of the Danaher Motion/Dover
case, we have tried to outline the possibilities for better utilization of the GDC -
the final decision to do so would depend on Dover's satisfaction of the performance
of the GDC in Phase 2 and the benefits that the GDC will provide in Phase 3.
Similarly, Pitney Bowes, through product decomposition, has been able to outsource
the manufacturing of modules. These suppliers may have the capability to progress on
to designing the modules thereafter (Canon is already designing the printer technology
and the finishing module is a natural step forward for them). Similarly, Cessna will
look for higher utilization, through a mix of in-house/outsource, from the GTC. By
developing a suitable real option structure (Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Trigeorgis
(1996)), researchers can look at how system architecture can progressively identify
sub-processes/tasks or sub-systems/components for outsourcing or offshoring. By
going in for a sequential approach to GPD, the firm will be able to evaluate the
progress until date and the prevailing environment before deciding on the quantum
of task/component for the next stage of GPD.
GPD is emerging as the valuable tool for managers. While the first wave of GPD
is likely to be a result of arbitrage or adaptation considerations, soon aggregation
on regional basis may take over. Though earlier literature has covered multi-national
R&D, they have focused more on research. Simultaneous development as envisaged in
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GPD has received scant attention in literature until Eppinger and Chitkara (2007) and
Anderson et al. (2008). In this chapter we outlined some of the relevant literature on
R&D networks, presented five case studies of GPD experiences of companies engaged
in complex engineered products, and built on the same to identify a process for GPD
that firms can follow. Our findings and proposals reflect the current state of GPD
practice and related opportunities therein. We expect that as GPD practice evolves,
our findings and proposals will modify accordingly.
Chapter 3
Optimal Structuring of Global
Product Development
Organizations
Chapter Abstract: This chapter proposes a methodology to optimally structure the
global work distribution for a product development (PD) organization. Research in
optimal work distribution/allocation in PD organizations has been limited, so far, to
prescriptions recommending distribution of modular tasks/responsibilities. However,
most PD efforts are characterized by significant complexity in information sharing
and information dependency between PD tasks which are performed in parallel. This
complexity is represented by coupling in the system architecture (product, process,
organization) of the firm. Further, such complexity restricts the PD performance of
the firm when the participants of the PD organization are globally distributed (GPD).
We build on our earlier field studies and existing literature to identify the key factor
that contributes to the performance of the GPD organization: coordination required
between PD tasks. We incorporate this factor to develop a recursive equation model
that structures the global work distribution of a PD organization. We apply our
model to optimally structure the GPD organization in an industrial setting, utilizing
the design structure matrix (DSM) to identify the system architecture of the firm.
Our optimization results, based on detailed modeling of coordination costs, show
significant cost savings through a re-structured PD organization. Subsequent analysis
of our results shows that while offshoring based on modularity is generally right, it is
not the whole answer as there exists a trade-off between the efficiency of performing
specific PD tasks at the offshore location and the modularity of the task.
In the previous chapter we observed the GPD efforts of five firms involved in the
development of large complex engineered products. We analyzed their respective
approaches from a system architecture view using the DSM tool. We then summarized
the findings by proposing a GPD approach that a firm may follow. We recognized
that while our summary reflected our observations in these firms, developing 'thumb
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rules' to enable firms (engaged in the design and development of complex engineered
products) is a rather daunting task. Most of the firms' selection of GPD content
evolved from a 'gut feel' or 'thought it was easy' (to get the offshore work done)
approach. There appeared to be a lack of coherence amongst the set of components
or product development activities that were offshored. To understand the way in
which a firm needs to develop its GPD organization, we frame our research question
as: How does a firm optimally structure the global work distribution, over
time, of its product development organization? Further, given our interest in
complex products, the role of system architecture in the analysis of complex products,
and our observation of the relationship of system architecture and GPD content, we
extend our research question to: How does the firm's architecture affect these
work distribution decisions?.
We explore the above research questions in this chapter. In the previous chapter
we had completed a literature survey on GPD and system architecture. In this chapter
we discuss complex products/systems and their relevance to the offshoring questions
(outlined in the previous paragraph). We then proceed to develop a theory, incorpo-
rating the firm's architecture, towards structuring an GPD organization by building
on existing research in the areas of operations management, product development,
organizations, and transactions theory. Finally we apply this model in an industrial
setting to show how a firm can optimally structure the global work distribution of its
product development organization.
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 What is Global Product Development?
Product development (PD) has been defined and studied in many ways. Brown
and Eisenhardt (1995) segregated the research on PD along three streams: PD as
a rational plan (careful planning followed by meticulous execution supported by top
management), PD as a communication web (communication within and with outside
suppliers stimulates the performance of development teams) and PD as disciplined
problem solving (overall balanced act across all activities leading to project success).
Other definitions of PD include those by Wheelwright and Clark (1992) (effective
organization and management to enable an organization to bring successful products
to market, with short development times and low development costs), Krishnan and
Ulrich (2001) (transformation of a market opportunity into a product available for
sale), Ulrich and Eppinger (2004) (set of activities transforming the market oppor-
tunity to the production, sales and delivery of a product), Ulrich and Ellison (2005)
(information processing), etc. In yet another definition, Madhavan and Grover (1998)
defined new product development as the process that converts embedded knowledge
(knowledge residing either inside or outside the organization) to embodied knowledge
(knowledge incorporated into the product). Loch and Kavadias (2008) summarized
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various definitions of PD and characterized PD as comprising of four key elements:
variant generation process, selection process, transformation process, and coordina-
tion process.
GPD, specifically, has been defined by Eppinger and Chitkara (2007) as com-
bining certain centralized functions with some engineering and related PD functions
distributed to other sites or regions of the world - the practice may involve outsourced
engineering work along with captive offshore engineering facilities. Along similar lines,
Anderson et al. (2008) refer to distributed product development as the use of orga-
nizational arrangements involving multiple organizations that are separated by firm,
geographical, or other boundaries, that are used for product development.
From the above definitions, we observe that GPD is an organization form for a
firm's PD activities. A firm may resort to this organization form to address specific
elements amongst those outlined by Loch and Kavadias (2008). This organization
form is dynamic and seeks to generate increasing value, over time, for the firm.
As discussed in the previous chapter, a firm's GPD efforts are a mix of adaptation,
aggregation, efficiency seeking (through cost reductions, or seeking competencies)
and capacity hedging. In this chapter we model for a firm that is pursuing GPD
for cost reduction (through re-assignment of work content within the firm, across
locations). Subsequently we discuss the flexibility of our model towards the other
GPD considerations.
3.1.2 What are Complex Products/Systems?
While academic literature has extensively covered modular products/ systems (Ulrich
(1995)), it is very difficult to identify most products or systems as modular. Rather
most of them can be called complex systems. Complex products are made up of a
large number of parts that interact in such non-simple ways that it is not easy to in-
fer the properties of the product from those of the parts and their given interactions
(Simon (1969)). Our interest lies in those complex products that are engineered, i.e.
CES, which has been discussed in section 2.1.2. Such CES products have a significant
number of interaction needs between the systems, sub-systems, components, tasks,
or activities that they are made of (Fig 2-2). These interactions necessitate signifi-
cant coordination needs to ensure that appropriate information exchange takes place
(Clark and Fujimoto (1991), Wheelwright and Clark (1992)).
As outlined in section 2.2, it is rare for a firm engaged in the design and develop-
ment of CES to offshore the complete set of activities other than when either it is to
an offshore captive unit or the product is being supplied by an ODM. At times the
design and development may be offshored (with outsourcing) to design houses but
these become rare as the complexity of products increases. However when a firm is in
the process of setting up an offshore development center (captive or supplier), it starts
with a set of tasks, with the expectation that this set would grow over time. Identifi-
cation of these set of tasks is challenging for complex systems due to the coordination
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needs.
As shown earlier (Fig 2-3), CES can be thought of being made up of sub-systems
which, in turn, are made of components or tasks (referred to as 'task' hereafter).
At the task level, there can be a need for significant coordination during offshoring.
As shown in Fig 2-3, offshoring of a task that has coordination needs with another
task that is at a different (home) location is hard compared to offshoring of either
a task that does not have such coordination needs or a set of tasks that have co-
ordination needs within themselves. However in some cases the firm may decide to
go in for offshoring the component with coordination needs across locations when it
may be seeking product competence and is unable to identify the necessary interfaces
(Fujimoto (2002)) to eliminate coordination needs. Generally these happen with out-
sourcing where the supplier with the necessary competence happens to be offshore (a
happenstance). In chapter 2 we saw the example of Pitney Bowes who could identify
the interface needs to ensure outsourcing to an offshore supplier Canon with limited
coordination needs during component development. It could also arise when a firm
offshores a task because it believes that the benefits may outweigh the challenges
posed by coordination between locations.
The above offshoring approaches can be classified into two types for CES: com-
ponent offshoring and sub-system offshoring (Fig 2-4). Each of these GPD organiza-
tional arrangements has its own benefits and challenges. While sub-system offshoring
may ensure that coordination needs are controlled within a location, it could lead to
loss of sub-system development capability at the home location. Similarly compo-
nent development offshoring will require significant coordination across locations and
a potential loss of efficiency.
3.2 Theory and Model Development
Since GPD is a relatively new research topic, there is limited academic literature, in
particular economic modeling, that identifies the approach that a firm should take
with respect to offshoring content. At the base of any economic modeling is the
trade-off question which is determined by the intent of the exercise. As outlined
in chapter 2, firms pursue offshoring for cost savings, capacity hedging, competence
seeking, adaptation and aggregation purposes. Here we will develop the theory and
model that reflect the evolving GPD organization for a firm seeking cost savings. We
use existing theories in product development, operations management, organizations,
and organization economics literature to build our model. Since a lot of this literature
was developed for outsourcing (make/buy decision), we will first distinguish between
offshoring and outsourcing.
As discussed in chapter 1, offshoring involves the location of the various indi-
viduals and groups involved in the PD activities. The challenges here pertain to
those of ensuring appropriate exchange of information or coordination across time-
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zones, cultures, geographic distances, etc. (Anderson et al. (2008), Boh et al. (2007),
Loch and Terwiesch (2008), Srikanth and Puranam (2008a), Srikanth and Puranam
(2008b)). Thus, activities that require significant coordination during product devel-
opment stay onshore whilst others can be offshored.
On the other hand, outsourcing involves the ownership of the various resources
involved in the PD activities. The make/buy decision is driven by various factors,
including cost and competence. The key challenge here is to protect those resources
of the firm that are strategic in value and provide sustained competence. In a
CES, as seen in chapter 2, system development and system integration is rarely out-
sourced (except for ODMs). The outsourced PD activities are defined during system
development and generally constitute a subset of PD activities. It is rare for a PD
activity that is considered strategic to be outsourced unless the firm believes that the
value proposition (Fine (1998), Fine et al. (2002)) from such an action will be sus-
tainable (avoid 'outsourcing trap' (Anderson and Parker (2004)), e.g. Pitney Bowes
outsourcing printer development to Canon in chapter 2.
We plot the respective trade-offs of outsourcing and offshoring along different
axes in Fig. 1-2 (Ulrich and Ellison (2005), Eppinger and Chitkara (2007), Khurana
(2007)). Each PD activity can be assigned to one of the four squares and the related
action on the same is shown in the figure. Thus, PD activities which are high in
coordination needs but low in strategic content can be outsourced but not offshored
and similarly PD activities that are high in strategic content but low in coordination
needs can be offshored but not outsourced. There can be exceptions to the above,
e.g. Pitney Bowes' relationship with Canon, and these need to be managed carefully.
Our theory and model developed over the remainder of this section address the
issue of the firm that is seeking to set up an offshore location to achieve cost savings.
The key difference between modeling for offshoring in such a case and a outsourcing
model is that the value proposition in outsourcing extends to the relative incentive
structures between the firm and the supplier. In terms of Fig. 1-2, our model de-
veloped here addresses the trade-off between top and bottom boxes on the left side
('make'). We build our model on existing work in OM/PD/Organizations and orga-
nization economics literature (similar to Gomes and Joglekar (2008)).
3.2.1 OM/PD/Organizations Approach
The Operations Management/Product Development/Organizations (OM/PD/Org.)
literature provides two complementary prescriptions with regards to GPD: offshore
modular products and improve communication between GPD locations (Srikanth and
Puranam (2008a)). This stream can be traced to the seminal work of March and Si-
mon (1958) who stated that there are two generic coordination strategies: coordina-
tion by plan and coordination by feedback. Organization planners aim for decompo-
sition to identify standardized interactions between interdependent tasks to achieve
coordination by plan. However as uncertainty increases, coordination relies more on
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feedback. Thus while modularity achieves coordination by plan, ICT (Information
and Communication Technology) tools are used to achieve coordination by feedback
(Srikanth and Puranam (2008b)).
The fundamental concern of OM/PD/Org. approach is to ensure that PD pro-
grams adhere to or exceed the program timing and/or quality targets (Krishnan et al.
(1997), Loch and Terwiesch (1998), Terwiesch et al. (2002)); this stream considers
task interdependency and concurrency. As outlined by Allen (1977), increasing the
distance between members of a R&D group reduces the chances of them communi-
cating for technical matters. Sosa et al. (2002) found that while firms have found
ways to mitigate such hindering effects, there continues to be a detrimental impact of
distance separation. In a GPD environment, specially when the geographic distances
are large and there exist significant time-zone differences, effectiveness of coordination
is challenged (Kraut et al. (2002), Armstrong and Cole (2002)). Hence the proposed
way is through reduced need for interactions across locations, implying the offshoring
of modular tasks (Sanchez and Mahoney (1996), Baldwin and Clark (2000), Lan-
glois (2002)) or that of 'task-partitioning' to ensure minimum interdependence across
barriers (von Hippel (1990)) to ensure proper division of labor in the information
processing view (Simon (1973)). However this proposal assumes that the interfaces
are well identified and defined.
The IT literature has built on Parnas (1972) to identify methods of pursuing
modularization. However it may not always be possible to achieve modular structures
(Ethiraj and Levinthal (2004)) to aid offshoring in CES. This could be due to the
complexity of the system (Simon (1969), Whitney et al. (2004)) or because it may
require significant economic and/or technical sacrifices to attain modularity (driven by
bounded rationality (March and Simon (1958), Whitney (1996))). So it is necessary
to have appropriate means of communication between the various GPD locations
and efforts should be made to improve the ICT (Information and Communication
Technologies) tools for the same (Kraut et al. (2002)). However, the effectiveness of
ICT tools as appropriate and successful channels of communications continues to be
debated (Olson and Olson (2000), Olson et al. (2002), Orlikowski (2002)).
In addition, a new area of research, common ground (Srikanth and Puranam
(2008a)), is emerging. Common ground between two parties is defined as their net
common knowledge, belief and suppositions (Clark (1996)). Common ground can be
achieved across locations by relying on shared work procedures, enabling visibility
of information across locations and prior shared experience (Srikanth and Puranam
(2008a)) or by forging social identities (Kogut and Zander (1996)). This common
knowledge helps achieve tacit communication and thus supports coordination efforts.
3.2.2 Transaction Costs Approach
Transactions costs theory (TC) as defined by Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975,
1985) looks at firms making the decision between markets and hierarchies based on
3.2. THEORY AND MODEL DEVELOPMENT
economic value. Williamson (1975) built on the principle of bounded rationality
(Simon (1957)) to say that bounded rationality and opportunism combined to give
rise to TC. The decision variable is the governance structure which depends on asset
specificity, and uncertainty arising from behavior and environment (Rindfleisch and
Heide (1997)). Clemons et al. (1993) outlined thus:
total cost = production cost + transaction cost
transaction cost = coordination cost + operations risk + opportunism risk
(3.2.1)
Operations risk arises from environmental uncertainty and opportunism risk from
behavioral uncertainty. TC theory is primarily concerned with the make/buy co-
nundrum. GPD, when considered independent of the sourcing decision and hence
looked at solely as the location decision, can be compared to (3.2.1) above. Since we
are considering the in/out-sourcing issue, opportunism risk need not be considered.
Coordination costs are incurred during interactions across locations and operations
risk arises out of the environmental uncertainty pertaining to offshoring the PD task
to a GPD location. This uncertainty leads to differential efficiencies between various
locations while performing the same tasks. We need to consider these factors during
economic modeling.
3.2.3 Theory Setup
As seen in the earlier sections, modularity and coordination needs are key parameters
to be incorporated for modeling GPD organization structures. Modularity is a mea-
sure of task interdependence for a given architecture (Gomes and Joglekar (2008)).
Given our interest in complex products and systems, it is necessary to perform system
architecture studies, which are abstract descriptions of the entities of a system and
the relationships between those entities (Whitney et al. (2004)). Architecture de-
termines the amount of interactions (coordination time and cost) between PD tasks
which may be performed from different locations.
Brown and Eisenhardt (1995) stated that PD comprises of a set of disciplined prob-
lem solving tasks. We extend the interpretation of 'disciplined problem solving' to
imply that PD comprises of a set of information processing tasks, in each of which, in-
formation is received, generated/processed (problem solving) and disseminated. This
follows the information processing view of product development (Galbraith (1973),
Tushman and Nadler (1978), Clark and Fujimoto (1991), Adler (1995)). Thus, the
associated PD task time comprises of time required for each of these activities related
to information processing. We can segregate this task time into work time, where time
is spent individually by the responsible group in performing the sub-tasks leading to
the deliverables of the task (information generation or disciplined problem solving),
and coordination time, where time is spent by the group in obtaining information to
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support its efforts, working jointly with other groups towards completing the deliver-
ables of its tasks, dissipating the output of its tasks to other appropriate groups, etc.
(receiving and dissipating information). Thus,
task time = work time + coordination time
This information (the division of task time) is obtained through system architecture
studies. With respect to (3.2.1), operations risk lies with both work and coordination
time as the time required to complete the equivalent amount of work at the GPD
location may not be the same as the home location and further, there could exist
uncertainty regarding the time taken to complete the PD task. Similar uncertainty
may also be experienced with respect to coordination time. Uncertainty needs to be
incorporated into GPD modeling.
Given the definition of modularity as an indicator of 'dis-connectivity' (Gomes and
Joglekar (2008)) and the above segregation of task time, we identify the modularity
index of a task in the GPD context as follows:
work timeindex of modularity = work time (3.2.2)
work time + coordination time
Thus, a task that has low coordination requirements (in proportion to its work time)
is more modular and its index of modularity will tend towards 1. We will use this
measure of modularity for the rest of the thesis. We need to highlight here that when
we mention higher modularity, increasing modularity, etc. in the rest of the thesis,
we would be referring to this index of modularity. None of these terms would imply
that the task/department/component is completely modular (index = 1).
Further there are switching costs with every increase in work assignment at the
GPD center (coupled with the decrease in work assignment at other locations). These
switching costs cover hiring, training, retrenchment, etc. Some of these switching costs
may be used to alleviate the challenges of multi-location coordination. Switching costs
need to be considered for modeling purposes.
3.2.4 Model Development
Consider a firm engaged in the design and development of a product. This product
can be decomposed into various components, each of which is required to go through a
set of PD activities leading to the market launch of the product (Ulrich and Eppinger
(2004)). We represent each of these component-activity combinations by n. The set
of all n is then partitioned into 2 sets I and I', where I comprises of all n that the
firm has identified for offshoring (top-left box in Fig 1-2). Let k denote the locations
where n E I can be carried out (current home base, offshore locations, other onshore
locations, etc.). Ankt is the decision variable that indicates that n is performed at
location k at time t (Ankt E {0, 1}). Then, we can model our research question, with
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total cost as the value proposition and Vt as the total expected value at time t, as:
V = min Ant [[St + Z Z ekt.Ankt(Wnkt + Cnkt)] + e-.E[Vt+]] (3.2.3)
k n
At time t, each n has a work time Wnkt and a coordination time ckt at location k.
Besides k, Cnkt also depends on locations k' where all the other n (with which it has
to coordinate for successful completion of its tasks) are located. Thus if we designate
the home/base location as k = 1, an efficiency factor can be used to relate Wnkt with
the home/base location time Wn(k=l)t. Similarly we can have efficiency factors relating
the coordination time. We will discuss efficiency factors in greater detail in the next
section.
lkt is the manpower rate at location k at time t. St is the sum of all the switching
costs incurred at time t when a n undergoes a change in location or an added in-
vestment is input to improve productivity. It comprises of hiring costs, retrenchment
costs, training costs, etc. e- 3 is the discounting factor. The expectation is with re-
spect to work time and coordination time. Thus our research question is represented
as a recursive equation where we look for the appropriate task locations to minimize
the total cost over the period under study. Some related constraints are:
SAnkt = 1 Vi, k,t (3.2.4)
k
Cnkt = 55 Cnn'kk't Vn, n', k, k', t (3.2.5)
n' k'
other applicable constraints (3.2.6)
(3.2.4) ensures each n is only performed at a single location at time t. Thus, the
above is equivalent to the work location problem seen in optimization literature (since
we have specified Ankt E {0, 1}). The above formulation can be generalized to a work
distribution problem by taking Ankt E [0, 1], i.e. Ankt is continuous in [0, 1]. (3.2.5)
defines the total coordination time of n at location k at time t. We observe from
this equation that the coordination time is, thus, also dependent on the location k'
of all other n' with whom n has to coordinate. (3.2.6) is a set of all other applicable
constraints that are required to be fulfilled, e.g. all work and coordination needs
are fulfilled, capacity constraints (absolute and change across time periods), budget
constraints on expansion/retrenchment, preference relationships between tasks that
are to be offshored, etc. We will identify a few of these during our empirical exercise
in section 3.3.
Now suppose Wn(k=home)t is the total time required to complete the work at home
location for task (i, j)at time t. Then,
Wnkt X Onkt = Wn(k=home)t Vn, k, t (3.2.7)
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where cnkt is the relative efficiency of doing task n at location k at time t. The
efficiency factor is relative to the home location (Sobrero and Roberts (2001)). This
can also be explained as the 'stickiness' (von Hippel (1994), Srikanth and Puranam
(2008b)) of the work, where stickiness is the incremental expenditure required to
transfer that problem solving capability. Though there may exist related capabilities
in the GPD location, knowledge specific to the firm may not exist (Kogut and Zander
(1992)), thus leading to efficiency differences compared to the home location. Such
inability to transfer the home base efficiency to GPD location can also be attributed to
human asset specificity (Williamson (1985), Zaheer and Venkatraman (1994)) wherein
the specialized human skills that have been generated through learning by doing over
many years at the home location cannot be transferred or replicated at the GPD
location immediately. Similarly, for coordination time, we have
Cnk,n'k',t X Onk,n'k',t > c Vn, n', t (3.2.8)
cnkt =- E E Cnk,n'k,t Vn, k, t (3.2.9)
n' k'
where Onk,n'k',t is the relative efficiency of coordination between tasks n and n', which
are at locations k and k' respectively at time t. It is relative to coordination time
required between the same tasks when both are done at the home location, i.e. k
- k'= home/base location, at time t. (3.2.9) defines Cnkt which is used in (3.2.3).
Thus (3.2.7) and (3.2.8) ensure that all the work and coordination requirements are
met at all time t. However, it builds on the assumption that the firm architecture
remains constant. (3.2.7) and (3.2.8) can be varied to incorporate changes in total
task content and architecture changes, if any. With repetitions of the job, the GPD
locations learn by doing (Argote (1999)). The efficiency factors Onkt and Onk,n'k',t
evolve over time based on these learning effects.
The above formulation includes all the factors that we have discussed. The actual
work distribution/assignment will depend on the relative work time and coordination
time requirements of each n. While the above formulation is primarily based with cost
as the decision factor, it is possible to extend it to other factors that drive a firm's
GPD efforts. Adaptation to local market needs, aggregation for a market region,
and competence seeking can be built in through appropriate constraints on Ankt and
capacity constraints. Similarly, hedging scenarios can be studied through changes in
wnt and c,,n',t in equations (3.2.7) and (3.2.8) respectively.
The above formulation represents a real options setup (Dixit and Pindyck (1994),
Trigeorgis (1996)). By starting the GPD process by offshoring the first task, the
firm creates the option of offshoring further tasks (it has the opportunity but not the
obligation). Offshoring the first task allows the next task to be offshored to the same
location with spillover benefits or learning effects from doing the first task (Schilling
et al. (2003)). Real option problems have been studied in detail primarily through
dynamic programming and contingent claim analysis. Approaches to address similar
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models have included the use of queuing theory, stochastic knapsack problems, index
policies using dynamic programming, etc. However, the interdependence (interac-
tions) between tasks violates the assumptions in most of these formulations (require
tasks to be independent).
A common approach to such problems (task selection, i.e. (Ankt E {0, 1})) is
through the use of index policies (bandit class of problems). The multi-armed bandit
problem has been shown to be polynomial-time solvable using the Gittins Index (Git-
tins and Jones (1972)). However, a critical assumption for the multi-armed bandit and
the restless bandit (the task's reward structure changes even when not acted upon),
which has been shown to be PSPACE-hard (Papadimitriou and Tsitsiklis (1999)), is
that the tasks are independent of each other. This assumption is not valid in our case
since we are dealing with complex systems where change in location k for a n may
result in change in coordination time and thus affect the task time of other tasks.
Our problem falls under the category of generalized bandit problems which have no
known general solutions. Literature on the same (Nash (1980)) assumes separability
of tasks to define indices.
Model formulation (3.2.3) is very general. It can be used to identify work allo-
cation/distribution when a new offshore development center is being setup or when
seeking a more efficient PD organization structure. The key challenges when solving a
problem using this formulation are: (a) identifying and collating the appropriate data
(the inter-dependencies), and (b) managing the complexity of the problem. In the
next section we show a methodology to restructure the existing work distribution in
an industrial setting, using the above formulation, to minimize total cost. We outline
the data required, its generation, and then a transformation to solve the formulation.
3.3 Organizing GPD at Nokia
(per agreement with Nokia, organization names have been altered and data scaled for
confidentiality purposes)
Nokia is involved in the design, development, manufacture and sale of mobile
phones and related services. Their product has evolved from a device in the 1990s
to include more features and significant associated services. Our research is based at
a division of Nokia that we identify as the High-End devices division. This division
comprises of the Hardware (A) and Software (B) business units. These business units
comprise of departments that are spread globally. We segregated these departments
between those that were flexible to re-organization (j) and those that were not (d).
Business unit A had 10 j and a single d department. Business unit B comprises of a
single d department.
The initial expansion of the High-End devices division beyond Finland (k = 1),
the home location, was in search of competencies and development capacity. This
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had led to development centers at various global locations (k = 2, 3, 4, 5) with each
department having its own work distribution across locations mjk, mdk. With the
evolution of the internet and development of digital design tools, the High-End divi-
sion set up another development center (k = 6), the low cost location, transferring
work responsibility of certain j departments there. This development center had sig-
nificantly lower manpower costs with respect to the other locations. Though this
development center was in its third year of operations, the High-End devices contin-
ued to face significant difficulties in managing development activities within the new
center and between the new center and other development centers. The High-End
division was looking at reorganizing the work distribution across locations with an
intent to minimize the total cost over a planning period of 5 years.
PDD Process: The High-End devices division is involved in many programs si-
multaneously. Each program's PDD process (Fig. 3-1) comprises of range planning,
product definition, and product development phases. While there exist several for-
mal and informal reviews through the earlier phases, the stage-gate process (Cooper
(1993)) starts with the product development phase. The planning phase is calendar
based and common across products. It ends in December (year t) with the confirmed
launch plans for t + 2 year. It also schedules the resources for all the products un-
der development. At this stage, the program is either notified as a complex product
(a) or a standard product (b) program (a + b = e). The ratio a/b and e are main-
tained constant by the division for planning and execution purposes. The definition
phase involves identification of the product characteristics and culminates with prod-
uct definition and product architecture freeze. There could be a time gap between
completion of planning phase and start of definition phase. The product develop-
ment phase starts on completion of product definition, and ends when the product
is ready for market launch, wherein the product is customized per respective market
needs. Our exercise involved the range planning, product definition, and product
development phases.
Research Range Product Product MarketPlanning Definition Development Launch
Product Design & Development
Figure 3-1: Nokia Product Development Process
3.3.1 Problem Definition
We could relate the problem with our formulation for organizing global product de-
velopment (3.2.3). The tradeoff relates to lower costs (due to lower manpower rates)
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of doing PDD work at some locations but is associated with the caveat of higher
task time and coordination challenges across locations. In discussions with Nokia,
we agreed on using net cost as the criterion for evaluation. Our objective involved
identifying the global distribution of work for the various departments over a planning
period of 5 years (each year is a time period). We needed to develop the model to
include specific Nokia related constraints (e.g. location based content, etc.).
We applied the model developed earlier in this chapter (3.2.3) to address Nokia's
dilemma. We identified and measured/derived the related variables and captured the
learning dynamics. We modified our recursive equation (3.2.3) for this situation, and
optimized for various scenarios. We used our definition of modularity (3.2.2) to make
observations on the results obtained. Thus, we were able to address the two research
questions that we had posed: How does a firm optimally structure the global
work distribution, over time, of its product development organization?
How does the firm's architecture affect these work distribution decisions?.
By firm's architecture, we imply the product, process or hybrid architecture that can
be used for system decomposition to help the firm identify the task to be offshored.
The High-End devices division was looking at work distribution, across locations,
for each department. This implied that we had to consider the aggregate of all
programs that the division is involved in each year. Thus, in a hierarchical sense
(Anderson and Joglekar (2005)), we were looking at identifying the work distribution
at a 'strategic --+ operational' level. Actual work distribution for each program would
be derived based on simulation studies/manpower availability and would constitute
the 'tactical' level. For each type of program (complex product or standard prod-
uct), the High-End devices division has identified the manpower allocation for each
department for each phase, and for the product development phase, the manpower
allocation for each stage gate has been identified. Thus our problem relates to work
distribution of the total manpower, which is the aggregate of the allocation for all
departments for all programs in a given year.
At the program level, there will be a higher level of uncertainty relating to the
specific nuances of the program. Such uncertainty could lead to different departments
needing to get involved in unplanned coordination (coordination by feedback (March
and Simon (1958))), perhaps requiring temporary allocation of extra work time and
coordination time. These are balanced by transferring engineering staff from other
programs or by hiring temporary staff. At the organization level, the aggregate
planning considers the average coordination that is required by each type of program
(coordination by plan (March and Simon (1958))). Hence, our study reduces (3.2.3) to
a multi-period mathematical programming (deterministic) formulation. The tradeoff
relates to lower costs (due to lower manpower rates) of doing PDD work at some
locations but is associated with the caveat of higher task time and coordination
challenges across locations.
Aggregating through the program level data, we could identify the total manpower
for each department for each phase/stage-gate. However, per (3.2.3), we needed to
-"-
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identify the work time and coordination time separately, within the total manpower
allocation. Since doing so at the aggregate level was both difficult and susceptible to
errors, it was necessary to identify the same at the program level and then aggregate
for the division.
3.4 Data Development
The foundation of the High-End devices division's PDD process is based on well iden-
tified deliverables for each phase/stage gate. The PDD process represents the process-
flow architecture of the organization. It identifies the list of tasks that are required for
a successful PDD. We also needed to understand the information flow/dependencies
between these tasks to enable the differentiation between work and coordination time.
So we opted for a process-flow DSM (Browning (2002), Chen et al. (2003)). Design
structure matrix (DSM) (Steward (1981), Eppinger et al. (1994)) is a useful tool to
decompose the architecture of a system, either by product, process, team/group, hy-
brid of these, etc. It is a project modeling tool which represents the relationships
between project tasks or sub-systems/components in a matrix form. Here we de-
velop the process-flow DSM for the range planning, product definition and product
development phases.
The High-End devices division identified a number of personnel from various de-
partments for us to interview. We had two rounds of interviews, split by a month
in between. In the first round (unstructured interviews), we interviewed 15 people
for 60-120 minutes each. We asked them to identify the respective deliverables for
their departments for each phase/stage gate and the tasks (i) required to be done for
the same. They were also asked to identify, for each task, the source of information
leading to the task and the destination of the output of the task, and the difficulty in
obtaining this information. We collated this data to create a draft process-flow DSM
of 160 tasks. The department(s) responsible for each task was identified. In certain
cases multiple departments were assigned. This was done when it was deemed that
there was significant difficulty in information transfer or when multiple departments
were required to work jointly.
In the next round of interviews, we reviewed the draft DSM with the same per-
sonnel: 7 personal interviews of approximately 60 minutes each, group interviews
of approximately 12 hours and a full-day workshop. Based on these interviews and
the workshop, we developed a modified process flow DSM (Fig. 3-2) comprising of
214 tasks. 90 of these tasks required significant interactions between departments
or had to be done jointly. The DSM had a total of 598 marks (dependencies), i.e.
approximately 2.79 dependencies per task.
We now had the process flow DSM and the data for manpower allocated to each
department for each phase/stage gate. We then met with representatives from the
various departments and those from the planning group. We asked them to distribute
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I -
Acthity/nformation Responsibility I -nm -m
Range vision (gives planning targets) A-PfM 1
Approval of range vision Gus 2
Range program plan ready A-PfM 3
Camnwimarket research (including operator inputs) A-PfM
B and SCD roadmaps (intent) 8-PfM 5
xperience brief APfM -PfM 6
Figure 3-2: Process DSM for Nokia High-End Devices Division PDD Process
the manpower time allocation, assuming that all the manpower is based at the home
location k = 1, between the various tasks that the department is involved in each
phase/stage gate, and for each task, distribute this task time between work time and
coordination time whenever multiple departments were involved for the tasks (Fig.
3-3). This split of task time to work time (wij) and coordination time (cijjl, Cijd, Ciddl)
data was developed by them based on their experience from various programs through
the years. We resolved differences through a final full-day workshop. To resolve the
differences, we needed to understand that cjj, = max (c, c(ij,)), i.e. coordination
time is maximum of the coordination time needed by the departments involved for
successful completion of the task. We had the average work time and coordination
time split. However it is necessary to recognize here that not every program follows
this split exactly.
Then, with the process flow DSM (Fig. 3-2) and the work time and coordination
time data (Fig. 3-3), we did an organization mapping exercise (Pimmler and Eppinger
(1994)) to develop an organization (department) numerical DSM (Fig. 3-4). We
determined each department's work time as wj = E wij and coordination time with
every other department as cjj, = Ei Cijj (j j') and Cjd = Ei Cijd. This was done
for each of the program types and then weight added with the respective number of
programs of each type/year (a, b).
The left column in Fig. 3-4 lists the respective departments of business unitsprgrm ofec tp/er )
Th letclm4nFg..4lssterspciedprmns fbsns nt
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Category I: Complex Products Category 2: Standard Products
Activity I Information w'I j  i w, c. j w j W cm.
Product Plannine Phase
CSO Milestone: Release resources for start of concepting different alternatives 74 A A
Architecture (DeSW. PC, Service)compliancy check against agreed API set 75 B-AM B-AM
Technology updates required/roadmap 76 B-AM A-TM 0.70 0.35 B-AM A-TM 0.30 0.2c
Gap identification, recovery plan defined 77 A-PfM 020 A-R&D 010 0.30 A-PfM 0 18 A-R&D 0.10 0.15
Approved system design studies 78 A-AM 050 A-AM 020
Identification of technical roadmap requirements 79 A-TM 2 00 A-TM 0 5
Architecture study and API availability check and approval APL application interface in sw 80 A-RhD 0 10A-AM 0.70 0 30 A-R&D 0 04 A-AM 0.35 0al5
Review architecture compliance to requirements 81 A-RM 1 35 A-RM 070
Check design compliance to architectures 82 A-R&D O 25 A-AM 0.60 0 30 A-R&D 0.04 A-AM 0.35 0.15
Product concept pre-studies (continues) 83 A-RD 0 0 A-RM 0.55 0 15 A-R&D 008 A-RM 0.15 a3
Figure 3-3: Work Time and Coordination Time for PDD Process Tasks (units: man-
years)
A and B, and they are repeated in the top row. Any numerical value that is non-
diagonal in the nDSM denotes the total coordination time between the respective
departments cj3, and Cid. Numerical values along the diagonal represent the work
time for the department wj. Department A-PfM and business unit B are constrained
against changes (d departments) in their current work content distribution and hence
do not contain values in the diagonal against them. The right most column identifies
the index of modularity for each of the j departments per (3.2.2). This nDSM is
a symmetric square matrix (interactions between two departments is the same) and
represents the architecture of the High-End devices division.
3.4.1 Cost Data
For each location k, we identified the various cost data which we were advised to
consider as constant over the planning horizon. These include
* li, the manpower rate at location k
* SUk, the cost of increasing manpower between successive time-periods at loca-
tion k, per man-year
* SDk, the cost of decreasing manpower between successive time-periods at loca-
tion k, per man-year
* SUDk, SUDdk, the cost of increasing manpower between successive time-periods
for departments j and d at location k, per man-year
3.4.2 Efficiency Differences
Nokia observed differences in work and co-ordination time across locations. The
same work takes different time for completion in different locations (also observed
by Herbsleb and Mockus (2003)). Through discussions and data available with their
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Figure 3-4: Organization (department) nDSM (units: man-years)
planning group and past program leaders, we could establish the relative work time
efficiencies between locations by department, qjk. It was assumed that when an
activity is carried out at the department level, cross-location coordination challenges
are captured within this factor (presence of strong department deliverable culture
through a strong department project leader (Wheelwright and Clark (1992))). The
relative efficiencies are as shown in Fig. 3-5.
reltive effidences Le t-
jy 1 2 3 4 5 6
A-AM 1.000 0.429 0.429 0.429 0.286
A-TM 1.000 0.600 0.400
ARM 1000 1.000
A-PgM 1.000 1.000 0.733 0.667 1.133 0.600
A-R&D 1.000 1.000 0.733 0.667 1.133 0.600
A-M 1.000 1.000 0.733 0.667 1.133
A-ID 1.000 1.000 0.733 0.667 1.133
A-UI 1.000 1.000 0.733 0.667 L133
A-PM 1.000 1.000 0.733 0.667 1133 0.600
A-OL 1.000 0.733
A-PfM 1.000 1.000 0.800 0.667 1133 0.600
8 1.000 1.000 0.733 0.667 1133 0.600
Figure 3-5: Work Time Relative Efficiencies (at time t=O)
Similar challenges are faced in coordination between departments, particularly
when they are situated in different locations. These challenges vary depending on
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the respective locations. Through discussions with the same group (as for work
efficiencies), we were able to rank 0 kk', the relative efficiency when the departments
engaged in coordination are located at k and k' respectively (though Oejk3'k' would
have been the ideal data (j f j')). Thus, while the work time efficiency data was
obtained on an absolute basis, data for coordination time was on a ranked basis. We
ranked the various combinations of (k, k'), 15 combinations when k $ k' and 6 when
k = k', on a 4 point scale. Through discussions we understood that the 1-4 rank scale
transformed to a doubling of the time required for coordination, though not linearly.
We used a convex function (details in Appendix A) to transform the same from scaled
numbers to absolute efficiencies. Thus we were able to establish Okk,. We confirmed
our findings with Nokia personnel. An example of this data is shown in Fig. 3-6.
Figure 3-6: Coordination Time Relative Efficiences (at time t=O)
In this way, we could now relate the actual manpower distribution across locations
since we have department work and coordination time data (Fig. 3-4) at the home
location levels and the respective efficiency levels.
3.4.3 Learning Effects
As established in literature, through repeated work, organizations learn and are able
to improve their output (Argote (1999)). Though most literature has alluded to the
same for manufacturing operations, the same has also been established for service
industries (Boone and Ganeshan (2001)). Similarly, product development centers
benefit from the learning curve with repeated work and coordination (ill structured
problems in Simon (1973), von Hippel and Tyre (1995)). Nokia's PDD centers expe-
rience the same benefits. We built in the learning effect through the efficiency factors
defined in the previous section.
Learning in work time: We captured the learning effect in the work time as
_ jk(Tk)
Ojk(Tktt) =-rk
ekk' t  relative coordination efficiencies at t=O
k/k' 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 1.000 0.870 0.870 0.706 0.706 0.503
2 0.870 1.000 0.870 0.706 0.706 0.503
3 0.870 0.870 1.000 0.706 0.706 0.503
4 0.706 0.706 0.706 1.000 0.706 0.503
5 0.706 0.706 0.706 0.706 1.000 0.503
6 0.503 0.503 0.503 0.503 0.503 0.706
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where Tk is the number of years that location k has been operating as a Nokia
PDD center and rk is the learning rate measured at that location. Relative work
time efficiency factors evolve with time t. We consider each year as a time period
(consistent with Nokia's product programs which are spread over a period of one year).
We initialize as ¢(jk(Tk)) = Ojk, the data provided by Nokia. Since most Nokia PDD
centers have been functioning for a number of years (Tk much greater than t), the
benefits of learning are not significantly visible or measurable year to year. However,
learning effects were visible, experienced and considered for the GPD location k = 6.
There could be training-induced efficiency improvements at the other locations, but
these would involve investments and were not considered.
Learning in coordination time: Similar to work time, we capture learning ben-
efits in coordination time through
Ok(Tk)k'(Tk,)
Okk'(Tk+t) T
We initialize 9 k(Tk)k'(Tk,) = 0kk' (the data available), and observe that since most lo-
cations have been a Nokia PDD center for many years (Tk much greater than t),
learning effects are observable for location k = 6 related coordination only. This as-
sumes that coordination tools and mechanism remain the same as currently practiced.
There could be improvements in coordination through new practices and methodolo-
gies which have not been factored in, but that would involve incremental investments
in process improvements.
3.4.4 Current State (t = 0) Work and Coordination Time
We had obtained the work time wj and coordination time cjj, and Cjd in the organi-
zation nDSM (Fig. 3-4). This represented the time required if all the work was done
at home location k = 1. However Nokia's PDD activities are distributed globally.
Nokia provided us with mjk and mdk, the proportion of task time that department
j/d does at location k, at home base efficiency levels. Thus we were able to identify
the current state work time and coordination time using:
j= .mjk and k = cj .mjk'
wjk = and ckOkk
This transforms the organization (department) nDSM (Fig. 3-4) to an organiza-
tion (department-location) nDSM (Fig. 3-7), providing the initialization or current
state conditions:
Wjk(t=O) Wjk and Cjkjk'(t=) = Cjkjk'
We found these comparable to the existing manpower allocations across departments
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Figure 3-7: Organization (department and location) nDSM
and locations. Fig. 3-8 summarizes the steps that were followed.
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Figure 3-8: Data Development Methodology
3.5 Model and Results
3.5.1 Problem Formulation
In (3.2.3) we had Ankt as the decision variable as w,kt and cjkt were assumed to be
known. Now we have the known efficiency factors $jk(Tk+t) and Okk'(Tk+t) and the total
work and coordination to be completed at each time epoch t, i.e. wj and cjjy. Thus
we now need to identify the work and coordination allocation at each t (similar to
the case where Ankt E [0, 1]). So our decision variables are wjk, Cjk 'k't and Cdkjk't with
(3.5.2) and (3.5.3) ensuring that all work/coordination is completed (3.2.4). Given
j' 4,' 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 S 5 S 5 6 6 6 6 "" 6
/' 1 2 3 4 S 6 1 2 3 4 S 6 1 2 3 4 5 ',
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our objective
as:
of minimizing cost, we formulate our problem for the planning horizon
5
Min E e-ot(E ( (lk (wj kt + Cjkt)) + (k.Cdkt))
t=1 k j d
5
+ E e-3(- 1)(3 SUk. max((Z(Wjkt + Cjkt - Wjk(t-1) - Cjk(t-1))
t=1 k j
+ Z(cdkt - Cdk(t-1))), 0))
d
5
+ E e'( SDk. max(( (Wjk(t-1) + Cjk(t-1) - Wjkt - Cjkt)
t=1 k i
+ E (cdk(t-1) - Cdkt)), 0))
d
5
+ t( SUDjk. max(wjkt + Cjkt - Wjk(t-1) - Cjk(t-1), 0)
t=1 k j
+ E SUDdk. max(dkt - Cdk(t-1), 0))
k d
S.t. : Cjk'k't = Cjkt Vj, k, t & cdkjk't= Cdkt Vd, k, t(3.5.1)
j k' j k'
E Wjkt X jkt Wj Vj, t (3.5.2)
k
I E Cik(fk')t X 0kk' cif Vj, j', t
k k'
& E E C )k(dk)t X Okk' Cjid Vj, d, t (3.5.3)
k k'
k'(Cjk(jk)t X Okk't) > CL' V(jj'), k, t (3.5.4)
Wjkt X Cjkt Wj
Ek,(Cjk(dk')t X Okk't) > Cjd V(jd), k, t (3.5.5)
Wjkt X Ojkt Wj
Capacity and non-negativity constraints (3.5.6)
Competence preserving constraints (3.5.7)
The objective function gives the total cost to be minimized over the planning
horizon. Each of the four terms has a part corresponding to the j (flexible) and
the d (non-flexible) departments respectively. While the first term looks at the total
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manpower costs incurred in each period, the next three terms capture the cost of
manpower change between time periods (manpower increase at location, manpower
decrease at location, manpower increase for a department at a location).
Constraints (3.5.1) are definition constraints. Constraints (3.5.2) and (3.5.3) en-
sure that all the work time and coordination time needs are completed. These were
identified from the Organization (department) nDSM. Thus these requirements are
defined at home location k = 1 efficiency levels.
Architecture constraints (3.5.4) and (3.5.5) introduce the organization architec-
ture. As discussed earlier, any product development task comprises of work and
coordination time. For any work to be performed, a proportionate amount of coor-
dination needs to be done. We identified this ratio of coordination to be done by the
department with every other department and the work to be done by the department
through our organization (department) nDSM. (3.5.4) and (3.5.5) ensure that this
ratio (at home location k = 1 levels) is maintained with every workload distribution.
The inequality ensures that the minimum coordination needs are met (the direction
of the inequality is based on the premise that coordination needs have to be met for
successful product development). In the absence of these constraints, the optimiza-
tion exercise could have allocated the work time and coordination time to different
locations. The LHS of the constraint is obtained from the Organization (department)
nDSM (Fig. 3-4). It reflects the organization architecture and is constant.
Constraints (3.5.6), besides the non-negativity constraints, include capacity con-
straints which ensure that the manpower changes at any location, between time-
periods, is constrained. These are of the type:
-(Wjkt + C3kt) + E Cdkt * ((Wjk(t-1) ± C3k(t-l)) + Cdk(t1l)
3 d 3 d
x < 1 would imply that downsizing between successive periods for location k is
constrained. Similarly with the inequality in the other direction and with x > 1, the
upsizing between successive periods can be contained (it may be difficult to expand
too fast at GPD locations due to non-availability of appropriate manpower, non-
availability of manpower from existing locations to provide startup support, etc.)
Moreover competencies to perform department tasks and activities are developed
and established at locations that have been PDD centers for a long time. Where
desired, these competencies are preserved through (3.5.7), which ensures that the
total task content of certain departments at these locations does not reduce beyond
desired limits. An example of such an equation is as follows:
W3kt Y * W3k(tl )
In the above, work content for a department j at location k is not allowed to reduce
to less than a fraction y of the work content of the previous period.
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Analysis of the Formulation: We linearize the non-linearities in the objective
function (present through max functions) as follows:
min max (x,0) is linearized as
min g subject to g > x, g > 0
The constraint set consists of linear equations, thus forming a convex set. The
simultaneous presence of a convex constraint set and a linear objective function en-
sures that the above formulation is reduced to a linear programming problem. This
gives two very important implications (Bertsimas and Tsitsiklis (1997)): the problem
is now polynomial time solvable and there exists a corner point (unique) solution
with no duality gap. Thus, we can develop such problems for a very high number of
departments or can solve such problems at the task level rather than at the depart-
ment level (data availability could be a challenge in that case). In a general case,
many firms may use manpower head count in lieu of manpower task time. Then we
would have a mixed integer program and scalability and duality gap could be issues.
In the case of the High-End devices division, the manpower allocated to each depart-
ment/location is quite high and hence it was ok not to use integer restrictions (agreed
with the division).
3.5.2 Optimization Constraints
Since we were running an optimization model, we needed to develop a base case to
compare our results against. To develop a base case (called 'Status Quo' (SO)), we
calculated the total cost of all the PDD work over the defined planning horizon (5
years), assuming that the current state work distribution is maintained. We included
the future expected learning on the work and coordination time at the GPD location.
We initiated the location capacity constraint (3.5.6) as follows:
* total work at home location (k = 1) cannot reduce by more than 10%/year or
25% over the 5 years
* total work cannot reduce at locations k = 2,3,4,5 by more than 10%/year
* total work cannot increase at GPD location by more than 15%/year
We started by running the optimization for the case where a decision is made
only once and the PDD organization is constant between time periods t = 1 and
t = 5. We called this the 'Single Decision' (S1) case. We then allowed the work
assignment to change in every period ('Existing Dept-Loc' or Case S2). Next we
introduced the competence preserving constraint (3.5.7) wherein the work content for
any department at any location cannot reduce, at any time period, to less than 50% of
existing content. ('Competence Preserving' or Case S3). In each of the above cases it
o .... * rl = :: k :L : . ....... ,_, ,.^~ll~ -----x~c ~,~,i...~..~.~.~,~,_~il -lyclli~--r*lll,~--- ------- --- ~--~.~~lrxr~r~------~-m~-P-~~-rrri h~~l,.n ru.~---r ulr--~ri~*c1;
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was assumed that only the current departments that are present at the GPD location
will continue there. So, in the next case, we assumed that all the departments can
expand to the GPD location ('Global Expansion' or Case S4), requiring us to develop
new efficiency factors (we assumed that the learning rates carried over).
3.5.3 Optimization Results
Our results from the above cases are as follows:
Case S1 S2 S3 S4
single-period multi-period multi-period multi-period
existing existing competence GPD
dept,-ioc. dept.-loc. preserving expansion
SO 5.89% 7.77% 7.01% 8.55%
Figure 3-9: Optimization Results (cost savings from SO case)
We observed significant cost savings over the case of continuing with the current
work/capacity distribution (Status Quo). The only other possible comparison with
any proposed policy existing in literature would be to use the prescription of offshoring
modular products first. This is not a viable case to compute as it would involve, after
ranking the departments in terms of modularity, transferring the complete contents
of the most 'modular' department to the GPD location till some constraint becomes
active. But what does it replace? From which location does this task get re-assigned?
Thus all our cost comparisons were with respect to the case of 'Status Quo' SO.
Our cost reductions (savings) translate to significant amounts for Nokia. We
observe that most cost savings are captured in the first period changes itself (5.89%
in case S1). Thereafter the cost savings increase as changes are allowed in subsequent
periods (case S2); there is reduction when the competence preserving constraints are
introduced (case S3), and finally there are more cost savings through developing the
GPD center for all departments (S4).
3.5.4 Observations
As we are using an optimization model, we can make observations from the results.
We cannot make generalizable conclusions as the data is specific to the firm under
study. We next outline our observations. Two of these conform to existing literature.
However the third observation highlights a new trade-off leading to a subsequent
research question.
Earlier we had defined modularity as the state of 'dis-connectivity' of a compo-
nent/process/task in the architecture and identified its measure for GPD as the ratio
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of work time to task time (3.2.2). We now apply this measure to the data that we
have with Nokia. In the organization (department) nDSM (Fig. 3-4), we identify the
work time and coordination time for each department. Thus we are able to identify
index of modularity for each department. We rank the departments by this index as
ModRkl, ModRk2,...ModRklO0, with department labeled ModRkl having the highest
modularity index. This data is with base location efficiency. We need to consider the
organization (department-location) nDSM (Fig. 3-7) to identify the modularity for
the existing department location capacity distribution. Further given that the man-
power rates vary across locations, cost considerations also needed to be considered.
So we consider the Status Quo case identified above (derived from the above nDSM
and the manpower rates) and identify the total work time and total coordination
time costs for Nokia's High-End division. We observe this ratio to be approximately
70:30 (69.84 : 30.16) between work time and coordination time costs. We will use
the above identified measures, ranks and ratio in subsequent analysis.
Obs 1: Reduction of coordination content and costs
In Fig. 3-10, the cost changes for cases S1, S2, S3, and S4 with respect to Status
Quo have been separated out, e.g. we observe that for case S2, the cost reduction
of 7.77% comprises of cost increase of 2.76% (2.59% + 0.17%) due to fixed costs
(costs incurred in restructuring (hiring, retrenchment, department setup, etc.) at the
various locations) and cost reduction of 6.63% and 3.90% on account of work time
cost and coordination time cost reductions respectively. These reductions correspond
to reductions in work time cost and coordination time cost by 9.50% and 12.92%
respectively, i.e. 9.50% work time cost reduction contributes to 6.63% reduction to
the total cost under consideration.
.fs dihf1 s in tntal osts C..se s Case 2 c.. S3 C..se S
Costs: Hiring retrenchment, etc. In locations k 1,2,3,4,5 -0.99% -2.59% -2.52% -2.56%
Hiring, retrenchment, etc. at GPO location k= 6 -0.01% -0.17% -0.15% -0.29%
aralble Costs: Work time costs 3.97% 6.63% 5.35% 688%
Coordination time costs 2-92% 3.90% 4.33% 4.52%
Total cost chane 5. 7.77% 7.01% a55%
Cost rduction In
Work time costs 5.68% 9.50% 7.66% 9.85%
Coordination time costs 9.68% 12.92% 14.35% 15.01%I-- - - -
Figure 3-10: Analysis of cost reductions
We had earlier seen that the work time cost to coordination time cost is in the
ratio of 70:30 in the existing ('Status Quo') work distribution. However, the cost
reduction contributions for case S2 is in the ratio of 62:38 (6.63% : 3.90%). The
corresponding ratio for cases S1, S3 and S4 are 58:42, 55:45 and 60:40 respectively.
The corresponding reductions in work time and coordination time costs are 5.68%
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and 9.68% for case S1, 7.7% and 14.3% for case S3 and 9.8% and 15% for case S4
respectively. We observe that the proportionate reduction in coordination time cost
is more than that of work time cost. In the resulting organization structures, the ratio
of work time cost to coordination time cost increases, implying that the organization
tries to increase its 'work assignment' modularity (reduce coordination content). This
supports the literature prescriptions to prioritize offshoring of modular tasks (Sanchez
and Mahoney (1996), Baldwin and Clark (2000)). It is important to note here that
the 'organization' modularity (Fig. 3-4) does not change. 'Modularity' changes as
discussed here relate to the final work time and coordination time per varying work
assignments.
Obs 2: Changes in work assignment at locations
We had identified constraints for changes allowed in the work assignment for each
location (between successive time periods). In Fig. 3-11 we identify the changes in
work assignment at each location (quantum of work given to that location) over time.
Along the X-axis we have the time periods t = 1,2,3,4,5. Along the Y-axis we have
the % change in work assignment to the location with respect to the previous year.
At time t = 1, we have the change in work assignment between t = 0 and t = 1. We
develop this graph for each of the cases S1, S2, S3, and S4.
We observe that the year on year change in work assignment constraint is active
for locations k = 2,3,4,5 and the GPD location k = 6 at various time periods in each
of the cases. For the base (home) location k = 1, it is not active during any time
period. The difference between the graphs is due to the different conditions under
which the optimization models were run. The constraint corresponding to the year to
year change allowed in work assignment for the various locations ceases to be active
when the cost savings from work time and coordination time changes cannot payback
the incremental costs for capacity relocation.
Interestingly, in S1, S2 and S3 cases, though this constraint is active in locations
k = 2,3,4,5 at time t = 1, the capacity at the Base and GPD locations does not
increase. On review of the relevant data we find that there is a 're-organization'
of task allocation/capacity distribution. Thus all the work and coordination needs
are met through re-assignment. Only in case S4 is the capacity transferred to the
GPD location (since other departments can be expanded there in this case) at t = 1.
Similar to Obs 1, we observe that the coordination time cost between time periods t
= 0 and t = 1 reduces, relatively, more than the work time cost for each case. While
the work time cost reduces in the range 3.44% to 5.62% between t = 0 and t = 1,
the coordination time cost reduces in the range 11.29% to 13.48%. Thus we can say
that the organization prioritizes re-structuring to reduce coordination requirements
(improve modularity) before assigning capacity to the low cost rate GPD location
(adds to Obs 1 earlier).
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Figure 3-11: Work assignment changes at locations over time
Obs 3: GPD work assignment for each department
The earlier observations support literature prescriptions on prioritizing modular tasks/components
for offshoring. However, as shown in Fig. 3-12, this may not always represent the
optimal solution for organizing product development organizations for complex prod-
ucts.
We observe the total work allocation by each department to the GPD location in
Fig. 3-12. Per earlier definition, we could identify the modularity of each department
from the organization (department) nDSM (Fig. 3-4). On ranking the departments
by their modularity, with ModRk 1 representing the most modular department and
ModRk 10 the least modular department, we observe that departments with ranks
4,8,9, and 10 were present at the GPD location at time t - 0 (existing conditions).
Thus under cases S2 and S3, these would remain the only departments at the GPD
location. Other departments would expand to the GPD location in case S4.
Our optimization results show that while the content offshored to the GPD lo-
cation increases for the departments ranked 4,8, and 10, it actually reduces for the
department ranked 9. This non-monotonic behavior does not support existing lit-
erature which predicts otherwise (Sanchez and Mahoney (1996), Baldwin and Clark
(2000)). On investigating this phenomenon further, we observed that ModRk 9 de-
82 CHAPTER 3. OPTIMAL STRUCTURING OF GPD ORGANIZATION.
time period
Figure 3-12: GPD content over time (for each department)
partment's coordination needs with other departments were similar to those of ModRk
8 and ModRk 10 departments. The difference was in the relative work efficiency fac-
tor (Fig. 3-5). It was 0.286 for ModRk 9 department at the GPD location. The
corresponding efficiency factor was 0.6 for the other departments at t = 0. This
significant efficiency difference for ModRk 9 department caused most work to be con-
centrated at the base location, though this department requires coordination with
various departments which are distributed across all the locations.
As seen above, the efficiency difference also drives the offshoring content. This im-
plies that the modularity based offshoring prescription is not always valid. Efficiency
differences play a critical role. This behavior, understood through the data details,
has not been explored significantly in literature (Anderson et al. (2008)). Efficiency
differences exist as it may be very difficult to transfer the full set of competencies to
another location (Kogut and Zander (1992), von Hippel (1994)). A lot of it can be
attributed to the differences in terms of culture and practices between the two loca-
tions (Fine (1998)). It may be possible to improve upon the efficiency differences over
time through learning effects. This observation leads us to frame a further research
question: How does the work time and coordination time of a task change
(efficiency differences) when it is transferred to an offshore product de-
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velopment center? How does a firm spread its offshoring efforts between
the factors that contribute to these eficiency differences? We explore this
question further through a stylized model in the next chapter.
3.6 Sensitivity Analysis
Our methodology and modeling efforts have involved a lot of data and a number of
constraints. As outlined earlier, many of these constraints are driven by the strategic
considerations of the firm, e.g. capacity changes at a location. While a number
of combinations of data and constraints can be studied for sensitivity analysis, we
discuss a few of them here.
3.6.1 Capacity Change Constraints
snDecion (S) EAsti Dept Lc (2) Co te Preseving (5) Glo l Epensin (S4)
t1 t3 tt4 1t-5 lt 1tt. tt 2 t s.3 t 4 t1. l lst t t- 5 14 t.l- 5 I ll 1 t.  t-2 t .4 l.5
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Figure 3-13: Active capacity constraints
As seen in Obs 2 (Fig. 3-11) and in Fig. 3-13, capacity change constraints
of certain locations are active during some time periods. These capacity change
constraints are developed as part of the firm's strategic priorities and decisions. With
6 locations and 5 time periods, there are many combinations of sensitivity studies
that could be done. We study sensitivity of the optimal cost with respect to changes
in the capacity change constraints in three different cases.
Locations k = 2,3,4,5
As observed in Fig. 3-13, the capacity constraints for locations k = 2,3,4,5 are active
over multiple time periods. This capacity constraint is 10%, i.e. the total capacity at
any location cannot reduce by more than 10% year on year. Though the relative work
time efficiencies differ across these locations, we group them together as we expect
the firm to follow a common policy across these locations. We performed sensitivity
analysis changing the capacity constraint to 9%, 11% and 20%. The results are shown
in Fig. 3-14.
A 1% reduction/increase in the year-on-year capacity change leads to cost in-
creases/reductions in the range of 0.21% to 0.37%. This is the shadow cost of the
capacity constraints that needs to be reviewed by Nokia should they intend to incor-
porate such a capacity change. There are two interesting observations here:
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Base case:
9% cap. change cons. at 10% -- 11% 20%
Status Quo SO
(1) ~~* Existing 777% S2nDept-Loc
Global 8.S5% S4
Numbers in parentheses ()0 are cost increases, others are cost reductions
Figure 3-14: Sensitivity analysis of capacity constraints at Loc k = 2,3,4,5
1. the costs reduce in a decreasing manner with more flexibility (higher year on
year capacity changes allowed), i.e. it is convex reducing.
2. with increasing flexibility, the number of active capacity change constraints
reduces
The above occurrences are functions of the data used. With more flexibility at these
locations, the capacity change constraints are active in the earlier periods and hence
restructuring and 'optimal' capacity transfer to the base and GPD locations occurs
earlier. Subsequent capacity transfer does not pay back (work time and coordination
time cost save following fixed costs related to hiring, retrenchment, etc.) over the
planning period. The above cost sensitivities provide Nokia with an opportunity to
make a strategic decision for capacity planning for these locations.
GPD Location k = 6
At the GPD location, the capacity change constraint is limited by availability of
appropriate manpower, ability to train personnel to required efficiency levels, etc.
Thus, though the manpower rates are significantly lower than other locations, it is
not possible to increase the capacity as desired. While we worked with a 15% year
on year increase in capacity for the base model, we performed sensitivity analysis for
10% and 14% also. The results are shown in Fig. 3-15.
We considered these cases because, as seen in Obs 3, there is a trade-off between
lower manpower rates and efficiency challenges when task content is moved to the
GPD location. The efficiency improves through learning by doing. However this effi-
ciency increase is hard to achieve if the manpower increases significantly year on year
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Base case:
10% 14% - cap. change cons. at 15%
Status Quo SO
ruoDecision
(.1)% o.oo xisting 7.77
) ( Competenc ng 7.0%
(0.108)L (0.018% * ax 8.55%s I4
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cost reductions
Figure 3-15: Sensitivity analysis of capacity constraints at GPD Loc k = 6
(availability of new manpower with same efficiency levels as that of existing man-
power (with experience through repeated doing) is difficult and challenging). Rather
the challenge is more to find the appropriate manpower and yet see the target efficien-
cies (improved through learning) get realized. As seen from the results, difficulties
with availing appropriate manpower result in cost increases. However it is not as sig-
nificant as in the earlier cases of sensitivity analysis. However, Nokia's key challenge
will be to identify and recruit the best and maximum possible manpower at its GPD
location.
Base Location k = 1
Though the capacity change constraints were not active at any time period for the
base/home location of Nokia, we felt the need to do sensitivity analysis by incorpo-
rating a new constraint. This is driven by the fact that since Nokia is at Finland
where availability of additional appropriate manpower is challenged. Since the base
location k = 1 is the biggest engineering center for Nokia, it has the highest manpower
and increasing it by even 1% is challenging. We performed sensitivity analysis using
maximum 0%, 1% and 3% capacity changes between years. The results are shown in
Fig. 3-16.
Unlike earlier cases, here we observe a concave reducing total cost behavior with
respect to relaxation of the capacity constraint value. When compared with the base
case where this constraint does not exist, we observe during sensitivity analysis that
this constraint is active in all instances where the capacity change is more than the
constraint value. Introduction of this constraint has tremendous practical value as
hiring of additional appropriate manpower at Nokia's base location is constrained.
~iX~~~ "L-lll~lhrUII ~I" -^"- 1"""""""~~~"~"~~~"x ~1x"~
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Base case: Introduce upper cap. change cons.
no upper cap. change cons. 0% 1% 3%
Status Quo SO
Decision n 8;
Existing 7,77% S2]-.6% %
Expansion
Numbers in parentheses () are cost increases, others are cost reductions
Figure 3-16: Sensitivity analysis with new capacity constraint at Base Loc k = 1
3.6.2 Learning Rate at GPD Location k = 6
Our learning rate calculation at the GPD location was based on actual work time
observed by Nokia at time t = -1 and -2, and expected work time at t = 0. We had
extrapolated this learning rate on the work time efficiency factors and compared the
expected work time efficiency at t = 5 with the existing work time efficiencies at other
locations. We had observed that other locations continued to have higher efficiencies
(though marginally for some locations), and this supported our earlier assumption
that the other locations had 'non-measurable' learning by doing benefits. We ran
sensitivity analysis for 5%, 10%, -5%, and -10% changes to the learning rate. Our
findings are shown in Fig. 3-17.
We observe that if the learning rate is higher than actually calculated for organiza-
tion design, the realized cost benefits improve. It would also lead to higher allocation
of capacity to the GPD location with or without increasing manpower, i.e. higher
efficiencies.
3.6.3 Manpower Rate at GPD Location k = 6
While firms set up and allocate capacity to the GPD locations using existing cost
structures, many times the actual cost rates increase at the GPD location and con-
sequently cause the net costs to be higher than originally planned for. Our base
organization capacity planning problem had assumed that the costs at all locations
would not change over time. We now ran the optimization problem assuming an
annual relative inflation of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively at the GPD location (with
the manpower rates remaining constant in other locations).
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Figure 3-17: Sensitivity Analysis of Learning Rate at GPD Lock = 6
We observe that the total cost increases with increase in manpower rate at the
GPD location. It is interesting to note that the capacity at the GPD location reduces
with increasing costs for cases S1, S2, and S3. It is only with case S4 that the capacity
increases: however this increase is with new departments being moved to the GPD
location rather than increase in the capacity content of the existing departments. As
we had observed earlier, the existing departments at the GPD location were those
with relatively lower modularity. With case S4, the more modular departments are re-
assigned to the GPD location. The significant cost increase in this case is attributable
to the fixed costs of change and its under recovery within the planning horizon. The
15% capacity constraint on year over year increase at the GPD location is active for
only two time periods and in case C only.
Uncertainty
There could be a number of scenarios that Nokia may consider. Our model is general
enough to incorporate all of them. We have done sensitivity analysis for certain cases
here. Year over year capacity change constraints are driven by strategic and political
considerations. In such cases, sensitivity analysis can be used to decide on work
assignments for the best value to the firm. However, learning rate and manpower
rate changes in the GPD location are more uncertain, and the ability to successively
hire appropriate levels of skilled manpower at the GPD location is challenging. While
different scenarios can be created and sensitivity analysis run accordingly, it may be
advisable to review the task assignment after each period though the decisions may
be made for the planning period using an expected value. We observed that when
there is an annual manpower rate increase, the capacity change constraint becomes
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Figure 3-18: Sensitivity Analysis of Manpower Rate increases at GPD Lock = 6
active for the GPD location only when tasks that are more modular are allowed
to be expanded there. Additionally uncertainty in the learning rate also affects the
coordination efficiency. These observations imply that Nokia should review to expand
departments ranked ModRkl, ModRk2,etc., i.e. the highly modular departments, to
the GPD location.
3.7 Robustness of Methodology
In this chapter we developed a methodology, through an empirical example, to struc-
ture te global product development organization for a firm engaged in the design and
development of complex products. While we have been able to build on the theory de-
veloped earlier in the chapter, apply the data observed, and recommend optimization
results for the firm to consider, we also need to be confident regarding the robust-
ness of the methodology. Robustness of the optimization tool and the results therein
is well established in literature (linear programming gives corner point solution and
polynomial time solvable). However, we need to understand the robustness of the
data development process. The data used can be separated between that which is
measured/available as policy measure by the firm and that which is developed though
brainstorming and discussions (qualitative reasoning applied to available quantitative
data). In this methodology there are two such pieces of data:
* the work time and coordination time are obtained through discussions with
various department personnel who use manpower allocation chart to arrive at
the same
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* the coordination efficiency uses a four point scale whose respective weights were
assigned by curve fitting.
We checked the robustness of the results with respect to each of the above factors.
The initial impact of changes in the first piece is on the organization (department)
nDSM (Fig. 3-4), and then it flows through, along with the coordination efficiency,
onto the organization (department location) nDSM (Fig. 3-7). Changes to the coor-
dination efficiency also flow through the planning horizon.
3.7.1 Coordination time
The coordination time is first quantified on the process-flow DSM (Fig. 3-3) where
we obtain the coordination time for each task. After organization mapping, this
data transforms into a organization (department) nDSM (Fig. 3-4). For each depart-
ment, since the manpower allocation is constant, any change to the coordination time
is accompanied by corresponding changes to the work time, or change in organiza-
tion architecture. These changes then impact the organization (department location)
nDSM (Fig. 3-7). We had two levels of checks on our earlier data: the program level
manpower allocation is used to develop the organization (department) nDSM and
the organization (department location) nDSM output was used to compare with the
existing manpower distribution.
Our analysis showed that every 10% change in each of the coordination times
in the organization (department) nDSM results in 0.66% and 0.6% change in the
total actual manpower over all departments and locations and in the 'Status Quo'
total costs respectively. The corresponding cost change for 10% and -10% change
in the coordination time are, respectively, 1.36% to -1.01% and -0.42% to -0.48%
in the various cases (S1, S2, S3, S4). Thus we can say that misinterpretations in
the coordination time and work time splits (organization's architecture) result in
significantly lower impact on the results.
3.7.2 Coordination efficiency
We looked at coordination efficiencies between locations. We had transferred a rating
scale of 1-4 to efficiency factors in the range of 1 to 0.5. We modified the correspond-
ing efficiency factors of 2 and 3 on the scale by 10%. Thus, while the organization
(department) nDSM did not change, the organization (department location) nDSM
changed. Also the optimization results now had different coordination efficiency fac-
tors for all periods. While the 10% increase in efficiency factors led to a cost increase
of 1.3% approximately for the S1 case, it led to a cost decrease of approximately 1%
in the other cases. In summary we observed that significant changes in quantifying
of qualitative data did not have a significant impact on the final results.
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3.8 Challenges and Limitations
Though we demonstrated a robust methodology to structure a global product devel-
opment organization, there exist challenges and limitations. Data requirement for
such an exercise is huge and we were fortunate that Nokia has a well streamlined
product development process and was forthcoming in developing and providing us
the necessary information. Though we were able to develop most data, there was still
some data where we were not able to generate the desired visibility, e.g. we used Okk't
instead of Ozjkj'k't. Any firm that intends to adopt this methodology needs to have
the same level of determination towards data development. Data development chal-
lenges, besides differentiating between work time and coordination time, also include
determining work and coordination efficiencies, learning rates, etc. which could take
a political dimension within the firm.
An assumption input by us was that work time efficiency for a department at any
location is independent of the amount of the department capacity assigned. Thus, it
is monotonically non-decreasing. However it may be possible that an optimized or-
ganization structure may involve capacity allocation reducing significantly over some
time periods and then increasing again. In such cases the efficiency factors may ac-
tually drop with capacity addition. The efficiency factors would then be a function
of the capacity over the various time periods. Then it may not be possible to reduce
the mathematical programming formulation to a linear program, raising questions
on scalability (polynomial time solutions not gauranteed) and potential duality gap
(corner point solution may not exist). In certain cases, if we have a quadratic prob-
lem, it may be possible to reduce to polynomial time solutions since the organization
(department location) nDSM that we use is square symmetric.
In our model development we have considered capacity in terms of total task time
distribution. Many firms use capacity distribution through headcount allocation.
In such cases we may have a mixed integer program and the benefits of a linear
programming problem may not exist.
3.9 Conclusion
Our results (cost savings) present significant opportunities for Nokia to structure their
existing work assignments. Their existing work assignments to the GPD location rank
low on modularity, relatively; and with the low coordination efficiency of the various
locations with the GPD location, they need to review their work assignment. While
political and strategic needs may constrain them from moving work away from some of
the established development centers globally, they are also constrained on increasing
work assignment at their home location. Hence they need to expand at the GPD
center to meet increasing work needs. They need to carefully re-evaluate the tasks
that have been offshored to the GPD center and look for opportunities to establish
departments that have higher modularity at the GPD center. As shown by the
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sensitivity analysis, this approach is also the only way to protect against manpower
rate increase (relative) at the GPD location and uncertainty of the learning rate.
Capacity distribution in product development is a challenging proposition. It
is further challenged during the development of complex products and particularly
when the team involved in development is spread over multiple locations which are
separated geographically, culturally, etc. Our approach is an early contribution in
this field. We incorporate the architecture of the product under consideration in our
modeling approach. Our observations of the results obtained (Obs 3) raise another
research question: How does the work time and coordination time of a task
change (efficiency differences) when it is transferred to an offshore product
development center? How does a firm spread its offshoring efforts between
the factors that contribute to these efficiency differences? We discuss this
question further in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
Effort Distribution in Global
Product Development
Chapter Abstract: Offshoring of product development tasks is challenged by the
significant coordination requirements between the tasks that have been offshored and
those that have not. Academic literature has prescribed modularity, a measure of
dis-connectivity, as a possible determinant of the offshore content. However, (a) it is
generally not possible, in complex engineered systems, to identify 'modular' tasks for
offshoring, and (b) other factors (such as competence prevalent at the offshore loca-
tion) may provide better efficiencies at the offshore location than modularity. In this
chapter we develop and analyze a stylized model (two tasks, two locations, two time
periods) for a firm seeking to establish a product development center at an offshore
location to benefit from cost savings. Our key results show that (a) firms should
determine their offshore content to benefit from the existing knowledge base created
by the prior offshored content and to create a knowledge base from which subsequent
offshoring can benefit (indicating path dependent offshoring) rather than offshoring
based solely on modularity; (b) efforts supporting offshoring should prioritize the co-
ordination challenges between tasks at different locations before those between tasks
at the offshore location; and (c) in an environment of high volatility of external fac-
tors, efforts should be prioritized to enhance the work time and coordination time
efficiencies in the first (earliest) period.
4.1 Introduction
While literature on GPD is broad on the subjects of why, where and how firms
engage in GPD, it is relatively sparse on 'what' the firms should offshore as they
engage in GPD. When firms offshore PD tasks seeking competencies, the offshoring
content is determined by the competence they seek. When they engage in GPD as
a cost saving measure, literature prescribes offshoring content based on modularity,
building on the idea that coordination across locations/regions is difficult (Anderson
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et al. (2008), Eppinger and Chitkara (2007)). However, for a firm that designs and
develops CES, it is very challenging to identify modular content for offshoring. In
addition as we observed in chapter 3 (Nokia example), modularity is not the complete
answer in determining offshoring content. Literature is also silent on how a firm
identifies the (second) next phase offshoring content, and how it is influenced by the
previous offshoring choices, nor does it factor in the efficiency gap (takes longer time
to complete the PD task) between performing the PD task at the home (existing)
location and the new offshore location. Thus, the firm's managers, besides identifying
the offshoring content, also need to be mindful of the efficiency gap.
As a firm decides to offshore PD tasks to a GPD location, it also identifies a set
of tasks that it may offshore (based on perceived ease of transfer of responsibility,
low interdependence with other tasks, etc.) The firm expends resources, which are
limited, to support the offshoring efforts and address the efficiency gaps. Thus these
resources need to be appropriately distributed or prioritized amongst the tasks that
are to be offshored such that the benefits to the firm are maximized (thus by existing
literature it would imply that 'modular' tasks should be prioritized). Our interests,
in this paper, relate to how this prioritization or distribution of efforts takes place
with respect to modularity and the efficiency gap.
We frame our research questions, which address the firm's dilemma in effort priori-
tization, as: How does the task completion time change (efficiency differences) when a
PD task is transferred to an offshore product development center? How are the firm 's
prioritization and distribution of efforts towards the offshored PD tasks affected by the
various factors that affect the task completion time? We are particularly interested in
situations when the separation (distance, time-zone, culture, etc.) and the efficiency
gaps are high. This also aligns with the two complementary observations that we
made in chapter 3: (a) work and coordination efficiencies differed across locations,
and (b) the transfer of work content to the offshore location was not monotonic with
respect to modularity.
We address these questions by developing and analyzing a 2-task, 2-location, 2-
time-period model for a firm that is establishing a captive offshore PD center. Our key
observation is that a firm should prioritize those tasks for offshoring that develop the
competence/knowledge at the offshoring center (rather than offshoring solely based
on modularity). This contributes to the learning process of the subsequent tasks that
are offshored. However, it also represents a trade-off between the long-term (knowl-
edge development based) and short-term (modularity based) benefits that the firm
needs to understand and decide on. Prioritizing offshoring tasks to develop compe-
tence/knowledge implies that the offshoring sequence is path-dependent. We also
observe that firms should prioritize to manage the coordination required between
locations than within locations. In an uncertain environment, firms need to exert
substantial upfront efforts to ensure that efficiency differences in work time and co-
ordination time are not significantly affected in an adverse way by the volatility of
external factors.
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4.2 Model Development
Consider a profit seeking firm with centralized PD operations at home/base location
k = 1 (e.g. USA, Western Europe). This firm is exploring opportunities for expanding
its PD operations globally for cost efficiencies (e.g. a lower manpower cost location
in Asia). The firm is involved in the design and development of a single family of
products/CES, for which we identify each component-activity combination as a task
n.
The firm has been able to identify a GPD location k = 2 with manpower rate
4k such that el >> f2. The firm expects to benefit from this manpower rate dif-
ference. Assume that the firm has identified two tasks n = 1, 2 for offshoring. The
firm's options include: do not offshore any task, offshore only one task (n = 1 or
n = 2), offshore the tasks sequentially (n = 1 first or n = 2 first), or offshore the
tasks simultaneously. The firm's decision would depend on the best value generated
amongst the different options, determined through (3.2.3). Our interest in this paper,
however, is to identify the factors that contribute to the work time and coordination
time efficiency differences as the task is offshored and understand how these factors
and the index of modularity affect the distribution/prioritization of efforts of the firm
towards offshoring. In this chapter we analyze the cases when the best value option
is either when both tasks are offshored simultaneously or sequentially.
We assume that the firm has limited resources, identified through an allocated
budget B at t = 0. These resources are used in efforts to support offshoring. The
effort is spent towards initial setup costs, training, running experiments/dry-runs for
familiarity, etc. The effort expended has a direct impact on the efficiency of the work
and coordination performed at the offshore location. Thus we have B, for the respec-
tive tasks such that B > B 1 + B2 . The value and sensitivity of B, is an indication of
the prioritization of efforts that the firm undertakes. Our research question requires
us to understand the impact of various factors that influence the work time and co-
ordination time at the offshore location on the optimal efforts exerted, BI* and B 2*.
We assume that the effort is expended on a task only once, and in the time period
before it starts performing the task at GPD location k = 2 (we briefly outline the
case when the effort is expended over two periods in the Appendix). We also assume
that the complete task is offshored, i.e. Ankt E {0, 1}.
In the next section we determine the dynamics of work time and coordination time
(the constituents of task time) as the two tasks are offshored from the home location
k = 1 to the GPD location k = 2. We incorporate the factors that influence work
time and coordination time, e.g. how effort allocation acts, how does learning by
repeated doing impact work time and coordination time, etc. Effort, corresponding
to budget B is expended during period t = 0 (or t = 1 for sequential offshoring). The
outcome of this effort is observed during t = 1 and carried over to t = 2 when some
other factors are also observed. Our modeling approach has similarities with Loch
and Kavadias (2002).
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4.2.1 Dynamics of Work Time
Assume that the tasks n = 1, 2 have respective work time wl and w2 and coordination
time c between them at k = 1. The coordination time is required to ensure successful
execution of the task and includes receiving and providing information related to the
task. We assume that these tasks do not have coordination requirements with any
other task (which are at the home location k = 1): we will relax this assumption
later.
When the tasks are offshored to k = 2, the work time w, changes to w,.gn (Fig.
4-1), gn is the offshoring penalty incurred (gn > 1) (Herbsleb and Mockus (2003)). n
is a new task at the GPD location, and though there is a manpower rate reduction
(f2 << f 1 ), the time taken to complete the task increases due to novelty, available
knowledge of the task, familiarity with the task, etc. g, is a function of the GPD
location, the talent available there, and the ability of the firm to take advantage of
knowledge spillover at the GPD location. If g < 1, the problem would be trivial
with both cost rate and work time reducing. Similarly if g 1 and f 2 <<< 1
the problem may be very trivial. We will assume that gn is significantly high for a
tradeoff (g vs. f1 - t2) to exist.
The respective distributions Bn have an impact on the work time as f,(B,). This
effort can be termed as training/familiarity before task execution starts. Further,
0 < f,(Bn) < 1 with f,(0) = 1, i.e. when there is no investment f, has unity value.
Thus f,(B,) is reducing in B,, i.e. f'(B,) < 0 such that the actual work time at t = 1
for task n at k = 2 is wn.gn.fn(B,) (Fig. 4-1). The effort exerted (training before the
job) mitigates the adverse effect of gn of increasing the work time. We also assume
that f,(B,) is convex and twice differentiable, i.e. f"(B,) ) 0. Concave reducing
f,(B,) would imply increasing returns to the efforts applied. Then with high effort
B,, the actual work time can reduce to w, (thus quicker to perform task at GPD
location at a lower manpower rate, and so not an interesting proposition), or with
still higher effort we may be able to reduce the work time to 0 (unlikely to happen).
Concavity may exist during the initial efforts but would not be sustainable as the
effort exerted increases. Thus, f,(B,) is either convex or S-shaped with an initial
concave part (some minimum effort has to be exerted before benefits are observable)
before moving into the convex region, i.e. with incremental effort, the returns will
tend to be diminishing. While all our model analysis is based on convex reducing
f,(B,), we also consider the S-shaped behavior in the proof of Result 1.
In the next period t = 2, the offshore location performs the task for the 2nd
time and hence experiences a learning effect r, (learning by doing repeatedly (Argote
(1999), Boone and Ganeshan (2001)). In parallel, there are some effects observed from
having performed the other task (-n) at the GPD location during t = 1, p[A (learning
by doing something else (Schilling et al. (2003))). Learning by doing something else is
dependent on the ability of the firm's offshore facility's ability (absorptive capacity:
Cohen and Levinthal (1990), Kogut and Zander (1992)) to assimilate the learning
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Figure 4-1: Work time changes with offshoring
obtained from a related task that is also being done at the offshore location so as
to enhance the learning rate (Schilling et al. (2003)). As argued in the previous
chapter, product development is a set of information processing tasks (Brown and
Eisenhardt (1995)). Thus engineers compare the different information tasks that they
are involved in and create an abstract, based on the commonalities (Schilling et al.
(2003)), that they are then able to transfer between the tasks, enhancing the learning
rate. This learning is implicit. We introduce this enhancement in the learning rate as
p,- through 2- (r' + -" ). The learning by doing the other task helps the GPD location
to learn task n faster by doing along with a related task. Thus, the time required to
perform the task is wn.g,.f,(B,).2-('+"-") (Fig. 4-1).
4.2.2 Dynamics of Coordination Time
The coordination time c also changes similar to work time. Coordination time is the
maximum of the time required for coordination among the participating tasks, i.e.
the coordination time of the task which requires more coordination time. Note: we
are assuming that the effort Bn is exerted for the task and is not separable between
the effort to improve work time efficiency and the effort to improve coordination time
efficiency.
Thus, for t = 1, the coordination time is c.gc. max,(fn(B)), where g, is similar
to gn, i.e. the increase in coordination time when both tasks are moved to the GPD
location (g, > 1 due to the 'newness' of the task at the GPD location k = 2).
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The factor maxn(f,(B,)) is used since coordination time is determined as Cab =
max(ca, Cb), (Cab is the coordination required between two tasks a and b, ca and cb
are the respective coordination time requirements of tasks a and b), and fn(B,) is
reducing in B,. We observe that the effort Bn being exerted on the task n helps
to improve its deliverables (work and coordination time efficiencies). It helps the
respective tasks to recognize their interactions with and dependencies on the other
task, leading to better coordination and reduction in coordination time.
Similarly, at t = 2, the coordination time is c.gc. max,(2-(rnc+"-nc)).f(B). Be-
sides the impact of the effort applied towards supporting the setting up of task n at
the GPD location B,, the tasks also learn by coordinating again, i.e. they learn to
coordinate 'better'. They recognize their mutual dependencies better and are able
to improve on the coordination time. r, represents the respective coordination time
learning rates of task n. Similar to work time, there is also a learning rate increment
by doing the other task at the offshore location (both tasks are being done at the off-
shore location). We assume that rl = r2c = rc and differential learning rates between
the two tasks are captured through p1 and P2 respectively, i.e. we consider p_ =
4.2.3 Problem Formulation
We collate the terms corresponding to the dynamics of work time and coordination
time to determine the total cost of the case when both the tasks n = 1, 2 are offshored
simultaneously as follows:
x = B +e-.(2- E wn-.g.f(Bn) + 2.e 2 .c.gc.max,(fn(Bn))) (4.2.1)
n
+e-2 .(e 2. > w,.gn.2-( "+I"-).f(B) + 2.1C2.C.gC. maXn(2 n + )fn(Bn) )
n
Thus, the problem formulation is now
Min x (4.2.2)
subject to E B, < B n = 1, 2
n
Solving (4.2.2) will give the minimum cost that will be incurred (4.2.1) when
the two tasks are offshored simultaneously and the optimal distribution of efforts
(corresponding to budgets B,*). Similar formulations can also be developed for the
cases when neither of the tasks is offshored, when only one task is offshored or the
tasks are offfshored sequentially.
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Sequential Offshoring:
There will be some differences in the dynamics of work time and coordination time
changes when the tasks are offshored sequentially. Consider the case where the firm
offshores task n = 1 at time t = 1 and follows it with task n = 2 at t = 2.
The work time for task n = 1 will evolve as in the simultaneous case for t = 1
but the benefits of learning by doing something else, i.e. y 2 , will be affected by a
factor 61 (61 > 0) since task n = 2 is performed at the home location k = 1 at t = 1.
61 is influenced by the coordination requirement c between the tasks. 4 > 0, i.e.
with higher coordination the learning rate for task n = 1 at the GPD location will
be higher, albeit limited by the absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal (1990)) at
the GPD location. Similarly the coordination time c now increases by gcl due to task
n = 1 at the GPD location and n = 2 at the home location (gcl.1). This increase is
partially mitigated by the impact of the effort exerted fl (B1 ). We assume that since
the tasks had been performed at the home location k = 1 for a long time, the learning
between successive time periods is insignificant.
Similarly at time t = 2, n = 2 is also offshored. The impact of the effort exerted
B 2 is affected by a factor v (v > 0, v < 1). Thus the increase in work time by g2 is
mitigated by a factor f 2(v.B 2). However, though the task is being done for the first
time at the GPD location, there is a learning effect from having done task n = 1
during t = 1 and this is experienced as (1 + e)- 2A1 where e > 0 (to capture the
learning effect) and E --+ 0, and 62 > 0 is similar to 61 described earlier. Collating the
terms, we obtain the total cost for the case of offshoring n = 1 in the first period and
n = 2 in the next period as follows:
x' = B 1 + e-o.(B 2 + e2 .w1.g1 .f 1(B 1) + f 1-W2 + (f1 + 2).c.gc1.f 1(B 1)) (4.2.3)
+ e-2 .( 2.w.g1.fi(B1).2(r + e2 .w2 .g2 .f 2 (v.B2).(1 + 62
+2.f2.C.(c.maB(2-(r 1, i, (1 + e)-h2I .f 2 (v.B 2)))
Thus, the problem formulation for the sequential offshoring case is
Min x' (4.2.4)
subject to B1 + e- .B2  B
4.3 Model Analysis
In this section, we solve the formulations developed in the previous section, and then
follow with comparative statics analysis to determine the effort prioritization during
offshoring.
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4.3.1 Simultaneous Offshoring
To solve the non-linear optimization problem (4.2.2) we start by forming the La-
grangean:
L(Bn,,v) = x+v.(B-Z Bn) for n= 1,2 (4.3.1)
With two decision variables, we follow the Kuhn-Tucker conditions. However
since we are considering effort application once for any task and given the convex
(or concave-convex S-shaped) reducing behavior of f1 (Bn), any effort applied would
result in an improvement to the work time and coordination time. Our model is de-
veloped for a profit seeking firm that is looking to reduce costs by offshoring product
development tasks. We assume that the firm is resource constrained, i.e. the avail-
able effort (hence budget B) is such that if budget Bi (B1 > B) were available, it
would reduce the total cost further. Hence, for optimal distribution of the efforts, we
assume that B = En B,. So we now have a single decision variable. Without loss of
generality, we assume
maxn(fn(Bn)) = f1 (B 1) and
maXn(2-(rnc l). f((Bn)) = 2 -(rc+2). f(B 1 ) where 2 -(r i + 2) -= 2 -(rc + 2)
Our analysis shows that using max,(2-(c+f-n).f,(Bn)) = 2-(c+l).f2(B 2 ), i.e. differ-
ent tasks in different periods for the max function, does not affect the comparative
statics results.
Incorporating the above assumptions in (4.2.1), (4.2.2) and (4.3.1), we obtain:
L(B 1) = xz where (4.3.2)
Xi = B + e-6.(12(Wl.g.fi(B1- w 2.g2 .f 2 (B -Bl1)) (4.3.3)
+2.1 2.c.g.f(B1)) + e- 2 .(12 .w1.g1.2-(r1+ 2).fi(B1)
+12-W2-9 2 .2 2 J1)f2 (B - B 1) + 2.12 .C.g,.2-(r+ 2)f(B)))
The above Lagrangean is solved for minimization using the first order conditions.
Second order conditions prove that the solutions to the first order conditions give the
minimum value to the Lagrangean. All proofs are outlined in the Appendix. We ob-
tain solutions as outlined in Result 1. The effort allocation is a ratio of the marginal
returns of the efforts expended (similar to Loch and Kavadias (2002)).
Result 1: The distribution of effort is given by (if a solution exists):
f (B 1*) w2 .g2 .(1 + e- 0 .2 - (r2+ 1))
f2(B - Bi*) w1.g1.(1 + e- 3 .2- (r±t2)) + 2.c.gC.(1 + e- 3 .2- (rc+ j1))
If a solution does not exist, all efforts are prioritized to the task that ensures the least
total cost.
100
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The above solution (4.3.4) is a single equation in a single variable. Numerical
methods can be used to solve such problems. We observe that the distribution of
efforts is a ratio of the marginal effects of the efforts exerted (similar to Loch and
Kavadias (2002)). If a solution does not exist or the minimization conditions are not
satisfied, all efforts are applied to the task which gives better benefits to the efforts
applied. The other task may also be offshored in this case but without any support
in terms of training, familiarization, etc.
While we solved for optimality, our interest lies in understanding how the optimal
effort allocation changes with the various factors that we have identified. We use
comparative statics to establish the relationships between the optimal effort alloca-
tions and these factors. Comparative statics uses the envelope theorem on optimality
conditions to generate a set of simultaneous equations which are solved to determine
the respective sensitivities.
Using the definition of index of modularity (3.2.2), we define the respective indices
of modularity for task n (n = 1, 2), as 1 = W. Thus we get = 1- =
and -== c = (rq - 1)wl.
Proposition 1: The optimal effort allocations (corresponding to Bi*), when a solu-
tion (4.3.4) exists:
a) Bi* decreases with modularity (1/u1) of the task.
b) BI* increases when the other task's learning rate can benefit from task n = 1 being
done at the offshore location simultaneously (p1 ), but decreases when the task n = 1
can benefit from the other task being performed at the offshore location ( 2).
c) Bi* decreases if the task's work time and coordination time learning rates (rl, rj)
are high, i.e. rely on learning rate benefits in subsequent periods.
d) Bi* increases with the offshoring penalty of the work time (g) and/or of the co-
ordination time (ge) of the task.
The first finding highlights that for optimal conditions, the effort allocation does
not increase with modularity. This may appear contrary to literature which prescribes
that preference should be given to modular tasks (extending Sanchez and Mahoney
(1996), Baldwin and Clark (2000), Langlois (2002) to imply tasks with higher mod-
ularity). However, in our 2 task scenario, allocating upfront efforts (training) to the
more modularity task may help its work time and coordination time but the actual
coordination time spent is the maximum of the coordination time required by the two
tasks. So if higher effort is allocated to the more modular task, the other task (with
relatively higher coordination time in its task time) does not see related improve-
ments in its coordination time. In summary, the effort spent on the modular task is
not appropriately 'rewarded' through improvements to the total cost/total time spent
over all tasks in the GPD center.
The second finding indicates that it is prudent to invest in tasks which help in
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improving the efficiencies of the other task, i.e. by applying effort to one task, the
effects are also felt in the other related task (Schilling et al. (2003)) such that the
other task improves its learning ability, leading to reduction in work time and hence
related costs. However this effort need not be high if there are learning benefits from
investing in the other task. This is an interesting observation since it would mean that
the priority should lie on identifying and allocating effort to those tasks for offshoring
that will aid other tasks as they are offshored but the effort need not necessarily give
the best benefit for the task itself. This is a key observation that we discuss further
in section 4.5.
The improvements through learning rate and through initial efforts (training, fa-
miliarization, etc.) lead to long-term and short-term benefits respectively. Thus, for
tasks with high work time or coordination time learning rates, higher efforts need not
be expended as improvements are obtained through repeated doing. On the other
hand, if the work time learning rate of the other task is high, then efforts need to be
prioritized towards the base task's GPD efforts because as the other task improves in
work time, its related benefits to the coordination time will not be obtained unless the
base task is also able to improve accordingly (coordination time required is maximum
of coordination time requirement of the two tasks).
The fourth finding on the proposition states that efforts should be prioritized for
tasks which have high offshoring penalty, either work time or coordination time. This
is required to reduce the resultant extra time and cost from offshoring.
4.3.2 Sequential Offshoring
We solve the equations developed for the sequential offshoring case ((4.2.3) and
(4.2.4)) by forming the Lagrangian as in the earlier subsection (4.3.1) and then using
the first and second order conditions.
Result 2: The distribution of effort is given by (if a solution exists):
fl(BI *)
f2(v.e0.(B - Bi*))
2-.w 2 .g92..(1 + e)-62111
2 W19.g1 + (e1  + f 2 ).c.g9c + e- 2.(2 .W1.gl.2-(rj+61A2) + 2. 2 .C.9g.2 - (rc+61A2))
If a solution does not exist, all efforts are prioritized to the task that ensures the least
total cost.
As in the simultaneous case, the solution for the sequential offshoring case (4.3.5)
is also a single equation in a single variable and is ratio of the marginal effects of the
efforts exerted. We apply comparative statics, but unlike the simultaneous case, we
need to observe for impact on BI* and B 2*, i.e. the efforts applied for the first task
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and the efforts applied for the second task.
Proposition 2: The optimal effort allocations (corresponding to Bi* for the first
period offshoring and B2* for the second period offshoring), when a solution ((4.3.5)
or (B.3.2)) exists:
a) Bi* decreases with modularity (1/n1) of the task, but B2* increases with modularity
(1/772)
b) Both Bi* and B2* decrease with the benefit that the respective tasks obtain by per-
forming the other task at the offshore location, but increase when by performing them
the other task benefits through enhanced learning rate.
c) BI* decreases if the task's work time and coordination time learning rates (ri, r)
are high, i.e. rely on learning rate benefits in subsequent periods.
d) Bi* increases with the offshoring penalty of the work time (ga) and of the coordi-
nation time (gcl, g9) of the task, and while B2* increases with the offshoring penalty
of the work time (g2), it decreases with the second period offshoring penalty (gc).
Statement a) of Proposition 2 says that the second period effort is increasing in the
modularity of the task and statement d) outlines that the second period effort does
not increase with the coordination time penalty (unlike the first period effort). Thus
it is evident that the efforts towards the second period offshoring are directed towards
improving the work time efficiency at the offshore location, and in benefiting from
the learning rate from the first period offshoring. Improvements in the coordination
time between the tasks arise more from the efforts input to support the first period
offshoring and the learning (by repeated coordination and by learning from the work
time).
4.3.3 Interactions with Home Location
Now assume that the two tasks, besides coordination needs amongst themselves, also
have coordination needs with other tasks of the CES which are constrained to the
home location. So the two tasks n = 1 and n = 2, as earlier, have respective work time
wl and w2, coordination time c amongst them, and also have respective coordination
time cl and c2 with the other tasks. The respective indices of modularity are now
given as __ - w"~-. We also identify another measure of modularity, i.e. index of
77n Wn+c+c "
within modularity, such that 1 = W Thus, - -- as cn -+ 0 and 1 < "7no wn+c 77n 7no 7n - 77no
Similar to c = (r0no - 1)wn, we get from the definitions c, = (qn - ,no)wn.
The dynamics of work time and coordination time when the tasks are offshored si-
multaneously is shown in Table 4.1. g,, (n = 1, 2) is similar to the offshoring penalty
for coordination time g, defined earlier, but instead corresponds to the coordination
time between task n and the other tasks at the home location. rc corresponds to the
learning rate of coordination time between task n and the other tasks at the home
location. Parameters hi and h2 reflect that the learning rate benefits by doing the
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Table 4.1: Simultaneous offshoring with coordination with 'home based' tasks
Time Description t = 1 t = 2
n = 1 work 2 .w1 gli.fl(B 1 ) 2 .w11.gi.fi (B1).2-(r1+ A2)
n = 2 work e2.w2.g2 .f 2(B2 ) 2W2g2.f2(B2).2 - (r2+ 1)
coord. b/w n = 1 62 .2.c.g,.fi(Bi) 2. 2.C-.g9.f(B1)
and n = 2 .2-(re+A2)
coord. b/w n = 1 (f1 +- 2 ).Cl.gc.f(Bi) ( 1 + f 2 ).cl.gcl.fi (B1)
and other tasks .2 -(r el +h j 2 )
coord. b/w n = 2 (f1 +- 2 ).C2.gc 2 .f 2 (B 2 ) ( 1 - f 2 ).c 2 .gc2 .f 2 (B 2 )
and other tasks .2- (r c2+ h2 A1)
other task is not the same as in the case of work time and coordination time between
the offshored tasks, i.e. h, < 1.
Following the earlier steps, we get for the simultaneous offshoring option:
Proposition 3: The optimal allocation Bi*, when both tasks are offshored together
(simultaneously) and there exists coordination needs with other tasks that are con-
strained to the home location:
a) Bi* decreases with modularity (1/91) of the task, but increases with the within
modularity (1/i10) of the task.
b) Bi* increases with the benefit that the other task's learning rate (pL) can get by
doing task n = 1 simultaneously but decreases when its own learning rate can benefit
from performing the other task simultaneously ( 2)
Similarly we proceed for the option of sequential offshoring. The changes in the
work time and coordination time are shown in Table 4.2 (assuming that task n = 1
is offshored first and n = 2 follows in the next time period). gcb is the coordination
efficiency when task n = 1 is at the GPD location and n = 2 is at the home location.
Since the task n = 1 has already been performed at the GPD location before n = 2
is introduced, there is a transfer of learning effect which is reflected in the work time
of n = 2 as (1 + e)-(r2+ 1) and due to this, the full benefits of the efforts towards
introduction of n = 2 are not realized. Hence we have f 2(k.B 2), where k < 1. 6 < 1 in
the work time and coordination time of n = 1 reflects that though n = 2 is introduced
at the GPD location at t = 2, n = 1 has had coordination with n = 2 when it was at
the home location and this has benefited the learning rate.
Following the earlier steps, we get for the sequential offshoring option:
Proposition 4: The optimal allocation Bi* (the first period offshoring) and B 2*(the second period offshoring), when the tasks are offshored sequentially and there
exists coordination needs with other tasks that are constrained to the home location:
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Table 4.2: Sequential offshoring with coordination with 'home based' tasks
Time Description t = 1 t = 2
n = 1 work 2.w 1 .gl.f (B1 ) e2.-w1.g.f 1 (B 1)
.2-(rl+ 2)
n = 2 work .w2  e2 .w2 .g2 .(1 + )-(r2+1)
. f2(k.B 2 )
coord. b/w n = 1 (f1 + £2 ).C.gcb.fl(B 1 ) 2.e 2 .C.gc.f 1 (B 1 )
and n = 2 .2
- (r+ 512)
coord. b/w n = 1 (el + t 2).clc.gc .f(B1) (f1 + e2).C1-.gc.fi(B 1)
and other tasks .2
- (rc + h IJ 2 )
coord. b/w n = 2 2.1l.c 2  (e1 + £2).c2.gC2.f 2(k.B 2)
and other tasks .(1 + e)-(rc2+h21)
a) Both B 1* and B2* decrease with modularity (1/,) of the task, but increase with
the within modularity (l/rno) of the task.
b) Both Bi* and B 2* increase with the benefit that the other task's learning rate (t1)
can get by doing task n = 1 simultaneously but decrease when its own learning rate
can benefit from performing the other task simultaneously (p2).
Modularity Within or Total Modularity: We collate the findings of Propositions
1 through 4 in Table 4.3. The top row (from Proposition 1 and Proposition 2) posits
Table 4.3: Comparative Statics of Optimal Effort to Within and Total Modularity
Coordination Simultaneous Offshoring Sequential Offshoring
Only amongst n =1 dlI < 0 <0 >0d1/771 dl/il dl/12
and n = 2
Coordination amongst dB < 0 d > 0
n = 1, n = 2 and dBi <0 dBi >0dl/91 dl/d<10
home loc. tasks 1/ < 0 d > 0dl/72 dl/7720
that the offshoring efforts are directed towards improving the coordination between
the tasks, and during sequential offshoring, the efforts for the second period offshoring
are directed towards improving this offshoring content's work time efficiencies. In
contrast, Proposition 3 and Proposition 4 provide an interesting perspective. They
say that the optimal effort to support offshoring is always reducing in the index of
total modularity but is increasing in the index of within modularity. Higher within
modularity implies lower coordination between the tasks n = 1 and n = 2 that have
been offshored, while lower total modularity implies more coordination with the tasks
that are constrained to the home location. Thus these propositions posit that efforts
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should applied to improve the coordination between home and GPD locations rather
than within the GPD location.
We interpret these results to conclude that, when the offshore content has interac-
tions with tasks that are constrained such that they cannot be offshored, the efforts
that support GPD are allocated to improve the efficiencies of work time at the GPD
location and the coordination needs between locations.
4.4 Uncertainty and Risk Averse Firm
In the previous section we analyzed the prioritization of efforts for the deterministic
case. However, in many cases, all information may not available with certainty. With
uncertainty there arises the possibility that the firm may be either risk neutral or risk
averse. Our earlier formulations and results correspond to both the risk neutral and
risk averse cases, with expectation taken for the parameters that are uncertain. How-
ever a risk averse firm would also consider the variability of the uncertain parameters.
If utility of a firm that incurs a cost of x is given by U(x), then for a risk averse firm
U'(x) < 0 and U"(x) < 0 (concave utility function of risk averse firm (Mas-Collel
et al. (1995))). We now review the sensitivity of effort prioritization in the presence
of uncertainty.
4.4.1 Uncertainty in GPD Location's Learning Capability
As discussed earlier, the firm exerts efforts to support realization of lower work time
and coordination time (better efficiencies) from its PD center at the GPD location.
However, in addition to the firm's efforts, the existing capability of the GPD location
and the prevalent absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal (1990)), which represent
the capability of the GPD location, also play a key role. Often information regard-
ing the capability of the GPD location is uncertain (though there could exist some
information about how related tasks of other similar firms are being performed at
that location). Thus the firm's knowledge of the work time and coordination time
when engineering development tasks are offshored is estimated with some distribu-
tion. Here we analyze the impact of the variability of the learning rates. There is
limited literature on dealing with learning curve uncertainty. It has been modeled
for production by Mazzola and McCardle (1997), who have also suggested a Bayesian
updating approach to determine optimal production quantity during such uncertainty
(Mazzola and McCardle (1996)). However our modeling approach has used the learn-
ing rate as a contributor to determine offshoring content, and there does not appear
to be any literature that addresses uncertainty in such circumstances.
The difference in work time between t = 1 and t = 2 is due to the learning
effects (by doing and by doing something else), and this difference is E[2-(l112)]. We
assume that the firm has knowledge that rl + / 2 ' N(rf + I2, Uri,l,2 2 ), where or1,422
represents the variance-covariance matrix of the learning rate by doing and learning
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rate by doing something else (hereafter referred to as the variability of the work time
or coordination time learning rate).
We incorporate these uncertainty changes to the various terms in (4.2.1) and
(4.2.3). We then transform the terms related to learning impact as:
E[2-(r+A2)] = E[e- ( r j +A2). 1 n2 ] = e-n2.(r-l+2)+.(1n2) 2 .o,, 2  (4.4.1)
Following the solution and analysis methods followed in earlier proofs, we obtain the
following proposition:
Proposition 5: Uncertain learning rate at GPD location: The optimal
allocation Bi*, when both tasks are offshored simultaneously, is increasing with the
variability of the work time learning rate ao1,,2 and the coordination time learning
rate a0 rc,2. The results are same when the tasks are offshored sequentially, for both
the first period optimal allocation Bi* and the second period optimal allocation B2*.
The above proposition shows that the risk-averse firm would react to uncertainty
in the learning rate by increasing the effort allocation as the learning rate variability
increases. These results resonate with the findings of Carrillo and Gaimon (2004) who
derived analytically that managers invest in the workers' capabilities when uncertain-
ties in achieving the desired production capacity outputs are high. Variability in the
learning rate corresponds to the limited knowledge about the GPD location at the
time of effort allocation and the novelty of the task to the GPD location. Thus we can
conclude that with higher variability, the firm will push for higher efforts (budgets)
to be allocated such that fl(B 1) reduces and the impact of (adverse) volatility of the
learning rates on the firm's utility function is minimized.
Similarly when the capability at the GPD location is uncertain, the t = 1 work
time, after applying effort B 1 at t = 0, at the GPD location is wi.E[fl( l, B 1)], in
contrast to wl.g .f(B 1 ) when full information is available (refer Fig (4-1)). Similar
to f(B), we have E[fB((, B))] < 0 and E[f"B(, B))] > 0, where E[f' ((, B))] =
dE[fB( ,B)] and E[ff"(', B))] = dE[fB(,B))]. Applying an explicit form for this uncer-
dB dB
tainty and following the same step as the proof of Proposition 5, we observe that the
risk-averse firm will prioritize higher efforts when the capability of the GPD location
is uncertain.
4.4.2 Innovative systems
Our earlier results and observations build on the premise that the index of modularity
of the tasks remains constant (steady architecture). However this may not be case
when the firm is developing innovative products, i.e. the development effort required
for successive products changes, thus affecting the index of modularity. We will
assume, for simplicity, that the coordination time changes with successive generations
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of the CES that the firm is designing and developing, leading to changes in the index
of modularity. We capture this through r -= Wn+ with r, - N(q, , ,, 2). In such
cases, when offshored, it is likely that the learning rates may also vary due to the
constant 'newness' of the job. Since we observed the effort prioritization with respect
to the learning rate factors in the earlier sub-section, we will consider it to be constant
here.
As shown by Merton (1969) and Loch and Kavadias (2002), we assume that
the utility function is negative exponential with constant absolute risk aversion a,
i.e. U(x) - e-x. We then use the earlier transformation (4.4.1) to get
E[U(x)] = 1 e- aE[x]+a.a2ox2 We assume that E[x] - .a. 2> 0 to ensure that the
a a 2
firm always has positive utility. On solving the respective Lagrangeans and applying
the envelope theorem, we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 6: Innovative complex engineered systems: The optimal alloca-
tion BI*, when both tasks are offshored simultaneously, is increasing in the variability
of the index of modularity 1/a,, 2 . If the tasks are offshored sequentially, the first
period optimal allocation B 1* increases in the variability of the index of modularity
1/On,2, but the second period optimal allocation B 2* decreases in the variability of the
index of modularity 1/ 22.
Since the task time is uncertain for innovative CES, there is an apprehension that
the offshore location may not be able to manage the uniqueness in successive gen-
erations of the CES. So if the expected variability is high, it is prudent to support
offshoring with high efforts such that the knowledge gained by the offshore location
can handle the CES changes and the efficiency differences between the home and the
GPD location are minimized over successive CES generations. When the tasks are
offshored sequentially, the same apprehensions remain for the task that is offshored
first and hence the same approach. Since the variability is on account of the coor-
dination requirements, most efforts to manage the same have been applied to the
first period offshoring and need not be repeated completely for the second period
offshoring. So the second period allocation is decreasing with the variability of the
index of modularity.
Observing Proposition 1, Proposition 2 and Proposition 6 together, we see that
the first period optimal allocation B 1* is decreasing in modularity 1/rq1 but increasing
in the variability of modularity 1/a,,2. Similarly the second period allocation is
increasing in modularity 1/q 2 but decreasing in the variability of modularity 1/U, 22.
Thus we can conclude effort allocation recognizes the challenges of coordination and
hence the early effort aims at managing the coordination challenges and the later
efforts at managing the work time efficiencies of the subsequent offshoring content.
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4.4.3 Exchange Rate
A common problem faced by firms that offshore the manufacture of components/
parts/ systems relates to dealing with the exchange rate and in particular, when
the favorability of offshoring due to significant manpower rate differences (£l - £2)
diminishes. The same problems will also occur when the PD tasks are offshored.
Since we are considering that the complete task is offshored, i.e. Ankt E O0, 1}, the
home location may not be able to react to adverse changes in the manpower rate
differences and initiate the offshored tasks back at the home location.
We assume that the home location manpower rate fl remains constant while the
offshore manpower rate £2 changes with time, i.e. £2t, and only the exchange rate
component of this wage rate changes. We model the exchange rate evolution of
manpower rates using the geometric brownian motion which is common in literature
(Duffie (2001), Ross (1996), Huchzermeier and Cohen (1996)). Thus, the manpower
rate at the GPD location changes as £2t = 2o0.exP((ae2 - 2 )t + c 2 .zt). Here bP2
reflects the drift of the manpower rate, oe2 2 its volatility, and zt - N(0, t) represents
the Brownian motion. Incorporating this for the simultaneous and sequential cases,
we get the following proposition:
Proposition 7: Manpower rate changes at the GPD location: The optimal
effort allocation is independent of the drift of the manpower rate e,2. However, when
both tasks are offshored simultaneously, the optimal effort allocation Bi* is increasing
in the volatility of the manpower rate if f (B)(wl.gl + 2.c.ge) > f2(B - Bi).w2.g2.
When the tasks are offshored sequentially, the optimal effort allocation (for both first
period and second period offshoring, Bi* and B2*) is not increasing in the manpower
rate volatility.
The key observation is that the effort prioritization does not depend on the drift
but does depend on the volatility of the exchange rate. This shows that the risk-
averse firm is apprehensive about the exchange rate volatility. In the simultaneous
case, we observe that effort prioritization increases or decreases with the volatility
of the exchange rate depending on factors which are independent of the exchange
rate (or its movement), and thus observed during the first period. Similarly, in the
sequential offshoring case, effort prioritization does not increase (in fact decreases)
with exchange rate volatility, thus implying that the firm's optimal allocation is more
driven by factors like gn, modularity, learning rates, etc. Thus the firm attempts to
create sufficient competence at the GPD location such that the efficiency differences
are minimized to ameliorate the adverse exchange rate volatility.
An interesting observation is that the firm's optimal allocation does not increase
with exchange rate volatility or even when it increases (simultaneous offshoring case),
it depends on the first period observations of work time and coordination time. Second
period expected time is not considered. This can lead us to deduce that firms, though
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risk-averse, tend to be myopic in their decisions when allocating effort, with respect
to exchange rate movement.
To summarize, we observe that the firm should prioritize efforts, in the face of
uncertainty, to ensure that the efficiency gaps in work time and coordination time are
minimized.
4.5 Discussions
Modularity or Learning: We reviewed the prioritization of optimal effort between
the two tasks based on the various factors that affect work time and coordination time
(within the GPD location and with the home location) in section 4.3. Our findings
address the research questions outlined in section 4.1. Now we contrast the effort
prioritization based on modularity with that based on other factors that lead to work
time and coordination time efficiency differences across locations.
Collating from proposition 1 through proposition 4, we observe:
dB 1  dB 1  dB 1i) d < 0, dl > 0, dg > 0d-L dg, dg,
S dB 1  dB 1  dB 1ii) d < 0, > 0 < 0
d1 d 'l dp2
We infer from observation i) above that efforts to support offshoring are priori-
tized based on the offshoring penalty faced in work time and coordination time, and
in particular to those with lower modularity. Low modularity tasks have high coor-
dination requirements, and when faced with significant efficiency differences on the
same, efforts need to be prioritized towards managing the extra coordination time re-
quired. The key challenge on effort prioritization here comes when the firm needs to
decide between a low modularity task with low coordination time efficiency gap and
a high modularity task with high efficiency gap. Since effort prioritization is always
increasing in offshoring penalty (work time or coordination time), prioritization of
offshoring efforts should aim at minimizing the efficiency gap (high modularity will
have high work time and low modularity will have high coordination time).
Observation ii) compares the optimal prioritization based on modularity with the
ability of the task (n = 1) to provide related benefit to the other task (pl) and/or
receive related benefit from the other task (p2 ), with the corresponding benefits ap-
pearing in the learning rate. We observe that effort prioritization for a task should
increase as its ability to support the efficiency of other tasks increases, but should
decrease if its modularity is high. Similarly if the task is able to improve its efficiency
on account of another 'related' task being done at the same location, then efforts
to support offshoring reduce with increase in benefits from the other task. However
effort prioritization is always decreasing with modularity of the task.
4.5. DISCUSSIONS
When a task is offshored, it affects other tasks through two parameters of our
model: the index of modularity (1/qr) and the learning effect that is transferred
(un). Observation ii) above compares the respective effects of these factors. We build
on this observation hereafter.
Prioritization of tasks for offshoring: p1 is the benefit that the efficiency of the
other task gets because task n = 1 is performed at the GPD location (through the
learning rate). Thus, performing task n = 1 at the GPD location adds a knowledge/
learning element to the location. It creates a knowledge base/competence which other
tasks can utilize towards better efficiencies.
Now consider a firm that is involved in the design and development of CES and
after decomposition, has been able to identify the various tasks and their respective
interdependencies. Then, per existing academic literature (Baldwin and Clark (2000),
Anderson et al. (2008), Gomes and Joglekar (2008)), this firm, assuming all other
factors are equal, should offshore the task with the highest index of modularity first.
From the above, we observe that there exists a trade-off for a firm when deciding
on the task to be offshored. Should they offshore a task based on the index of modu-
larity and minimize coordination challenges? Or should they offshore a task based on
its ability to generate knowledge/competence at the offshore location? This trade-off
assumes that all other factors are identical between the tasks. Offshoring based on
the index of modularity of the task implies immediate efficiency gains through low
coordination needs, while offshoring based on ability of the task to generate knowl-
edge/competence implies long term learning rate based efficiency gains. This trade-off
is similar to that identified between efficiency (short-term) and learning (long-term)
by Sobrero and Roberts (2001). They found that, in supplier-manufacturer relation-
ship, the design scope helps in learning and the interdependencies in both efficiency
and learning. We represent our trade-off in Fig. 4-2.
Tasks that are highly modular and can contribute towards knowledge/competence
development at the GPD center (Wernerfelt (1984)) should be PRIORITIZEd for
offshoring. Tasks with low modularity and low knowledge/competence development
ability should be avoided for offshoring or SUSTAINed at the home/base location (or
offshored after all other tasks have been offshored). The key tradeoff arises when 1-1
are high-low or low-high. As discussed earlier, the impact of modularity is observed
from the time period the task is offshored, whereas those of 1L1 and p2 are observed
through the learning rate and hence later (e.g. only from time period t = 2 in the
model setup in (4.2.1) or (4.2.3)). Thus, we can say that the impact of effort allocation
based on modularity is short-term and thereafter, while that based on related/tacit
benefit is long-term.
If effort allocation is based on high modularity, it AUGMENTs the benefit in
terms of improved efficiency on the offshored task (high modularity-low knowledge/
competence development). On the other hand, in the case of low modularity-high
knowledge/ competence development, the benefits of the effort expended are more
~ -------- r~ rrrrr~ Irlm~-r l -^- --~-~~~--^I I-- Il^-rx~--r r -.--- ~L~~
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Figure 4-2: Offshoring Prioritization between Modularity and Knowledge Creation
long term (INVESTment) and are visible through better efficiencies in other tasks
over time. In this case, efforts need to be exerted to ensure that the coordination
challenges on account of low modularity index are handled appropriately. The above
trade-off matrix is valid over all time periods as long as all the other factors are con-
stant amongst the tasks under consideration for offshoring. Similar to Sobrero and
Roberts (2001), modularity reflects the interdependencies in the structure of the CES
and contributes to efficiency (through coordination needs). On the other hand, p, is
like design scope as it involves knowledge creation for other tasks and contributes to
learning.
Path dependent offshoring: Our economic modeling (4.2.2) and (4.2.4) and the
above discussions on p,n (ability to create knowledge/competence at GPD location
for other tasks to benefit from) suggest that the sequence of tasks that are offshored
to the GPD location are such that they:
* they gain in efficiency (through learning rate) from other tasks already offshored
* they are able to contribute to the knowledge base/competence at the GPD
location to help in the learning rate of the subsequent tasks that are offshored
This implies that the selection of tasks is 'path dependent' as defined in dynamic
capabilities (DC) literature (Teece et al. (1997), Eisenhardt and Martin (2000)). DC
builds on the limitation of the resource based view that it ignores the environment
and its dynamics. DC has been defined as the 'ability to integrate, build, and recon-
figure internal and external competencies to address rapidly-changing environments'
(Teece et al. (1997)). GPD is like a DC process with its 3 roles: coordination needs
AUGMENT PRIORITIZE
(short term)
INVESTSUSTAIN
(long term)
4.5. DISCUSSIONS
determined by architecture (static content), learning effects in many ways (dynamic
content) and work re-assignment (transformational content).
The choice of the offshoring task (as shown above) will depend on previous actions
of the firm (tasks that have already been offshored) and future benefits to the firm
from offshoring this task, thus displaying path dependent behavior.
Case Example: Consider again the example of Dover (discussed in chapter 2). This
example reflects horizontal carryover of learning effects rather than the sequential
effects that we have derived in this chapter.
Dover, a unit of Danaher Motion, is engaged in the design, development, and
manufacture of air-bearing based precision motion products. Dover's business in-
volves quick order-to-delivery timeline requiring quick engineering turnaround. Dover
initiated its GPD activities by offshoring some PD tasks like drawings, detailing for
manufacturing, CAD, etc. Successful completion of these tasks required extensive
coordination with other tasks that had not been offshored. Unfortunately Dover ex-
perienced significant problems in meeting the turnaround time in the offshored tasks
and decided to abort their PD offshoring efforts.
Thereafter, Dover joined the GPD efforts of its parent organization. Danaher Mo-
tion established an offshore PD center for all companies in its group. Each company
had dedicated project engineers who were trained at the respective companies. Below
the project engineers was a pool of flexible engineers who were assigned to various
groups based on task/workload requirements. Dover, subsequent to training of its
project engineers, offshored the same set of tasks as earlier. They had a better expe-
rience as the turnaround time, though not as efficient as at their home location, was
more satisfactory. Hence, Dover decided to increase its offshore content, in phases,
thereafter.
Why did Dover observe faster turnaround time in their second offshoring effort?
There were two reasons: a) they supported their offshoring actions with significant ef-
forts through training and familiarization of the project engineers, and b), the flexible
engineers who worked across group companies. Since most of these group companies
were engaged in the design and development of mechanical engineering systems, the
flexible engineers were required to be trained primarily for the first task that they
worked in. As they worked across companies, they could transfer their knowledge and
skill gained to the other company's tasks, and the training effort on part of Danaher
Motion reduced. This knowledge and skill portability is similar to Jp defined in our
model. Dover benefited through the flexible engineers learning by doing something
else (related). Thus, Dover's next offshoring content should be such that those PD
tasks benefit from the knowledge and skill set already existing at the offshore PD
center, and they also enhance the knowledge and skill set to benefit further tasks
that are offshored.
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4.6 Conclusion
Our modeling and analysis efforts provide several interesting insights for firms pur-
suing offshoring of PD tasks for cost saving. We summarize them below:
* Firms should prioritize their offshoring content to develop the knowledge and
skill set at the GPD location (long term benefits), rather than prioritizing off-
shoring content based on index of modularity (short term benefits). The choice
of subsequent offshoring content should consider the benefits from the existing
knowledge and skill set at the GPD location, and also enhancing the same so
that further offshoring efforts gain (path dependence).
* Firms should prioritize efforts to reduce the efficiency gap in the coordination
time between tasks that are at different locations before addressing the gap
between tasks that are at the GPD location.
* In the face of uncertainty, the risk averse firm exerts higher initial efforts to
support the offshoring efforts. This approach helps to minimize the efficiency
challenges and develop the knowledge base at the GPD location faster, thus
negating any adverse volatility in various exogenous factors.
Though literature has discussed knowledge spillover benefits in significant detail
(see Knott (2008)), our recommendation of prioritizing offshoring content so as to
create a knowledge base at the GPD location is novel. However it is accompanied
by a key challenge which relates to the ability of the firm to measure or estimate
the various variables discussed in our paper. Can firms quantify the benefits to
the learning rate from having done other tasks earlier? Are firms measuring and
segregating the PD task time between work time and coordination time (we have
shown an approach towards the same in chapter 3)? We consider this a challenge of
our modeling and analysis approach: it is quite detailed and firms will be challenged
in quantifying each variable.
A limitation of our model is that we have not incorporated the impact of the
factors on each other, e.g. we have not considered the impact of the effort applied
(corresponding to B, on the learning rates rn, re, pn, etc.). However we do not expect
these to impact our results adversely.
While we have developed our results/recommendations based on analytical mod-
eling and have shown a related case example that supports our recommendations, it is
desirable to do further empirical studies that confirm our results. It could involve an
econometric study (it could be challenging to obtain all the data required and from
various firms) involving simultaneous equations, with the work time, the coordina-
tion time and the various learning rates (all at the GPD location) as the dependent
variables; and with the efforts applied, the GPD location characteristics and several
control factors as independent variables.
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The base model developed by us (3.2.3) is very general and can also be extended
for multiperiod effort allocation (refer Appendix B.10O) and for partial offshoring, i.e.
Aij E [0, 1]. The partial offshoring case is important when the firm decides to keep
some knowledge of the task at the home location. Our overview of these extensions
show that they are useful when determining the allocation of efforts between tasks
or the relative offshoring content for the tasks, but do not enhance the comparative
statics results. We also expect, as a direct consequence of our modeling and analysis
efforts, that research towards measuring the various variables of our study will be
initiated.
A key extension of our model would be to a buyer-seller scenario when the seller
is at the offshore location. In that case the firm designing and developing the CES
may face challenges in visibility of actual task completion time by the supplier and
that would impact the construction of the contract. There would also be a case of
knowledge being lost by offshoring the task (but that would be a make/buy issue
rather than a on/off-shore challenge, though the offshore location of the supplier may
aggravate the situation). Our results can also lead to studies in understanding the re-
lationship between knowledge/competence development and the index of modularity
of the tasks offshored for CES.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
The following figure (Fig. 5-1) is a summary of this thesis. The top row has the
research questions. The second row outlines the contents of the various chapters.
The last row shows the contributions of each chapter.
Figure 5-1: Thesis Summary
We started our research with a system architecture based analysis of the GPD ap-
proaches of five firms engaged in the design and development of complex engineered
systems. These firms were pursuing GPD seeking cost savings (coupled with engineer-
ing capacity hedging) or competence. We observed that process decomposition was
the first step towards identification of offshoring content unless the firm was seeking
product competence at the offshore location (supplier in this case). However firms
continue to be challenged in identifying the offshoring content.
In Chapter 3 we explore the process of identifying, over time, the offshoring con-
tent for a firm pursuing GPD for cost savings purposes (setting up an inhouse facility).
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We developed a theory based on existing academic literature and modeled a recursive
equation to represent our theory. We also identified an index of modularity (ratio of
work time to sum of work time and coordination time) for establishing GPD content.
We then demonstrated a methodology to apply our theory in an industrial setting.
While our optimization efforts highlighted significant cost savings, we found a sur-
prising result: the offshoring content did not follow monotonic behavior. Analysis
of the details revealed that this was driven by the work time and coordination time
efficiency differences between the locations.
We next developed a stylized model to understand these efficiency differences. We
pursued a two-task, two-location, two-time-period model. We found that firms need
to prioritize their efforts, while transferring content to the offshore location, so as to
establish knowledge/competence at the offshore location, rather than prioritizing the
efforts based on modularity of the task. Offshoring based on modularity gives short
term payback whilst that based on the ability to create a knowledge/competence has
a longer payback duration.
5.1 A Process for Global Product Development
We build on our observations and results of the previous sections to propose a process
that firms can follow towards establishing a GPD center (Fig. 5-3). This process is
recursive with learnings following through to subsequent periods and the offshore
development content changing with time. In Fig. 5-2 we outline the sequence of
steps that a firm needs to follow, given its GPD motive. These are part of the system
architecture development phase.
GPD motive Steps
(during System development)
-market needs - ---------------- product
decomposition
complementary
knowledge c insourcel
competence wledge outsource
s ee king  incremental - - /
knowledge
process + product
- efficiencies decomposition
cost __ ------ - insourcel
savings outsource
capacity
_ein - process 4 pouct what todecomposition *- " offshore
Figure 5-2: Decision Steps for GPD Content
5.1. A PROCESS FOR GLOBAL PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT
The first step for a firm is to determine the reason for pursuing GPD. The sequence
of steps is determined by this motive and the respective steps have been outlined in
Fig. 5-2. For a firm pursuing GPD to meet market needs (we did not have an
example in our case studies), the primary GPD content is well established: it is the
unique content that needs to be designed and developed for the overseas market.
This content development may or may not be accompanied by related manufacturing
at the GPD location, e.g. Haier does development for the US market in the USA,
though the manufacturing activities continue at its home location in China (Eppinger
and Chitkara (2007)). This offshore development may be an inhouse operation or
outsourced.
Among firms that pursue GPD for efficiencies, those pursuing competence seek-
ing through complementary knowledge (necessary to complete the system) will have
defined content, and design and development will be carried out by a supplier with
the associated competence (e.g. Pitney Bowes). The process followed will be similar
to that for design and development for specific market needs. However firms that
seek competence through incremental knowledge would have the primary offshoring
content decided (based on the knowledge that they pursue) but decisions on sourcing
strategy and process and product decomposition would be taken in parallel as part of
system architecture development. The choice of sourcing strategy will influence the
architecture decomposition as planning for coordination is likely to depend on that,
and similarly the limitations faced while doing system decomposition would influence
the sourcing strategy. Amongst our cases, Intel set up development centers at India
and Russia to exploit the engineering talent in these regions, and they were captive
development centers. However, they could have also opted for outsourcing such design
and development activities: their decision would have been influenced by intellectual
property protection, coordination with suppliers, etc.
Firms that pursue efficiencies through cost savings and/or capacity hedging need
to first list and then distribute all process-product combinations, i.e. the outcome of
hybrid (process followed by product) decomposition exercises, in the 2x2 make/buy
in/out (Fig. 1-2) matrix. This will help identify combinations that can be outsourced
and those that can be offshored. Through the system architecture development steps,
as architecture develops, system decomposition, sourcing decision and offshoring con-
tent influence each other towards a final decision on GPD content. We observed that
Danaher Motion only offshored 'general' or 'commodity' engineering tasks to their
supplier and tasks involving their core competence were not offshored. Similarly,
Cessna offshored both 'general' and 'mission-critical' tasks but did not outsource the
'mission-critical' tasks.
We expand Fig. 1-1 to understand in detail the impact of GPD on the PD process
of CES. The key decision on identifying the offshoring content is taken during system
architecture development. This phase comprises of concept development, system
design, and system architecture approval. Key GPD inputs like GPD motive, details
on capabilities of offshore engineering center/location, etc. are required in this phase.
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Offshore centers (captive and suppliers) may be involved during concept development
and system design. We show this as X and Y respectively in Fig. 5-3. When the
GPD motive is market needs or competence seeking, the proportionate area of X
and Y increases. However, as seen in each case, the system architecture approval
is retained at the home location or the competence center. Firms should retain this
responsibility inhouse at the home location. This responsibility ensures that the home
location/competence center retains control on the design content, interface decisions,
onshore/offshore responsibilities, sourcing decisions, etc. Transferring of this decision
to an offshore engineering center can lead to serious implications on quality, and in
case of CES it is a very long capability transfer process. The ability to approve the
final system architecture is a core competence of the firm designing and developing
CES. It is built over many years, through a number of product development cycles,
and numerous product iterations.
System Architecture
Development
0 l GPD Content I| Discussions I
i I
I /
GPD Final Offshon
Information Content
* GPD motive
* Offshore information - -
- Product development (PD) tasks
9) Offshore PD tasks
D1 Non-PD tasks/content
Component/Task
Development
Evaluate
--- PD information flow
- - -+ Non-PD information flow
Figure 5-3: A Process for GPD
The final offshore content is decided as part of the system architecture decision.
Component/task development is now distributed, and this defines the GPD content.
The choice of offshore content, besides the cases of market needs and competence
seeking, need to ensure that the coordination needs between the various locations
System
Integration
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are minimized (Anderson et al. (2008), Eppinger and Chitkara (2007), Gomes and
Joglekar (2008)).
Subsequent to component/task development, system integration takes place. Like
system development, the offshore engineering center may be involved during system
integration proveout (and the area of Z increases with increased offshore content), but
the approval of the system integration remains with the home location/competence
center. Like approval of system architecture development, the ability to approve
system integration is a core competence of the firm. Along with approval of the system
architecture development, it is the last responsibility that is likely to be offshored or
outsourced.
The work distribution is not static, rather it is dynamic. There needs to exist
a regular evaluation process whereby the performance of offshore development work
and the coordination efforts are monitored and global work distribution reviewed
accordingly. This could include establishment of new GPD centers, allocation of
more task content to existing GPD locations, reduction of work allocation to certain
GPD locations, etc.
5.2 Conclusion
Global Product Development (GPD) is fast gaining attention as an opportunity that
firms can exploit. However, for complex systems, the challenge is immense. While
efforts are being made to reduce the difficulties faced in coordination across regions,
we have proposed an economic modeling approach to reduce coordination. We have
also shown that it may be beneficial for firms to take a long term view and invest
in competence and knowledge development through a careful selection of tasks for
offshoring. We firmly believe that GPD is an emerging phenomenon. Our findings
and proposals reflect the current state of GPD practice and related opportunities
therein. We expect that as GPD practice evolves, our findings and proposals will
modify accordingly.
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Appendix A
Nokia Example: Formulae and
Table
A.1 Derivation of Learning Rate Formulae
In section 3.4.3 we had captured the learning rate at the various locations for the work
time and coordination time efficiency. We will briefly describe the derivation here.
The basic learning curve for time taken to solve a problem (Boone and Ganeshan
(2001)) for the nth time is given as Tn = Tl.n - r, where Tn is the time taken for the
nth effort, T was the time taken the first time and r represents the learning rate.
In our case, when we consider the work time efficiency factor for department j at
location k, i.e. qjk, the learning (by repeated doing) acts to improve this efficiency
factor. Thus, if the task has been performed for Tk periods already, the efficiency
factor, with learning rate rjk is given as:
kjk(Tk) = Ojkl.(Tk)( - r k)
Similarly, for time Tk + t it is given as
kjk(Tk+t) = Ojkl(Tk + t) ( - rjk)
Combining the above, we get
jjk(Tk)
j(T+Tk+t -rjk
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The equation is section 3.4.3 assumes that the learning rate is independent of the
department j and hence uses rk ilo rk. With Nokia, each program has a total time
period of one year and hence we could use the above derived formulae. In case a
program is greater than or less than a year, the time factor Tk above will need to
modified accordingly.
The coordination time efficiencies are obtained similar to the work time efficiency
derived above.
A.2 Learning Rate at Nokia
We used the basic learning curve formulae to derive the learning rate at the GPD
location. Data available with Nokia had current work time efficiency at 0.6. This was
the third year of operation at the GPD location. The earlier efficiencies had been 0.5
and 0.564 in the initial two years. Fitting along a log curve, we approximated a slope
of -0.15272 and an intercept of 1.97114 which now represent the learning rate and the
first instance time. We used these factors to then derive the work time efficiency at
the GPD location for the planning period. We extended the same efficiency for the
calculation of the coordination time efficiencies.
A.3 Coordination Efficiency Table
Based on discussions, we arrived at the following relative coordination efficiency table
for coordination between various locations. Thus this represented Okk', though ideally
we would have liked to have Ojkj'k'.
B1. 1 2 3 4 5 6 ratio of
1 4 3 3 2 2 1 time taken rating
2 3 4 3 2 2 1 1 4 Excellent, no challenges
3 3 3 4 2 2 1 3 Good, Irttle coordination challenges
4 2 2 2 4 2 1 2 Average, some coordination challenges
5 2 2 2 2 4 1 2 1 Poor, a lot of challenges in coordination
6 1 1 1 1 1 2 0 No joint activities & coordination
Figure A-1: Relative Coordination Efficiency (between locations)
We also understood that the time difference between ratings 4 and 3 was less
than that between 3 and 2, which was less than that between 2 and 1. Thus it was
a convex reducing on the time scale. However if we have the rating of 4 to have
maximum efficiency of 1, then it is a concave increasing curve starting with efficiency
0.5 corresponding to rating 1 and increasing to efficiency 1 for rating 4. So we started
by fitting a convex function with the relative time durations. Thus we used MX- 1/ 4 =
1 for rating of 4 corresponding to time duration of 2, and Mx -1 = 2 for rating of
1 corresponding to time duration of 1. Solving, we got x = 0.397 and M = 2.52.
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We used these for ratings of 2 and 3 to get Mx - 1/3 = 1.26 and Mx - 1/ 2 = 1.587
respectively. Taking the inverse, we get a convex curve of 0.5, 0.63, 0.794, and 1 for
ratings of 4,3,2, and 1 respectively. Reversing for coordination efficiency, we get 1,
0.87, 0.706 and 0.503 for ratings of 4,3,2 and 1 respectively and these are transformed
to obtain Fig. 3-6. We check for robustness of this transformation in section 3.7.2.
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Appendix B
Proofs and Explanation for
Stylized Models (Chapter 4)
B.1 Proof of Result 1:
We solve (4.3.2) and (4.3.3) for Bi* using the first order condition 8L = 0. We then
use the second order differential 2 to determine if the first order condition solution
meets the minimization criteria. Taking the first order condition oL = 0, we get:
=- 0 = e-P(12 .w1.91.f(B1) - 12 .w2 .g92.f(B - B 1) + 2.12 .c.ge.fj(Bi))
aB,
+e-2,.1.g.2-(+12 ). fI(B 1) - 12-. 2 .g2-(r2+ I ).f'(B - B 1)
+2.1.C.gc.2 -(' re+2 ).I '(B i))
-- f'(Bi).[w,.gl.(1 + e- .2- (r+ 2)) + 2.c.g,.(1 + e- .2-(r.+12)
= f'(B - Bi).[w2.g2.(1 + e-3.2-(T2+/1)]
Rearranging gives the result in (4.3.4). Now let us consider the second order differ-
ential -.
02L
___2 e- (l 2 1w1.gi .f(B 1) + l2.w 2 *92f'(B - B 1) + 2.12 .c.g.f(Bi))
+e-23. (12-wl.g .2-(r+2) .f-(B 1) 2+ 12w2.g22-(r2+.f(B - B 1)
+2.2l...2-(+2 .f(B))
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Now let us consider the different cases:
Case 1: both f (B 1) and f 2 (B 2) are convex. Then f'(B,) > 0 and we get 2 0.
Thus, the first order conditions give us the minimization conditions if a solution ex-
ists. If a solution does not exist, then the entire effort is applied to the task that
ensures that the total cost is lower, i.e. (4.2.2) is minimized.
Case 2: f (Bi) is convex and f 2(B 2) is concave-convex. Then solve (4.3.2) and find
Bi* and B 2 *. If a solution exists and 82L > 0 then that is the solution. If a solution
a2Ldoes not exist or Q < 0, then the entire effort is applied to the task that ensures
that the total cost is lower, i.e. (4.2.2) is minimized
Case 3: both fl(BI) and f 2 (B 2) are concave-convex. Then solve (4.3.2) and find B *
and B 2*. If a solution exists and 2L > 0 then that is the solution. If a solution to
(4.3.2) does not exist or 02L
(4.3.2) does not exist or < 0, then the entire effort is applied to the task that
ensures that the total cost is lower, i.e. (4.2.2) is minimized.
Note: Use the other Coordination Term Now let us consider the case where
max(2 - ( r"c +" -).f(Bn)) = 2-(rc+m).f 2(B 2 ) where 2 - (r2,+1l) = 2 -(rc+ ul)
Substituting in (4.3.2) and (4.3.3) we obtain:
ll = B + e- 2.w121.( 1g.f (B) + w 2 .g 2 .f 2 (B - B 1 )) + 2.12.c.g.fl(B 1 ))
+e-20. (1 2.W1 .g.2-(r,+A2) f1(B 1 ) + 12 .2.2- 2 .2(r21)) f 2 (B - B 1)
+2.12.C.gc.2-(rc±+l). f 2 (B - Bi)))
Following similar steps as earlier for the proof, we get:
dL8L = 0 = e-'(12.w1-.g91 .f(B 1) - 2.w2 .g2 .f(B - 1 ) + 2.12 .c.g.f(Bi1))
+e-2(12. .2- ( B 1) - 12 .w29 2 .2-(r2 )( _ B 1)
-2. 2.c.gc.2-(r+1).f (B - B 1))
--> f (Bi).[wl.gi.(1 + e-4.2 - (r 1+ A2)) -+ 2.c.gc]
= f2(B - Bi).[w 2 .g 2 .(1 + e-.2 -( 2+ 1)) + 2.C.gC.e-.2 -(rc + 1)]
f1(B 1) w2 .g2.(1 + e-.2 -( r2+ /1)) + 2.c.gc.e- .2 -(rc+j)
f2(B - B 1 ) w1 .g1 .(1 + e- .2-(r1+jT2)) + 2.c.g C
Comparing the above with (4.3.4), we observe that the effort allocation continues
to depend on the ratio of the marginal benefits of the effort exerted, with some re-
arrangement of the terms. Evaluating for the different cases for 2L
same resultswe obtain the
same results as earlier in the proof. QED.
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B.2 Proof of Proposition 1:
We incorporate the definitions of index of modularity in the solution of Result 1
(4.3.4) to get
fj(B).[wl.gl.(1 + e-3.2-( r+2)) + 2.(711 - 1).wl.gc.(1 + e-0.2-(r +2)
= f2(B - Bl).[w2 .g2.(1 + e-0.2-(r2+I1))] (B.2.1)
Now for each of the comparative statics terms we need to use the envelope theorem.
B.2.1 Modularity
For the index of modularity = we have
dB 1 _ dB 1 dr1  dB 1  d 1  1
d1 d,' di 1- d1 d7i 2 J
171 771
Now applying _B1 on (B.2.1) we get
dB1 (f'(B 1).[wl.gl.(1 + e-0.2- (rl +12) ) + 2.(,q - 1).wl.gc.(1 + e-.2 - (rc+A2)]
drl1
+ f2(B - Bi).[w2 .g 2 .(1 + e-,.2-(2 1)
= -2.f'(B).wl.ge.(1 + e-0.2- (r+A2))
dBi -2.fj(B).wl.ge.(1 + e-8.2 - (rc+A2))
dr1 M
where M = f'(B).[wl.gl.(1 + e-3.2- (r+/42) (B.2.2)
+2.(ql - 1).wl.ge.(1 + e- .2-(rc+'2)))] + f2'(B - B 1 ).[w 2.g 2 .(1 + e-0.2-(r2+1))]
Now M > 0 (by proof of Result 1 this condition is required for (4.3.4) to be the
solution). Thus, d > 0 and d < 0 as fl(B 1) < 0.
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B.2.2 Learning by Doing Something Else
We follow the same steps as in the previous proof applying d-B and d to (B.2.1).
We get:
dB1  Al dB 1  A2dB = l dB A2 where M is as defined in (B.2.2)
del M' dI2 M
Al = (-1).w2.gg 2e-2.f(B - B1).2-(r2+A1).ln(2)
A2 = -(-1).wi.gi.e - .f'(Bi).2- (r12+P2).In(2)
-(-1).2.(ri - 1).wj.ge. f'(B1).2-(rc+A2).ln(2)
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Since f,(B,) is convex reducing, f,(B,) < 0. Hence Al > 0 and A2 < 0 and we
already have M > 0. So we get dB > 0 and dB< 0.dpj dp2
B.2.3 Learning by Repeated Doing
We follow the same steps as in the previous proofs applying dB1 dBi and dB1 to
(B.2.1). We get:
dB 1  B1 dB 1  B2 dB 1  B3dr1  M' dr - M' d - M where M is as defined in (B.2.2)dr, M dT2 M dr, M )
B1 = -(-1).wl.gl.e- .f'(B1).2 - (r l+2)In(2)
B2 = (-1).w2 2.e-.fI(B - B1).2-(r2+ l).ln(2)
B3 = -(-1).2.(rl - 1).wl.g,.f'(B1).2-(rc+P2).ln(2)
Since f,(B,) is convex reducing, f'(B,) < 0. Hence B1 < 0, B2 > 0 and B3 < 0
and we already have M > 0. So we get dB1 < 0, dB1 > 0 and aB1 < 0.
B.2.4 Offshoring Penalty
We follow the same steps as in the previous proofs applying aB1 dB1 and dB1 to
(B.2.1). We get:
dB 1  C1 dB 1  C2 dB 1  C3
- M' dg2 - M' dg - C where M is as defined in (B.2.2)
C1 - - f'(Bi).wl.(1 + e-0.2 - (r + / 2))
C2 = f2(B - Bi).w2 -92.(1 + e-.2 - (r2+/1))
C3 = -f'(Bl).2.(Tj - 1).wl.(1 + e- .2 - (re+u2))
Since f,(Bn) is convex reducing, f'(B) < 0. Hence C1 > 0, C2 < 0 and C3 > 0
and we already have M > 0. So we get So we get dB1 > 0, dB < 0 and dB > 0. QED.
We will outline all the remaining proofs briefly as they follow the same line of
reasoning as the proofs of Result 1 and Proposition 1. We will outline them as for
Case 1 of Result 1's proof.
B.3 Proof of Result 2:
We use the formulations for the sequential offshoring case ((4.2.3) and (4.2.4)) and
the assumption of max(2-(rl+1"2).f(Bi), (1 + 6) - 521.f 2 (vB 2 )) = 2-(rl±+11A2).f,(B 1).
Taking the other term changes the form of the solution slightly but does not change
the comparative statics results. We form the Lagrangean (similar to (4.3.1) and using
B.3. PROOF OF RESULT 2:
B = E, B, or B2 = e'(B - B1)) as follows:
L(B 1) = B 1 + e-3.(e3 (B - B1 ) + fl2 Wl.g 1.f 1(B 1) f -.w 2  (B.3.1)
+ (e1 + f2).c.gcl.f 1(B 1)) + e-2".(e2 .w1.gl.1- 1().2( 2
+ e2 .w2 .9g2 .f 2(.e1(B - B1)).(1+ +) - 2A1 + 2/.2.c.g.(2-(rc+61AL2)f(B1)))
Taking the first derivative as in Result 1, we get:
=0 = 1 + e-O(-e + 2.wl.gl.f(B 1 ) + (l + e2).c.gcl.f (B1))
8Bj
+ e-2".( 2 .-wl1-.g.f1(Bl).2-(r1+ 1"2) + 2.e 2.c.ge.(2-(rj+6112) f'(B1))
-12..2.g92.z.e3.f2(.(B - B1)).(1+ 6)-621
Solving the above we get the solution outlined in Result 2 (4.3.5). It can be shown
that the second derivative 2L > 0 as we are considering the convex case. In a similar
way, the solution can be obtained for the other term in
max(2-(r+1 2) .fi (Bi), (1 + e)- 62 f2(vB2))
Now, taking B1 = B - e- B 2 , we get
L(B2) = B - e- B 2 + e-O.(B 2 + e2 .w1.gl.f(B - e-B 2) + el-W 2 + (el + t 2).C
.gel.fl(B - e-B 2))+ e-20.(e W1.gl.f(B - e-B 2 ).2-(r1+12)
-f 2 W 2 .92..f 2 (v.B 2 ).(1 + e)-2A1 + 2.12.*.g .(2-(r+ 12). fl(B - e-3B 2)))
Solving the above for = 0, we get the solution
f(vB2*) '(B.3.2)
f'(B - e- 3B2*)
£2.wl.g1 + (l + t2).c.g9c + e- .( 2.wl.g .2 -
( +12) + 2.£ 2 .c.ge.2 -( r1c+612))
e- 2 .w2-.g2.v.(1 + )-62 1
This will be the solution if the second order conditions are satisfied.
If the above solution (ratio of marginal benefits) does not exist, then all the efforts
are to be prioritized for the task that ensures that total cost (4.2.4) is minimized. In
such a case, there may exist a condition wherein no effort is applied to support the
first task that is offshored and all the effort supports the task that is offshored at
t = 2. QED.
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B.4 Proof of Proposition 2:
We first apply the definitions of index of modularity (3.2.2) to (4.3.5) and (B.3.2) to
obtain:
f'(Bl*).(e2.-w.gI (1 e +1 2)71 - 1)W1.gcl (B.4.1)
+e-.(2.e2-(l - 1)Wl .g.2-(1 1.2-(+612)2) + )2.w1 .g 1
-f'(v.e.(B - Bi*)).( 2 .w2 .g2 .v.(1 + ) -621) = 0
f'(vB 2 *).(e-0f 22.w 92-.g2 .(1 )-62"1) (B.4.2)
- f (B - e-flB 2 *) ( 2 -w91 + (1l + e2) (712 - )29cl
+e-3 .(E2.W l.g.2 - (rj + 612) + 2.E2 (72 - 1).W 2 .g.2-(1c+12))) = 0
We apply the envelope theorem (as in the proof of Proposition 1) to (B.4.1) and
(B.4.2) above.
B.4.1 Modularity
We had identified modularity as - . Thus we get
?In Wn+c
dB 1  dB 1 dr)l 2 dB 1
d-1 d *1 d-1- d 71771 771
d  1)17)11
So differentiating the optimality equation (B.4.1), we get for dBi,
dB 1
d 1  (fl"(Bi).[ 2 .W 1.g- + (E1 + f -E).( - 1)wl.g' + e-+ ( 12-Wl gl.2
- (rl  1 2)
d771
+2.e 2.(1 - 1)Wl.gc.2-(r+12))]
+ f~ v.e .(B - Bi*)). [e2.w 2.g 2 . 2 .e 3 .(1 + E)-6211 ])
= - fj'(B1).2.e2. 1gc.2- (r 61 2)
dB1
drlq
-f' (B 1 ).2.e 2.wl .g.2 - (r1+61
l 2)
M1
where
M1 - f~'(Bi).[e2.w.g -91 (e 1 - 2)*.(m1 - 1)wl.g9,
+e-.(e 2.w 1.g 1 .2-(r1+ 6 12) + 2 e2.( - 1)- 1  Wl.gc.2-(rc+s12))
+ f2(v.e.(B - Bi*)).[e2.w 2.g 2.A2.e 1 .(1 + c)-2I]
Now M1 > 0 (by proof of Result 2 and for solution (4.2.4) to exist).
Proposition 1, - < 0.
771
(B.4.3)
Thus, as in
Repeating the same steps for B 2 and index of modularity, , we obtain (from772
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(B.4.2)),
dB2vB2).V.(e z2. 292.V. V~-+)-621)
dr2
+f"'(B - e- B 2).e-(e 2.wl.gl + (el + 2).(72 -- 1).w2-9l
+e-0.(V2 .W1.g1.2 - (r l +1A2) + 2.e 2. (2 - 1).w 2 .gc.2-(rjc+ 612)))
= f (B - eO- )((4 + t 2 )-W2.g-9 + e- .2. 2 .W 2.gc.2 - (r +1I2))
dB2  fl(B - e-'B 2)((i + ~2 ). 2 gcl + e- .2. 2. 2 .g.2 - (rc+6 12)) where
=-- = ,where
dr2 M2
M2 = f'(v.B2).u.(e- 2.w 2.g 2.v.(1 + )-6211) (B.4.4)
+f"(B - e-B 2 ).e-(e£2.w1-.g + (2 + 2).(72 - l).w2.gc
+e-.( 2 .w .g1 .2 - (r+61 2) + 2.2. (r2 - 1)w 2 .gc.2-(rjc+ 612)))
Now M2 > 0 (by proof of Result 2 and for solution to (4.2.4) to exist). So we now
get -_2 < 0 or % > 0.
B.4.2 Other Parameters
We follow the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 2. However, unlike Proposition
2, the effect on BI* and B2* have to be considered separately. We use the envelope
theorem on (B.4.1) for the effect on Bi* to observe the following:
dB 1  f'(v.eO.(B - B 1)).(.w 2 .. ln(1 + E).(1 + e)-621.(_ 2 ))
dli M1
dB1  X
= <0
dp2 M1
where X = - f (Bj).e- .(£2.w1.g1.ln2.2-(r +812). J1
+2.e1.(0 - 1).- 1 .gc.ln2.2-(rjc+j1A2).( _))
dB1  -fl(B).e-.e 2.l.gl.ln2.2-(rl+ 2).(-1) < 0
dr, M1
dB1  -f (Bi).e- .2.2 2.(r1 - 1).wl.g.ln2.2- (r j c+61j' 2) '(- 1) <0
dric M1
dB 1  -f'(Bi).( + e 2 ).(l - 1)W 1 >0
dgjl M1
dB1  - fj (B 1 )(2.l + e-.e 2.Wl.2 - (r+ 61A2)) >0
dgl M1
dB 1  - f (B).e-0.2. 2.(7 1 - 1).wl.2 - (r j +612)dg >0
dge M1
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Similarly, we use the envelope theorem on (B.4.2) for the effect on B2*
dB 2  2 -f(vB 2).e 2.w 2.g92.V.(1 + <)- 201.ln(1 + ).(-62)
dyl M2
dB2  X2
- >0
d/t2  M2
where X1 = f'(B - e-0B2).--.(x2-g1-91.2-('r+1L2).ln2.(-61)
+2.f-72 - ).W2 .g9c.2-(rc+61±12).ln2.(-61))
dB 2  2fl(B - e~B).e-. .W1.g1.2-(r1+12).ln2.(-1) >0drl M2
dB 2  fi(B - e-B2).e- .2 2.(72 - 1).w 2.gc.2-(rj1+ 612).ln2.(-1) 0>0drlc M2
dB 2  -f(vB 2).e-. 2.w 2... (1 + e)-621 > 0
>0dg2  M2
dB 2  f1(B - e-B 2).( 1 f2).(72 - 1).2 w2  <
<0dgcl M2
dB 2  fi(B - e- B 2).e - .2. 2 (qr2 - 1).W 2 2-(rc+61J2)
< 0 QED.dge M2
B.5 Proof of Proposition 3:
We use the work time and coordination time outlined in Table 4.1 and the prior
argument of B = oB, to develop the associated Lagrangean. Solving the Lagrangean
(similar to proof of Result 1), we obtain the solution for B1 * as:
f1(Bi*)( 2 .1.g91 + f2 .2.c.gc + (l + e2 ).Cl.gcl (B.5.1)
+e-e 3( 2 .WI g 1 .2-(r1+,2) + 2.2..gC. 2 - (r c+ 2) + ( 2 -- 2 ).Cl.g-9.2-(cl+h12)))
- f(B - Bi*)( 2 w 2 92 + f + e2 ).c2.gc2
+e- (£ N 292.2- (r2+A) + 1 + f 2 ).Cc2.g 2 (c2.c2 h21)) = 0
Now substituting the definitions of index of modularity and index of within modularity
(for c = (10o - 1)wl and cl = (ql1 - o10)w1 in (B.5.1)) and applying the envelope
theorem, we observe that
dB 1  Aldx - where
d7710 M3'
Al = - ffj(B)(f 2 .2.gC-Wi - (-1 + 2 )-.gciW1
+e-0(2.g.wl.2- ( c+~ 2 ) (1 + 2) .W 1.gc.2-(r1+h22)))
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= Al < 0 ((l + e2 )9.g, > f2.2.g as 1l >> 2
and gcl is across shores and g, is within the GPD location)
M3 = f'(B)( 2.w 1.gl + 1 2.2.c.gc + (f1 + E2).c 1.S, + e-(e 2.w1.g91.2 - (r+' /2)
+f2.2.c.ge.2 - (rc+ A ) + (1 + 2 ).C1.g-c.2-(rc1+h12)))
+f"'(B - B1*)( 2 -.w 2.g2 + (l + f 2 ).C2.gc2
+e-(f2.w 2-92.2 - (r2+ A ) + ( 1 + 2 ).c 2 .gc2. 2 -(rc2+h2 P1)))
SM3 > 0
dB1  dB 1do < 0, F > 0
drllo do10
Similarly for index of modularity and the learning rate (by doing something else),
dB = A2 where A2 = -f'(B).( + f 2 )9.gcj -. (1 + e-.2 - (rc+hI12)) > 0d7l M3'
dB1  dB 1
> 0, = <0
dB 
- A3, where A3 = f'(B - Bi).e- .(£ 2.w 2.g2.2-(r2+i1).ln2.(-1)
dal M3'
+(fl + t 2 ).c2.gc2.2-(rc2+h2A).ln2.(-h 2))
dB1
=A3>0 dB >0
daj
dB1 A4 ,where A4 = - fl'(Bi).e - o .(£2.wl.g .2- (r+'2).In2.(-1)
d/2 M3
+f 2.2.c.gc.2-(rc+I2).ln2.(-1) + (1 + t 2 ).c 1 .g9cl.2-(rcl+hl2).ln2.(-hi))
dB1SA4 > <<0 QED
dpL2
B.6 Proof of Proposition 4:
We use the work time and coordination time outlined in Table 4.2 and the prior
argument of B = oa,B, to develop the associated Lagrangean. Solving the Lagrangean
(similar to proof of result 1), we obtain the solution for Bi* as:
(1 - e- ) + f'(B*).e-#.(e2.wl .g.(1 + e-0.2- (r+JI2)) (B.6.1)
+(41 + e2).C1-gcl.(1 + e-0.2-(rl+h6 A2)) + (1 + . 2).c.g + e-.2.12.c.ge.2- (r +J 2 ) )
-k.f'(k(B - Bl*)).e-20.( (w 2 .g2 .(921 + )-(r2A)
+(t1 + 2 ).c2-gC2(1 + )-(rc2 +h 2A1)) = 0
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Now substituting the definitions of index of modularity and index of within modularity
(for c = (0lo - 1)wl and c1 = (771 - 2710)wl in (B.6.1)) and applying the envelope
theorem, we observe that,
dB 1  A5
= where A5 = -fj(B 1 ).(-( 1 + f2).wl.g,,.(l + e- 0 .2-(rI+h16 P2))dr7 o M4
+(f1 + f2).W1.gcb + e-.c.2 - ( r . + I 2 )
Now we can assume that gel gcb since both involve coordination (for the first time)
between task n = 1 at the GPD location and n = 2 and other tasks at the home
location. Also we have h < 1 and since the coordination of n = 1 and n = 2 has
the advantage of efforts being applied to support the offshoring of both tasks while
the coordination of n = 1 and the other tasks has efforts being applied to support
n = 1 only, and coordination between n = 1 and n = 2 is at the same location
while that between n = 1 and the other tasks is across locations; we can assume that
2 - (r l + h 6[ 2) > 2 -(r e+ 6 2) . Thus,
= A5 < 0
M4 = f"'(Bi).e-4.(f 2.1g 1.(1 + e-±.2 - (1 + 6 W2 ) ) + (f1 2+ ).C.9cb
+(f1 + f 2 ).c1.g91.(1 + e-.2 - (rcl+h16l 2)) + e-.2.~2 .c.gc.2 - (rc+6 2))
-k 2.f"(k(B - B1)).e-2.(62.w 2.-g 2.(1 + E) - (r2+ 1)
+( 1 + £2).C2gc2 '(1 + 6 )-(rc 2+h 2 .1))
4M4>0
dB 17 < 0,
d2 lo
dB 17> 0
dl110i
Similarly for index of modularity and the learning rate (by doing something else),
A6
= where
S- '(B).e-0. (
dB1
=>dql > 0,
+ f 2 ) .gclWl.(1 +
dB1
_<0
rh
e-.2 -(rc1 +h lA2)) > 0
A7M4' where
-k.f'(k(B - Bj)).e 2,(C2.c.g2.(1 + e)-(2+1).l n(l + c).(-1)
+(1 + £2 ).c 2.gc2.(1 + E)-(rc2+h2Al).ln( + E).(-h 2))
A7 > 0 ~ B > 0dpl
dB 1
A6
dB 1
dpl
A7
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dB 1  A8
_d_ - M4' ,where
A8 = - f'(Bi). (f2.Wl-g.e-f.2-(rzl+t2).ln2.(-6)
+2.e-.12 .c.ge.2-(rc+6J2)./n2.(-J) )
+(e1 + g2).cl-9c .e-3.2-(rj+hjjL2).In2.(- h)
dB1
~ A8 < 0 d < 0dA2
In the sequential offshoring case, we also need to review the sensitivity of the effort
allocation for the second task to be offshored. We repeat the above steps for B2 and
observe that:
dB2  dB2  dB2  dB 2d1 >0, <0, d >0, dl<0 QED.d d1 d/ 2  dp17720 772
B.7 Proof of Proposition 5:
Now E[2"] = E[eln2 ] = E[eln2] and if x - N(p, o2), then E[ex] = e/l+2- . We can
apply this transformation to (4.2.1) and (4.2.3), e.g. E[2 - (r + 2)] = E[e- (rj1+2).ln2] =
2
e-1n2.(ir-+j2)+(In2)2-)2 ,22 . We take the utility function of the total cost and form the
Lagrangean. We then take the first order conditions to identify the optimal effort dis-
tribution (using U'(x) < 0) and then apply the envelop theorem for the comparative
statics (using U'(x) < 0 and U"(x) < 0).
Thus, for the simultaneous offshoring case (from (4.2.2)), we obtain,
x = B + e-.(2- Ewn-9n-fn(B) +- 2 2.e.g.f(B 1))
n2
+ e-20.'( 2 E Wn n f n(B ) e -n 2. ( +p )+(n2)2" 
- 2
+2.n2.c.g.f (B).e- n2.(c+/2)+(2)
Taking the FOC with respect to B1 and with B = B1 + B2, we get:
U'(x). [9i. f (B ).w.(1 + e- .e-In2(i+2)+(In2) '2 ~ 2
+2.gc. fc(B1).(h - 1).wl.(1 + e-o.e- n2 .( r+22)+( n2)2  )
-g.f(B - 1).w 2 .(1 + e-. - l n2.( -2+1)+(n2)2 )] = 0
-92f2' B Bi -W -(l + e e )] =
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This gives the BI* and hence B 2 * provided the SOC are satisfied. The SOC is given
by
02L
0B12 = U"(x).[Z]2 + U'(X). a
where U'(x).Z = 0 (by FOC conditions Z = 0)
Inspection shows that this is always < 0 and hence the FOC give utility maximizing
conditions. Now applying the envelope theorem on the FOC conditions, we get
U"/(x).[Z]2 + UXBJZ dB 1 2
= -U"(x).Z.e-2. 2. 1.g.f~ (B 1). (I12) 2 . n2( 2)n2) 2  12 2
22
(In2)2 .- fn 2 ( -1+ 2 )+ (In2)2
2
dB 1Similarly, > 0,do-,,2,2 2
dB 1
- r > 0.
dB 1
and < 0
da,24ll11
Performing similar transformations on (B.5.1) and applying the envelope theorem,
we obtain
dB 1  dB 1
da',#2 0, d-rcl,42 2
dB 1>0, dO 2
dor2 ,.l
dB1
<0, <0
d rc 2 ,#1
2
We repeat the same steps for the sequential offshoring case, and we obtain
dB 1 > 0,
dart1,2 2
dB 2 < 0,
dO~rl A2
dB 1
> r,
dB2
< O,
dB 1 <0
d r2,#12
dB2 >0
dr2 ,2l
Performing similar transformations on (B.6.1) and applying the envelope theorem,
we obtain
dB 1> 0, > 0,
Sdac 22
dB2
< 0, < 0,
'do-re,#22 2
dB 1
d rcl ,/2
dB2
do ,cl,2 
dB 1> 0, dr2,2
dB2
< O,
d°-2,,#12
dB1
<0, <0
dTc2,1L2
dB2>0, >0
dOrre2 
,12
dB 1
dar, 2r ,/'2
>0,
dB 1
d-rl,12 2
dB 2
dUrl,#2 2
QED.
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B.8 Proof of Proposition 6:
For the simultaneous offshoring case (from (4.2.2)), we obtain,
E[x] = B + e- .(£2. * wn.g.f(B,) + 2.£2.E[q1 - 1].wl.ge.fe(Bi))
n
+e-2 3.( 2 E Wn.gn.fn(Bn).2-(rn+-n) + 2.e 2 .E[, - 1].w-l.f(B1).2
- (r+1))
7t
Var[x] - ax2 = e-2 .4.e2 2 12.gc.(fB1))2
+e-4,.4.122.W12.c2.a2 2 c( B i ))2.(2 - (rc+p ) )2
From E[U()] = -aE[x]+ .a2  2, taking FOC,
a a
S1.e-aE[x]a 2 2 d + .a2.2 d 1 2 2] = 0
a dB. 2[-aE[x] + .a.]
a dB1 2
we get d E[U(x)] = 0
dB1
S.eaE[x]4+.a 2 .x 2 . [-a.e_4 . 2 (w l.g~ f (B 1)
a
+2.E[771 - 1].wl.gc.fc(B 1) + e-.(wl.gl.fj(B1).2- (r + A 2 )
-w2-92f(B - B 1 ).2 - (r2+1) + 2.E[ 71- 1].Wl.fc(Bi).2-(rc+1)))2
a .(e-20.4. 22 . 2. Wl 2 g2 2.2 '(B). f(B)
+e-40.4.122.w,12.g2.a 12.2. f(B1). f (Bi).(2-(rc+))2)] = 0
= If we represent the above as A.dZ = 0,
then dZ = 0 where A = 1.e-aE[x]+ .a2,2
a
= For the above equation to give the optimal value BI*,
82L
we need the SOC to satisfy 2 < 0
aBj
i.e. -.e - _ _i.e. .eaE[x+2. 2 .(dZ)2 .e-aE[x]+.a 2. dZ
a a dB1
i.e.a .e-20.4e.22aw 2 122. (2. .f(B)f"(B 1) + 2.(f/(B1))2)_(2 + e-20.(2-(rc+t))
2)
< a.e-3.e2.(w 1.gl.f(B 1 ) + 2.g92.f2(B - B 1 ) + 2.E[71 - 1].wl.gc.f"(Bi)
+e-/.(wl.gl. f/(B1).2
- (rj+A2)
+w2g92f(- B ).- B1 2-(r2+s1) + 2.E[r - 1].Wl.fc(B1).2-(rc+1)))
Now applying the envelope theorem to the FOC, we get
A.(dZ) 2 + A. d d - 2 = -A.dZ. dA 2dBj I ddo2 -,, - A. dZ
- w2*92.f2(B- B1)
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- dZ
dBi
d 2
d71
and dZ < 0 (to meet SOC to ensure that BI* is utility maximizer)
dB1
<0
Similarly for the sequential offshoring case (from (4.2.4)), we obtain,
dB 1  dB2  dB 1  dB 2
2 <0 > 0, < 0, > 0 QED.da? '2 U 722 du7 2 da1 2
B.9 Proof of Proposition 7:
We incorporate the definitions of f2t for the simultaneous case (using (4.2.1)) and
analyze.
x = + .( 2 0 .e((i2-~) 2 .z) w.gn.fn(Bn)
n
2
+2.20-.e (( E 2 ) +a%2 z) ) . c .g c .fz) (B 1 ))
2
n+e-2 2o.e( 2(e 2 Z2 (rc+l) )
+212e0.(2(g2 -  2 2)+-2  c.g.2-(r-ll). f (B1))
Taking the FOC (as in proof of Proposition 5) with respect to B 1,
2
UI(x).[202o.e((12- 2 )+t2z1) .(wl.g 1 .f1(B 1) - w 2.g 2 -f2(B - B 1) + 2.c.gc. f(B 1))
+-fr20.e- .e (2 (pf2 )+O-2 .z2). e- (W1 .g .f1(B 1).2 - (r1 2)
-w2-2f(B B 1 ).2 -(r2 ) + 2.c.g.f'(B1).2-(rc+pl))] = 0
Since the SOC conditions are satisfied, solution of the above gives Bi* and hence B 2*.
Identifying the above FOC as U'(x).Z1 = 0, we get Z1 = 0 and
dB1  -U"(x).Zl.(dx/dee22 ) - U'(x).(dZ1/daf2 2) dZ1/de 2 2
daoe2 U"(x).(Z1) 2 + U'(x).(dZ1/dB1) dZ1/dB1
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Now < 0 = sign y ) = sign da2) and
dBj de22 do22
sign d = sign((-1 + ((t2- a2 2).Zl)
-w2-92f2(B - B 1) + 2.c.gc.fl(B1)))
2
+(-1 + ).(e2 o.e- .e(2( 2~ )+U12z2) .e-(wl.g.f'(B1).2-(r1+/ 2)
2.ae,
-w2-92.f(B - B 1).2-(r2+/1))))
1 2
= sign( (e 2o.e((/* 2 - 2)+ .zl).(w 1 .g.fl(B 1) - w2 9g2 f(B - B 1)
+2.c.gc.fj (B1))))
(from Z1 = 0 and as zt ' N(O, t), E[zi] = E[z2] = 0)
dB 1
=: 2 > 0 if f'(B)(w.gj + 2.c.gc) > f2(B- B1)-w2-g2
daj2
Similarly, applying £2t for the sequential case (using (4.2.3)) and analyzing,
x' = B1 + e-O.(B 2 + 2 2o.e((I2e2- )+c"t2.zl).w.g.f1(B1) + .w 2 + ( 1
+20.e((/L2- 2 )+" 2 .zl )).c.gcl.f (B1))
2
+e- 2 .(20 .e(2(/2 - w )+2.z2 ). gWl.g. fi (B1). 2 -(r+2)
+g20.e(2(/2- )+ .2.2-2.f2(v.B2)*(1 + )-2/1
2
+2.120. (2(12 - )+.2 ). c.gc.2 - (rc+&12). fl (BI))
Taking the FOC (as in proof of the simultaneous case) with respect to B1,
U'(x).[f20.e((A12 - )2" (wl.gl.fj B1 ) + c.gcl.f(B1)) + flc.gcl. f'(B1)
20 . ( 2  2 )+a~ 2 .2)(w . . f (B 1 ). 2 -(rl+1/A2)
-w2.2.v.f(v.e".(B - B 1)).(1 + ) - (5621) + 2.c.gc.f'(B 1).2-(rc+61t1))] = 0
Since the SOC conditions are satisfied, solution of the above gives BI* and hence B 2*
Identifying the above FOC as U'(x).Z2 = 0, we get Z2 = 0 and
dZ2 (dB 1  (dZ2Now d < 0 = sign d2) = sign d ) and
dBj d'2 2 )do 2
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s( dZ2
sign f 2 2
= sign(f 20.e((ie2, "29 2.z1) - 1 2 ).(wl.gl.fl(B1)
1 2 11).(wg lf1(B1).2-(rl +61A2)
-w2-92.-.f2'(v.e.(B - B 1)).(1 + C)-(21) + 2.c.gc.f (B 1).2-(rc 6ll)))
= sign (f20--(' W2 2 2Cw1.g 1 l(Bj1) + c..f(B)) + .c.g.f(B1)
(from Z2 = 0 and as zt - N(0, t), E[zi] = E[z2] = 0)
dB 1
- 2 <0
da2
dB 1Going through the same steps for 1p 2, we see that = 0d/e2
Now, considering the sequential case with respect to B 2*, we observe
2
U'(x). [ 2o0.e((t2 -22)+± 2"z1) .( 1 .gl .f (B - e-3B 2) + c.gcl.f (B - e-OB2))
+f .c.gl. f(B - e- B 2) 2o.e-.e(2(2 )+ 2z )
.(wS.g.f (B - e- B 2 ).2 -(r112) - w2. 2 .f(.(B 2)).( + )-(621)
+2.c.gc.fl (B - e-0B 2).2-(r+311))] = 0
(dB2  Uf 2 ) +Cr12 - z1) - 1sign iB2 = sign(20o ((/2 -- 2 Z) + - (W
doe 22 2 2.012
2
+C.gcl. fl(B - e-B 2)) + , 2o.e- 3 .e(2(ff2- 2 )+Oz2).(-1
.gl.f_(B 
- e-B2)
Z2+ 'f
.(Wl.gl.fj (B - e-B 2 ).2 -( ' r+6 1/2) - W 2 .g 2 .1/ .f2(v.(B2 )).(1 - ( 2 1 )
+2.c.gc.fl (B - e -- B 2 ).2-(rc+ l)))
Ssign (dB = sign( 2o0e(- W 2 e2 ) 2 ((B - e 2)
+c.gf(B 
- e-B 2)) - .c.gc.f(B - -B2))
(From Z2 = 0 and as zt - N(O, t), E[zi] = E[z2] = 0)
dB2SGo <0
dB 1Going through the same steps for p2e, we see that = 0 QED.
d p,2
+c.g. fl (B1 )) + 2o.e- .e(2 (42- )+U2z2) (
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B.10 Supplementary: Two Stage Investment
Work Time: Compared to the work time explained in Chapter 4, here the efforts are
spread over two time periods t = 0 and t = 1. Their respective impacts are experienced
in time periods t = 1 and t =2 and are shown in Fig B-1. The explanations for Fig
B-1 follow the same as that for Fig 4-1 in Chapter 4 with some differences for time t
= 2. The effort exerted (budget) for task n is now Bo0 and Bin for time periods t =
1 and t = 2 respectively. The work time observed at t = 1 is as seen in Chapter 4.
Two-step investmnt at t=0. t-=1
[-B \ fn(B + hoBid -f(Bod
2Lr p,- 
- - - -----
>B
Bo, Bon Bo, + B,
t--O t=1 t=2
Figure B-1: Work time changes with offshoring
In the next period t = 2, the learning by repeated doing effects rn and the effects of
doing the other task p_, are observed as in Chapter 4. However the complete effects
of the t = 1 efforts exerted B i, are not observed at t = 2 due to the overlap of some of
these efforts and the effects of learning by doing rn, and learning by doing something
else t-n. The work time is thus w,.g,.2-(r"c+"-).f,(Bon + h,.B 1,), where h, =
h,(P-n, rn) is the overlapping effect. Also 0 < h,(p/_-, rn) _ 1 and dhn(.-n,r')_ < 0
and dhn( " n,rn) < 0, (hn is decreasing in p_, and rn), i.e. with increased learning (by
repeated doing or by doing something else) the effect of the efforts exerted in t = 1
(and hence realized in t = 2) is reduced.
Coordination Time: The coordination time c also changes similar to work time.
Coordination time is the maximum of the time required for coordination among the
participating tasks, i.e. the coordination time of the task which requires more coor-
dination time.
Thus, for t = 1, the coordination time is c.gc. max,(f,(Bon)), where g, is similar
to gn, i.e. the increase in coordination time when both tasks are moved to the GPD
location (we observed this during the course of our empirical example of the previous
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section: the coordination efficiency between two tasks differed when both were co-
located at the GPD location). Similarly, for t = 2, we get the coordination time as
c.gc. max,(2-(rc+"-n).fn(Bon + Bin.h,(A-_n, rn))). We observe from the equations that
the efforts Bon and Bin are being exerted on the tasks n to improve their deliverables
(work and coordination time efficiencies). They help the respective tasks to recognize
their interactions with and dependencies to the other task. This leads to better
coordination and reduction in coordination time.
As shown/discussed above, the effect of the effort exerted at time t = 1 (effect
observed in time period t = 2) does not follow the curve of fn(Bn) due to the in-
terference effects of the learning effects (by repeated doing and by doing something
else).
B.10.1 Supplementary
Here we show how to solve the two stage problem.
Problem Formulation: Following the same steps as in Chapter 4, we now get the
total costs as follows:
x = Bo +e- .(B1 + 12. Wnn.g'fn (BOn) + 2.l 2.(rn -- Wn'.gc.'maX,(fn(Bon)))
+e.(l 2 . wngn.2(rn±I )fn(On Binhn (,Irn))
n
+2.12.(n - 1).Wn.gc. maxn(2-(rr+±-n).f,(Bon + Bln.hn( L-n, r))I)3.10.1)
Our problem formulation is now:
Min x subject to Bo > E Bon; B 1 > E Bin (B.10.2)
n n
Solution: We form the Lagrangean as follows:
L(Bon , Bln, Vo,vi) = x (B.10.3)
+vo.(Bo - E B On ) + v 1 .(Bi - E Bn) for n = 1,2
n n
Continuing, from Chapter 4, with our assumption that there is no interior point
solution (all budget is used), we have B 0 = B 01 + B02; B 1  B 11 + B 12. Also, without
loss of generality, let us assume that:
max(fn(B0 n)) = fl(B 01 )
max(2-(r+-j).f7n(Bon + Bin.hn(P-n, rn))) = 2-(c+2).f 1(B 0 1 + Bl.hi(L2, rl))n
Our analysis shows that using different tasks in different periods for the max
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function does not affect the comparative analysis results though it may change the
solutions shown in the following sections marginally.
We replace the above assumptions in (B.10.1), (B.10.2) and (B.10.3) to obtain
L(Bo0 , B 11) = x' where (B.10.4)
x' = Bo + e-O.(B1 + 12.(w1.gl.f(B1) + w 2.g2 f2 (Bo - B01))
+2.12.(71 - 1).wl.gc.f 1 (Bo 1 ))
+e-2.(2.wl.g-1.2-( 2 (Bol + B 1 1.h1(#2, r1))
+12 .w2 .g2.2 -(r2+1).f 2(Bo - B 01 + (B 1 - B 11).h2(A 1 ,r 2 ))
+2.12.(r1 - 1).wl.gc.2-(rc+2). f (Bo1 + Bll.h 1 (L2 , r1)) B.10.5)
We solve for B 01 and B 11 using the first order conditions a- 0 and a = 0.
We use the second order conditions to obtain the Hessian H = -2L f2 L (a2L )2 L 
As the Hessian H > 0, the solution to the first order equations gives the minima
conditions. The solutions from the first order conditions (similar to Loch & Kavadias
(2002)) are:
fj(Bol + B 11 .h1 (A 2 , r 1 ))
f2(Bo - Bo01 + (B 1 - B 11).h 2 ( 1, r 2 ))
w2-92.2-(r2+'l).h2(A , r2)
wi.h1 (Lt 2, ri). (gi.2-(rl+12) + 2 .gc.(771 - 1).2-(r+P2)
(B.10.6)
and e-O.(gl.2 - (r +A 2)
+2.g-(hl - 1).2-((+ 22). rl))) (Bol + B 11.h1(2, r1))
2gc(- 1)'2-(rc+2)w(1 - h2 ( 1 ,r 2) 1
+(g9 + 2 .gc.(1 - 1)).w 1.f'(B 1) - g2.w2.f2(Bo - B 01) = 0 (B.10.7)
We get a system of two equations in two variables and this can be solved using
numerical methods. Also, this solution is similar to a dynamic program wherein an
input (here effort) at time t=0 has a stochastic output fl(Bol) at time t=1, and
the effort input at time t=1 is based on the observed output at t=1. Solution to
this dynamic program can be obtained by starting from the t=2 conditions given by
(B.10.6) and then proceeding backwards to the t=1 conditions (given by (B.10.7)).
This approach can be extended to n tasks and t time periods (n,t finite) with (B.10.6)
as the t period condition and using (B.10.7) conditions for the earlier periods (similar
to Loch & Kavadias (2002)).
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